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Foreword
The purpose of this volume is to honor the work and thought of Robert C. Rubel, Captain,
U.S. Navy (Ret.). Since his retirement from the Navy, Robert (a.k.a. “Barney”) Rubel
has held senior positions in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), in the Naval
War College, in Newport, Rhode Island—first as deputy dean, then as chairman of the
War Gaming Department, and finally (since 2006) as dean. During this period, not only
has he presided effectively over a complex (and in many ways anomalous) institution,
but he has found the time to create a substantial body of published writings about naval
warfare and war, or strategy generally. In the process, he has quietly established himself
as one of the Navy’s most innovative and wide-ranging thinkers. This volume brings
together a selection of Rubel’s short papers from over the last decade and a half. Many of
these have appeared in the Naval War College Review, but others are scattered and less
accessible. Viewed as a single body of thought (Rubel himself indicates in his introduction that his basic views have not appreciably altered over these years), they gain in
weight from being read and considered together. It is hoped, therefore, that this volume
will provide a basis for a better and more enduring appreciation of Rubel’s contribution
to the intellectual capital of today’s Navy.
Perhaps the key characteristic of Rubel’s writings is their self-conscious return to the
classical naval strategists—especially the American Alfred Thayer Mahan and the
Briton Julian Corbett—as guides to the concerns of military analysts of the present
and near future. While he nowhere directly addresses methodological issues, Rubel
clearly intends to distinguish his own approach from the only too prevalent tendencies
of analysts to follow fads of the moment, to overrate the importance of technology, and
to embark on futuristic speculations detached from political and historical context.
Mahan—though widely regarded as obsolete and today little read, even (or especially)
by naval officers—is particularly valuable for Rubel, in two respects. First, he offers a
sophisticated understanding of the political and economic dimensions of naval strategy. Mahan wrote toward the end of the nineteenth century, in what may be called the
first era of globalization, extending to the outbreak of World War I. Since the end of the
Cold War, we are living in a second age of globalization, and Mahan provides important guidance to reordering naval or maritime strategy in this geoeconomic context
(see especially chapters 5 and 6). Second, Mahan and Corbett are essential in helping
us rediscover concepts that have withered, if not vanished, in American naval strategic thought since the disappearance of a peer naval adversary following World War II.
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The recent emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a formidable challenger to
the United States in the maritime domain makes it imperative, according to Rubel, to
rethink the meaning of command or control of the sea under contemporary geographical and operational conditions (see chapters 3 and 4).
To consider all this an exercise in backward-looking, navalist nostalgia would be to
make a serious mistake. Rubel is careful to give due weight to what is different or unique
in our contemporary strategic environment. Nor can he be accused of any kind of parochial advocacy. A former aviator himself, Rubel is so far from championing the aircraft
carrier as the Navy’s capital ship in the traditional manner that he has been one of the
most influential voices in calling for a rethinking of its core missions and a lessening over time of our reliance on it (see chapters 8 and 9). Indeed, one of his persistent
themes is the continuing problem of the Navy’s community-centrism and the need to
develop a more sophisticated “combined arms” approach to naval operational art and
tactics. Further, he is fully in tune with the need for the Navy to work in harmony with
and support of the other services (chapter 12).
The last eight years have seen major transformations at the Naval War College. Many
of these have involved a strengthening of the institution’s ties with the fleet and the
Navy Staff. Rubel has had a key role in this respect. As he indicates, the high point of
his tenure as dean of CNWS was its support of the development of the document that
was eventually published in 2007 under the signature of the chiefs of the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard, entitled “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”
Since that time, Rubel has been tireless in his explication of this text (see especially
chapters 1 and 2). More clearly than anyone else, he has spelled out its implications not
only for the Navy but for American foreign policy, or grand strategy generally. Though
not without its foreshadowing in Mahan, this vision of global maritime cooperation
between the United States and allied or friendly maritime forces is a radical departure
from the past and one that has already generated significant dividends for the nation.
It can only be hoped that this development—and Rubel’s part in it—will become better
known over time.

carnes lord
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, R.I.
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Introduction
It was my third flight as an operational squadron pilot. Just four days before, I had
reported to Attack Squadron 66 (VA-66) on board USS Independence, which was sailing in the eastern Mediterranean. There was no time to get me trained up before I was
pressed into service on an operational mission. My A-7 Corsair was loaded with live
five-hundred-pound bombs, and the ship was operating in “emission control”—that
is, not radiating any electronic signals. This was because the United States had gone to
Defense Condition Three, owing to the potential for a showdown with the Soviet Union
in the eastern Mediterranean as a result of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War. I was supposed
to be flying on the skipper’s wing this day, being the new guy, but our rendezvous point
was over a hundred miles from Independence. It was a very lonely flight, staying at two
hundred feet above the water until I reached what I thought was that point. My relief
was almost painful as I spotted the skipper’s aircraft. I would not have to decide on my
own whether World War III had started.
Our mission was to “bird-dog” Soviet warships, orbiting overhead and eyeing their
decks, looking for the smoke of a missile launch. If we saw it, we were supposed to get
out a “Zippo” call, a broadcast in the blind that the Soviets were shooting. We were in a
highly vulnerable position, being directly overhead of Soviet destroyers and cruisers, at
a slow loiter speed at ten thousand feet—right in the sweet spot for their surface-to-air
missiles. Had they launched, we would be dead just after we made our Zippo call, if not
before we could make it. This sucked, but the U.S. Navy, in October 1973, had neither
antiship weapons (at least for carrier aircraft) nor antiship tactics. The Yom Kippur
War and the Soviet response to it had caught us by surprise. The Soviet ships were well
armed with antiship cruise missiles, and, we learned after the Cold War, they had a
doctrine for using them. We had our subs, but that was cold comfort to us aviators who
were staring down at Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers.
The crisis blew over, but it was a wake-up call for the Navy. Work began on antiship
missiles (Harpoon and Tomahawk were the eventual products) and on antiship tactics
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for carrier air wings. However, Harpoon and Tomahawk were some years off, and until
they arrived we had to make do with what we had—dumb bombs, Shrike antiradiation
missiles, and some TV-guided bombs left over from Vietnam. Mostly, we had to develop
tactics that would allow us to get close enough to drop iron bombs hardly any different from those of World War II. We came up with a low-level coordinated maneuver, in
which five to seven aircraft split up just after breaking the radar horizon and attempted
to get in close for bomb release within several seconds of each other, coming in from
different angles. The hope was that at least one aircraft would get through and get a hit.
It seemed to me we were going to lose four or five aircraft for each ship we struck—a bad
economic proposition given the number of ships the Soviets would flush to the Med.
Thank God, no more crises flared up.
For the better part of the next two decades I flew off carriers that had been sent storming into crises of various sorts. As luck would have it, in none of them did I get a chance
to fly into actual combat. As a junior aviator, I wondered why the Navy was still so
unready for the situation it had encountered in the eastern Mediterranean in October/
November 1973. I wondered why we botched the hostage-rescue attempt in 1980, and I
wondered why we were not ready to execute theater air warfare in the summer of 1990
(I was by then in command of a Hornet squadron on board USS Eisenhower in the Red
Sea). I also wondered why we kept losing so many aircraft to accidents (I myself lost over
a dozen friends to accidents). All of these questions drove me to read and study. I lobbied to be a student at the Spanish Naval War College and later the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, both times in spite of sage advice from my seniors that
doing so would be career suicide. I figured that if answers were to be found, it would be
in those places.
Over the years of operating off carrier decks and, later, of teaching operations at
Newport, the answers started to emerge; I felt I was getting a grip on why the United
States and its navy operated aircraft carriers in the way they did and why those carriers
were either ready or not ready for the missions they were assigned. In developing these
answers I necessarily had to understand naval strategy writ large and how it supported
or did not support national strategies and interests. The answers I came up with did not
necessarily correspond to either conventional wisdom or that which is found in famous
books on warfare. Eventually I started writing.
The articles in this Newport Paper are a selection of those that I have published (all but
one of them) over the years in various publications. I did not write them to “get published”; I wrote them because I am a true extrovert—I have to talk, or write, in order
to think. I do it in a particular way—I write with pencil on graph paper. This seems to
lubricate the flow of thoughts from my head to the paper, or maybe it’s the other way
around. I’m not sure. In any case, I have a desk drawer with a fat file folder full of the
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handwritten versions of these articles and a lot of others that I have not seen fit to submit for publication. I write, as I say, to think, and if the end result seems sufficiently lucid, I submit it to a journal. I am not a trained academic scholar, nor have I been a naval
officer with an agenda. Nonetheless, as the dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies
at the Naval War College, I have been deeply influenced by the work of my faculty, and a
number of my articles on naval strategy are attempts to “fly high cover” on their ideas—
most of their work being classified.
To paraphrase Vince Lombardi, timing isn’t everything, it’s the only thing. Whatever purposes God has, he has elected to keep me alive when I should have died in an
airplane, and he has repeatedly plunked me down in positions of opportunity in which
I could leverage the answers to the operational and strategic questions I have asked and
answered for myself over the years. The most prominent case was when I was made acting dean of the center, just weeks before Adm. Mike Mullen asked for a new maritime
strategy in 2006. The Naval War College was tasked to support the Navy Staff in developing it, I was put in charge, and in that moment, I knew exactly what to do. I laid out a
program of workshops and games, along with some rules for how the project would be
focused and conducted. Our project produced a set of options for the Navy Staff, who
combined them, along with several key concepts we came up with, into “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” This document was catalytic in creating a
functioning global maritime partnership to ensure that the seas could not be used by
terrorists. As I write this, it is still the national maritime strategy, in effect for the last
six years. The first article in this Newport Paper gives my perspective on the creation
of this document—the capstone of my career in the Navy, both in uniform and as a
civilian.
That I was in that place at that time was a function in part of my decision to commit
myself to the Naval War College. Factoring out the various acts of God and turns of fate,
my ability to serve the Navy from the banks of Narragansett Bay hinged on the good
offices of three people. Capt. Frank Snyder, USN (Ret.), was my first boss at the College.
Director of the Planning and Decision-Making branch of the College’s Joint Military
Operations Department, he introduced me to the world of command and control, and
he did me the decisive favor of directing me to develop a teaching session on campaign
planning. This was in the mid-1980s, when the U.S. Army had just constructed its
operational-level-of-war theory—and the Navy had no inkling of what that meant. I
found a number of answers to my questions as I did research for that session. Frank later
was also decisive in bringing me back to the College after a command tour. He pulled
off that trick by appealing to Rear Adm. Joseph Strasser, then President of the College. Admiral Strasser, the College’s longest-serving president, was to throw his weight
behind keeping me there on several occasions. Finally, Dr. Ken Watman, then chairman

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 00 Rubel-Intro.indd January 28, 2014 2:47 PM

4

the newport papers

of the War Gaming Department (later my predecessor as Dean of Naval Warfare Studies), decided that I would make a good leader of an analytic cell he was building within
his department and hired me as a civilian. In our years of collaboration at the College I
found him to be a highly effective intellectual mentor.
The presence of these men at the College was no accident; the institution attracts people
who like to think. Founded by Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, an archetypal reflective
practitioner, the institution has remained true to his vision for almost 130 years, as a
place where naval officers can come to explore the higher reaches of their profession—
to answer questions they have developed over their years of service. Seen by many as
simply a schoolhouse, the Naval War College is really an incubator of thought. Whereas
the other service colleges perform structural educational functions for their respective
services (Leavenworth produces staff officers, Maxwell turns out airpower advocates),
the Naval War College has no such function beyond rendering the joint-education credentials mandated by Congress. The Navy, in fact, has had at best mixed feelings about
the institution. Receiving little in the way of rudder orders, the College has been free to
structure itself to fulfill Luce’s vision as conditions have changed over successive generations. It continues to constitute the intellectual soil in which the seeds of thought, sown
by reflective naval officers, can germinate.
A key fertilizer (to risk overusing a metaphor) in the College’s intellectual soil is war
gaming. It was introduced at the direction of Luce, and its practice at the College since
then has become almost legendary. It was thus inevitable that I would become deeply
involved in it over my years at the College, as variously a game sponsor, game designer,
game director, game umpire, and game analyst, and ultimately chairman of the War
Gaming Department. As has happened in everything else I have done, participation in
war gaming produced questions in my mind, specifically about how and why it is done.
One of the great advantages of gaming in Newport is that because of the institutional
characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraph, games here can be designed and
played for the right reasons, something much more difficult to achieve elsewhere.
With regard to how it is done, one of the achievements that satisfies me most is the
conversion of the War Gaming Department from a staff culture to a faculty culture.
The civilian war-gaming faculty does not simply conduct games—it professes war
gaming; I too professed war gaming. In doing so one must determine how the discipline or technique can produce valid knowledge. This is the subject of the last chapter
of this collection, and it is perhaps a most fitting tribute to the institution that has
nurtured my intellectual journey.
The chapters lay out the various answers I have developed for myself concerning naval
strategy, naval aviation, joint operations, and war gaming. They are not in chronological order, so the reader will see no progression in thought or in writing style. I do not
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believe I have changed my outlook over the years such that later articles contradict what
I said in earlier ones. In total, though, they represent a window into my brain, extrovert
that I am. I was never satisfied with pat answers or with the authority of famous writers
on military theory. I have always looked for the deeper patterns, the deeper motivations.
I hope that readers use what I write to stimulate a search for their own answers.
This Newport Paper is a benediction of sorts on my naval career, spanning in various
forms forty-eight years. This being the case, I beg the reader’s pardon for taking the
opportunity to offer some recognition and thanks. I will start with someone who, I
am sure, never thought he would see his name in a book introduction, Lt. Lynn “Pipper” Trowbridge. Pipper was not the kind of guy the Navy would consider an example
of an officer and gentleman. When he was my flight lead, I could not join on him fast
enough to catch him without a cigarette in his mouth. Why he never toasted his lungs
in the cockpit I will never know. However, he was a talented attack pilot and fanatically
meticulous about understanding the smallest details of the A-7 weapons system and the
armament it carried. I learned from him the benefits of digging deep for an understanding of how things worked. Another person who deserves recognition is Charlie Cook,
the guy who taught me how to be a landing signal officer—and who was the best one I
ever met. Nobody was cooler on the platform, and I learned from him how to keep my
wits when everything seemed to be going haywire. Sad to say, there were few others I
met in my naval career, other than the three gentlemen mentioned previously, to whom
I could point as positive role models, though I developed great respect for some—such
as now-senator John McCain, who was my commanding officer in VA-174. I would not
choose his leadership methods, but he was the most effective commander I ever met.
The real factor in my success as a naval officer is my wife Donna. On our first date I
picked her up in a Piper Cherokee borrowed from the University of Illinois (she was
attending Eastern Illinois University, fifty miles to the south). The girl got in the
airplane with me, and right then and there I knew she had the right stuff. Decades of
naval service revealed that I had been a good judge of character; she has endured the
separations, the repeated memorial services for fellow aviators, and all the vicissitudes
of Navy life without ever complaining or asking me not to get in an airplane—even on
certain occasions when we both knew pretty well I might not be coming back. She is a
natural leader herself and is actually the best role model I have had. Thanks are simply
not enough. Among her leadership feats is raising our two sons virtually as a single
parent for way too much time. Testimony to her success in this is the fact that both boys
have grown into outstanding fathers and family men whose adaptability in our years of
moving around is now being passed on to their children. If it does not kill you, the Navy
makes you strong.
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I am grateful to Chief Yeoman (and Dr.) Carissa Pokorny-Golden (USNR) for editing
and obtaining the necessary permissions for this work. Finally, I offer my thanks to Dr.
Carnes Lord and Mr. Pelham Boyer for the great gift of this publication. Their management of the Naval War College Press has been magnificent and has made oversight from
the dean’s position both simple and pleasurable.
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CHAPTER ONE

The New Maritime Strategy
The Rest of the Story
The U.S. Navy’s new maritime strategy is contained in a fairly terse ten-page document
that speaks in broad terms about how sea power should be used through the next ten to
fifteen years to defend the nation and its global interests. Soon after its release, analysts,
pundits, and naval officers began to offer criticisms and interpretations. A number of
the articles, blogs, and e-mails demonstrate a clear misunderstanding of the strategy, or
at least a failure to understand what the strategy is meant to do. The author, as the Dean
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, was in charge of the
project to develop maritime strategy options and analyses for the Navy Staff. Without
engaging in a defense of the strategy as written, this article will leverage its author’s
perspective to provide a deeper understanding of the strategy by discussing the findings
that emerged from the workshops and games that produced the options, as well as some
of the background logic that governed our approach to the project. It will also offer
some personal analysis of the strategy’s underlying intent.
It should be emphasized from the outset that the maritime strategy was written by
a combination of officers on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) and some participating civilian academics and contractors. The Naval War College delivered to them a series of options, to
be discussed later, which they used as raw material in the composition of the strategy
document. Throughout the development process, everyone avoided ascribing ideas to
individuals, so that positions would not harden because of “ownership.” Thus, while
no particular person can be pointed out as the strategy’s progenitor, a clear intellectual
audit trail winds through the developmental events, including a war game and workshops, to the published strategy.
In June 2006, during the Secretary of the Navy–sponsored Current Strategy Forum at
Newport, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, called in his
Naval War College Review, Spring 2008, Vol. 61, No. 2
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keystone speech for the development of a new maritime strategy. He called for a strategy
“of and for its time” and enjoined us to “elevate the discussion.” Within two weeks after
this speech, Vice Admiral John Morgan, the Deputy CNO for Strategy and Operations,
visited the College to provide more detailed tasking. He specified that the strategy development process was to be a “competition of ideas” and was to be open and collaborative. These parameters were themselves rather revolutionary in the history of maritime
strategy development, but two even more important pieces of guidance emerged from
our discussions as well. When asked whether the project should be internationalized,
he said yes. When asked if we were really working with a blank sheet of paper, with no
a priori assumptions of fleet size or policy constraints, he said yes. This set of instructions put in train a strategic logic vector that heavily influenced project design and the
nature of the final product.
From the outset, this project would not simply derive from existing strategic guidance, such as the National Security Strategy or the National Defense Strategy. This
may seem somehow subversive to those who are used to military planning processes in
which guidance from higher headquarters is regarded as holy writ. However, consider
our situation—the project was undertaken at the end of the Bush administration and
our requirement was to look ahead twenty years. We could not responsibly make the
assumption that current U.S. security strategy would remain in place, and there was no
adequate way to predict the direction of the next administration’s policies. Our solution was to postulate four different potential strategy vectors of a future administration,
which resulted in having four U.S. teams in a strategic war game we conducted. The
first team represented a “Primacy” strategy, in which the United States would attempt to
maintain its near-hegemonic status in the world. The second team adopted a “Selective
Engagement” posture, in which the United States would focus its efforts on averting
conflict among major powers. The third team played a “Cooperative Security” strategy,
in which the nation committed itself to seeking security through multilateralism and
international institutions. The fourth team represented an “Offshore Balancing” strategy, in which the United States retracted certain security guarantees and caused major
powers to balance each other.
As the project transpired we attempted to find maritime strategy options that would
be valid across two or more of these policy futures. Frankly, freeing ourselves from the
dictates of current policy allowed us to perceive and accept gaming outcomes we might
otherwise have missed. War games tend to “whisper” to you—that is, they produce
subtle results within the context of their play that can be ignored easily, especially if
they are things that defy conventional wisdom or are threatening to the game’s spon1
sors. Our strategic foundations game did indeed provide whispers, and we were able
to hear them.
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One of the things that improved our hearing was an initial workshop in which we
brought together some of the “old hands” who had participated in the development of
2
the 1980s Maritime Strategy (capitalized here to distinguish it from the current effort).
In that workshop, one of the participants asserted that what that strategy had had, and
what had been missing since the end of the Cold War, was context. What he meant was
that the Maritime Strategy told naval officers who they would fight, why, and where, in
addition to how. The “. . . From the Sea” series of white papers issued in the 1990s had
not—they had been more doctrinal in nature. The Navy needed to rediscover context
if its strategy was to be compelling and useful. Another thread of discussion involved
the need to “reglobalize” the Navy. There was no intellectual glue that linked operations
in the Philippine Sea with those in the Persian Gulf or the Caribbean, although most
participants in the workshop, as well as those in a number of different games in recent
years, instinctively felt that what happened in one part of the world had important ripple
effects in other parts. Thus, as we designed and played our strategic game, we were alert
for any indications of what might constitute a new context for maritime strategy and a
basis for global vision.
The Strategic Foundations Game took about six weeks to play and involved the four U.S.
teams, one for each potential policy future, and five “strategic entities,” countries and
nonstate groups selected for detailed play. Teams were directed to develop grand strategies for the next twenty years that would maximize their security, aspirations, and interests. Non-U.S. teams were not required to demonstrate hostility to the United States
unless that made sense in terms of their grand strategies. This represented a departure
from normal gaming, in which worst-case scenarios are the rule. In the open adjudication sessions in which each team proclaimed its strategy, a compelling central thread
emerged. Each state had an intrinsic interest in the effective functioning of the global
system of trade, even such “rogue” actors as Iran and North Korea. Only al-Qa‘ida and
associated groups had endemic hostility to the system. This insight produced the “big
idea” that the protection of the existing global system of trade and security (as opposed
to the process of globalization) provided both the context for the new strategy and the
intellectual glue that tied together all regions of the world. Thus the notion of system
security and defense figures prominently in the maritime strategy document, both “up
front,” in its introduction, and in the description of the maritime strategic concept. This
could not have been more important—even, in its way, more revolutionary. It provided
a basis for not only a maritime strategy but a national grand strategy not aimed against
a particular country or threat but positive, without being aggressive. The strategic
concept upon which the maritime strategy is based—defense of the global system of
commerce and security—offers the opportunity for future administrations to adopt a
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clearly articulated grand strategic defensive posture, with all the political advantages
that brings. As a defensive strategy, it makes global maritime cooperation much easier
to attain.
While the game and workshops had no trouble identifying current and future threats,
except in the case of Islamic extremists, these threats were either nascent or equivocal. Is China a true threat? How about a resurgent Russia? Iran and North Korea, while
clearly potential aggressors, were not existential threats, and at least at this juncture did
not seem poised to attack anyone. Moreover, glimmers of progress in reining in their
aggressive tendencies seemed to exist. Thus it was difficult to pursue traditional threatbased planning convincingly. In developing the strategy, we realized that one of the real
dangers, especially with regard to emerging powers, is that considering them hostile for
planning purposes could be self-fulfilling. Thus we tried not to engage reflexively in
threat-based or capabilities-based planning, techniques that would naturally assume the
breakout of war. Instead, we realized, we had opportunities to disrupt the flow of events
toward war. Accordingly, the new strategy reflects what I call “opportunity based” planning—positioning the maritime services to take positive actions to prevent war, protect
the global system, and create a better peace.
The injunction to elevate the discussion also greatly affected the development process
and the nature of the end product. The Navy has been afflicted in the past few years
with a controversy of sorts over force structure. One camp asserts that there are new
mission sets, such as homeland defense, the Long War, and humanitarian assistance,
that require new kinds of forces. The other camp holds that the Navy should only build
high-end combat forces and that these can be effectively used for less “kinetic” missions.
A solution could not be found if the “dialogue” continued at the level of forces; therefore, the strategy project banned any discussion of force structure. Participants mostly
followed this rule, and the options presented to the project’s executive committee,
consisting of flag-level representatives from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
contained nothing that would provide stimulus or opportunity for those who equate
strategy with force structure to drag the discussion in that direction. As a result, the
staff ing and vetting process forced the “three stars” and “four stars” to respond in kind,
and this appears to have generated both a new level of dialogue in the Navy and a new
strategic consensus. There are many who are frustrated that the new strategy makes no
mention of force structure, but it does seem to provide an overarching logic from which
future force structure could be deduced. At the very least, it is a consensus document
that has to some degree knit the Navy together.
At this nexus of force structure and strategy, it is useful to interpret the strategy in light
of the ideas of the two greatest maritime strategy theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and
Sir Julian Corbett. In a sense, the new strategy is very “Corbettian,” in that it requires
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that control of the seas—at least in the new sense of maritime security and maritime
domain awareness—be exercised day in and day out. Corbett described two traditional
concentration points for the Royal Navy, one near the French island of Ushant off Brittany to control the Channel, and the other in the Downs (a roadstead near Dover) to
guard against invasion threats from the North Sea. These concentration points were
established because Britain’s proximity to them afforded little geographic strategic
depth. However, fleets concentrated there could disperse for “systemic” sea-control du3
ties, being always ready to regroup if a major threat developed near home. Similarly, the
new maritime strategy prescribes two concentration points, one in the Arabian Gulf and
the other in northeast Asia, where important economic elements of the global system
4
are near potentially aggressive states. Per current U.S. Navy practice, these “combat
credible” forces will “starburst,” or disperse, for engagement purposes but can regroup
quickly in case of need. Corbett said that commercial shipping elsewhere could be
protected by cruisers and the “flotilla”—smaller ships that could deal with most threats
short of first-class forces—types not normally encountered in the far-flung reaches of
the empire. The analog today is the “thousand-ship navy,” the loose network of navies
cooperating for maritime security. The U.S. part of that flotilla will be those units assigned to Global Fleet Stations and other, more ad hoc deployments to catalyze greater
levels of cooperation. The key word is catalyze. We would not build a fleet of patrol craft
to do other nations’ jobs for them. We would dispatch ships and other kinds of forces
that would help other navies and coast guards adopt congruent strategies and provide
them with the training and perhaps equipment to implement them. The exact types and
numbers of forces required are not self-evident and need to be the subject of analysis
and gaming.
The notion of two deployment hubs where strong naval forces are concentrated follows
the logic of system defense. Just as Corbett acknowledged the necessity for concentration points in the home islands due to their proximity to threats emanating from
Europe—that is, a lack of strategic depth—so too does this maritime strategy prescribe
fleet concentrations in areas where there is little geographic space in which to absorb
an attack. The oil fields of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are uncomfortably near Iran;
Seoul is within artillery range of North Korea; and Taiwan is only a narrow strait away
from the power of the People’s Liberation Army. Certainly the oil fields of the Persian
Gulf and the productive capacity of South Korea and Japan are key organs of the global
system and must be protected. If deterrence fails, we must be ready and able to defend
these areas. Again, the exact type and nature of forces needed to do this is not selfevident, especially since rapid technological development overseas has significantly
morphed the kinds of sea-denial threats we will face. They must, however, be the most
robust type of high-end combat forces.
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The strategy has its Mahanian aspects too. One aspect of Mahan’s writing that is widely
ignored or misunderstood is his focus on deterrence. Mahan’s world was characterized
by the existence of great powers overseas that had navies capable of conducting operations in the Western Hemisphere. Mahan worried about the defense of the soon-to-beopened Panama Canal and about other European adventurism in Latin America. His
prescription for a strong battle fleet and its deployment was based as much on deterring
outside intervention in the Americas as it was on protecting American interests over5
seas. This notion of deterring a range of major powers through a strong, high-end fleet
is an intrinsic part of the new strategy. Moreover, Mahan’s prescription for a consortium
of cooperating navies belonging to like-minded powers has a strong echo in the new
strategy. In Mahan’s era, Britain was the preeminent naval power, but there were others
on the rise, including Germany, Japan, and the United States. Mahan could see that even
the Royal Navy might not be able to police the world in an era where capital ships were
becoming ever more expensive and any single nation might not be able to keep the seas
free around the world. Thus he proposed that the navies of several nations act in concert
(not necessarily in alliance) to make sure regional powers could not close off large parts
6
of the ocean to trade. Today, even though the United States enjoys a measure of naval
relative advantage Mahan could not have dreamed of, the world is still too big for a
single navy to act as sheriff of the seas. Therefore, the new maritime strategy advocates
a consortium of navies and coast guards working together to assure maritime security,
the new manifestation of sea control.
The strategy also implies a return by the U.S. Marine Corps to its expeditionary roots.
The global distribution of forces for catalyzing cooperative relationships, preventing or
containing local disruptions before they impact the global system, and for rendering
various kinds of assistance is a recipe for the kind of flexible maritime maneuver for
which the Marines are famous.
Prevention of war is a naturally deduced mission from the concept of system protection.
Throughout history, nothing has been more disruptive to the free movement of global
trade than war among the major powers. Niall Ferguson in his The War of the World
makes the case that the world was globalizing in the decades leading up to World War
I. It was a world of multiple great powers that enjoyed unprecedented levels of prosperity but that was also infected by nonstate actors with various agendas. This world slid
into a ruinous global war whose consequences afflicted it for more than seventy-five
7
years. One can make the case that, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the world is
just now getting back to globalizing in the way it was before the Great War tore it apart.
Mark Twain famously said that history does not repeat itself but rhymes. Thus, in this
globalizing world that is populated by one big navy and a number of growing ones, an
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implicit aim of the new maritime strategy is to help prevent a future slide into global
catastrophe such as that of 1914.
There was another element of thought that attended the design of the strategy development process. The focus on grand strategy had not only to do with elevating the discussion in order to untangle force-structure controversies. More broadly, there was a feeling
among several researchers in key positions that since the Cold War the United States
had lacked a concept around which a coherent national grand strategy could coalesce.
In the author’s personal view, the concept of containment that had guided American
policy and strategy throughout the Cold War had not been replaced with anything of
similar geostrategic rationality. Most importantly, because the global conceptual glue
mentioned earlier has been missing, American policy and strategy have tended to view
the world as a collection of regions, each of which can be approached as an independent
entity. The result has been that the United States, through successive administrations,
has backed its way into a de facto Eurasian continentalist grand strategy, in which it
has committed vast resources to projects of the kind one would expect to see from a
major Eurasian land power attempting to establish buffer zones, almost as if California
butted up against Iran. These projects included the enlargement of NATO to the east,
the “‘Stans’ project” to secure bases and influence in the heart of Eurasia, establishment
of ballistic missile defenses in Poland, and the invasion of Iraq. The danger of this rather
ad hoc and inadvertent grand strategic vector is that it is leading to strategic overextension. There has been no compelling alternate vision or concept to deflect its thrust. The
new maritime strategy does not, in and of itself, constitute that alternate vision, but our
goal in helping formulate it was to find the kernel of an idea that could translate into a
global concept that does not require the United States to intervene everywhere it sees
trouble and that provides criteria upon which the advisability of potential projects could
be judged. Neither the Weinberger nor Powell doctrine possesses suitable breadth of
8
vision to serve in this role.
It should be said at this point that the strategic logic expressed above was not meant to
be a recipe for disengagement. “Offshore Balancing” was indeed one of the four U.S.
policy futures examined, but in the end nobody thought that the United States should
retreat from its strategic alliances or from its forward engagement, and especially not
from the forward-deployed posture of its forces. Rather, it is meant to be an injunction
to look at the world as a whole. At the global level, because the world is 70 percent water,
grand strategy necessarily takes on a maritime flavor. Moreover, Eurasia is just one land
mass; there are others. The United States is about to establish Africa Command. Africa
is second only to Eurasia in size, and if Eurasia can absorb all the strategic resources
of a powerful nation, then Eurasia, Africa, South America, and North America can
overwhelm any power that seeks to use land superiority to assure its security. Leverage
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must be sought, maneuver on a global scale made possible, and criteria for investment
and risk established. Only a global, and therefore maritime, grand strategic concept can
provide the needed perspective and guidance. Thus it was from hopes of at least initiating a new dialogue on national grand strategy that the maritime strategy development
process took its cue.
As it turned out, the Strategic Foundations Game and the several workshops did not
produce the maritime strategy options in a straightforward way. Naval War College
researchers were left with a considerable body of data, but the planned events produced
no clear definition of options. Thus they set about trying to deduce strategy options
from the four policy futures. This work produced five options. The first, called “Winning Combat Power Forward,” was derived from the Primacy policy future and called
for strong, war-winning forces to be deployed in the northern Arabian Sea and in
northeast Asia. The underpinning assumption was that since deterrence could not
be relied upon and sufficient strategic depth in these areas was lacking, strong forces
must be positioned where they would be needed. The second option was based on the
Offshore Balancing policy future and called for U.S. naval forces to be forward deployed
only in the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Navy would remain in home waters, in a “surge”
status. Monetary savings of this posture would be used to increase force structure or to
transform the Navy. The third option called for a focus on securing the global commons
as a key element in the health of the global system. This option seemed to have relevance
across most of the policy futures. The fourth option, one that came “over the transom”
from outside the College, called for high-end forces to combat anti-access capabilities
in northeast Asia and low-end forces for the Long War and engagement elsewhere. The
final option, another one that came in from an outside source, was an outgrowth of the
Selective Engagement policy future and called for raising war prevention to the same
level of importance as war winning. Prevention was to be achieved through a combination of deterrence through strength and widespread engagement to reduce the causes of
discontent, resource competition, and failed governance that could spawn wars.
These five options were offered to the Executive Committee. These were quickly winnowed down to three: war-winning power forward, securing the global commons, and
war prevention. These three were carried forward for staffing and, eventually, were all
combined into a single strategy—the one that has been published.
In looking at the completed document, an important aspect to note about the strategy is
that it is meant to operate continuously. In this respect it is very different from contingent warfighting strategies of the past that would only be invoked in case of war. It is
also different from the doctrinal strategy contained in the “. . . From the Sea” white papers. This strategy is meant to prevent wars and ensure a better peace by deploying and
operating forces in a systemic fashion. Some have termed it a policy, not a strategy, and
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that may be true, but in my view it constitutes a way of achieving strategic ends, which
makes it a true strategy.
Another way to assess strategies is to consider how they use force to achieve their goals.
Some are meant to achieve definitive checkmates of an enemy, either through brute
force or maneuver. Others are coercive, posing threats or imposing destruction in order
to extract concessions. This strategy is catalytic; its aim is to get our maritime services,
our future administrations, and indeed all governments and navies of the world thinking in terms of cooperating to protect the global system.
The new strategy was announced in October 2007, and already there has been considerable analysis and critique. In reviewing the articles and blogs on the strategy, I have
observed two principal criticisms or objections to it. The first is that it does not identify
specific threats. A number of commentators feel that the strategy should have specifically mentioned China, Iran, and North Korea, at a minimum, as threats that need to
be countered. My answer to this is that if the strategy’s purpose is to prevent war among
major powers and generate the widest possible maritime cooperation, why create hostility by singling out specific countries as threats? That is especially the case with China,
with which we have a deeply interdependent economic relationship and which is working hard on conducting a “peaceful rise” foreign policy. It turns out that the strategy is
getting some favorable reviews from the Chinese, which seems to me to be a small step
forward that would not have taken place had we listed that nation as a threat. As the
UNESCO preamble says: “Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defenses of peace must be erected.” To this end the Naval War College has
already started implementing the strategy, by hosting a workshop with the Chinese navy
on cooperation and avoidance of incidents. I think that remarks made concerning naval
cooperation between the United States and China by a Chinese scholar in attendance at
the workshop bear repeating here: “Thus, cooperation on noncompetitive issues may lay
the interactive and cognitive basis for further joint efforts to mitigate the consequences
of maritime and naval competition.”
Another criticism is that the strategy does not prescribe force structure. As I already
mentioned, the controversy over force structure that exists in the Navy cannot be solved
by simply declaring a particular fleet size or composition in the strategy. For starters,
such a strategy would have never survived the staffing process. By focusing on global
strategic issues and ways, the strategy provides a basis for evaluating the utility of future
force-structure proposals and avoids “taking sides.”
No strategy document of ten pages can adequately explain the complex think ing that
spawned it. It is clear to those who worked on developing the document that it can
be easily misinterpreted, which is the price for being concise. It is also the price of
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producing a consensus document based on a highly collaborative development process.
But we hope that separate explanations, such as this one, can help people better interpret
what the maritime strategy document is really saying.
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CHAPTER TWO

The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm
The recently issued Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower reflects an institutional response to America’s changed strategic circumstances and embodies a logic that
1
suggests a significant change to the Navy’s force structure paradigm. However, because
the document is broadly worded, the service still has a lot of work to do to achieve an
internal consensus on the implications of this logic for its future force structure. There
is considerable intellectual “churn” associated with this shift, and the Navy has yet to
come fully to grips with its implications for force structure. This article will attempt to
describe the broad out lines of the paradigm shift and assess some of the programmatic
implications, including the need for additional numbers of general-purpose surface
combatants.
A naval force paradigm is a theory of how various types of ships and weapons available
to a navy should be organized for warfare. The paradigm is governed by the characteristics of the principal naval weapons of the day and by the maritime strategy a nation
pursues. In this nation’s early days, the principal weapon was the naval cannon, which
could hurl a twenty-four-pound shot about half a mile with effectiveness. The strategy of early administrations not to be drawn into European wars, coupled with their
determination to protect American merchant shipping, produced a force paradigm of
a small fleet of highly capable frigates, operating independently or in small squadrons.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, as the United States elected to widen its strategic
perspective and become a player on the world stage, its force paradigm shifted to a
battleship-centric fleet, reflecting the governing weapon of the day, the large-caliber
naval gun. With the advent of the airplane and the impetus of the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, the battle-line paradigm shifted to one of circular formations centered on fast aircraft carriers. In all of these paradigms there was a central ship type
that supported the principal weapon. Other ship types supported the central type or
performed such collateral, systemic duties as convoy escort, amphibious operations,
Naval War College, Spring 2009, Vol. 62, No. 2
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or minesweeping. As the Navy built budgets for submission to Congress, each type of
ship, as well as its characteristics and numbers, could be justified based on its role in the
existing force paradigm.
Of late, the Navy has come under fire from Congress and various pundits and think
tanks for its inability to provide adequate justification for the proposed “DDG-1000”
advanced destroyer, as well as for its decision to cut production of that type to three
ships. Much blame is laid at the feet of current Navy leadership, especially as this issue
is regarded as symptomatic of a larger problem with the service’s shipbuilding plans.
The call for a 313-ship navy by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary
Roughead, is regarded in some quarters as unaffordable and in others as based upon a
number, be it too high or too low, that is supported by insufficient analysis. Part of the
Navy’s current difficulty with programmatics may indeed be institutional and procedural, consisting, in various degrees, of failures in concept development, cost estimation, and program management. However, the perceived credibility problem also stems
from the fact that the Navy is in the initial stages of a fundamental naval force paradigm shift, one with implications for force structure that are not unlike the shift from a
battleship-centric force to an aircraft carrier–centric force. Today, the increasing effectiveness of antiship missiles, along with the increasing lethality of antiaircraft defenses,
is about to make necessary a shift from a force centered on “big deck” aviation platforms
to one that is more distributed and oriented around missile-firing platforms—most
prominently, submarines and surface combatants. In the process, the Navy will shift
from a force paradigm it adopted in 1942 and has employed in a refined version since
the end of the Cold War.
The “. . . From the Sea” Era
In September 1992 the Navy issued “. . . From the Sea,” a white paper that responded
to the radical alteration in global strategic conditions caused by the collapse of the
2
Soviet Union. With its only competition on the high seas gone, the U.S. Navy faced the
prospect of losing its justification for being. As Samuel Huntington pointed out in 1954,
a military service requires a viable strategic concept in order to generate the public sup3
port needed to secure funding for it. “. . . From the Sea” represented that new concept:
the Navy and Marine Corps would focus on projecting power ashore in support of joint
operations. In a post–Soviet navy era, the United States was left as sovereign of the seas,
and its navy, as the white paper asserted, “can afford to deemphasize some ef forts in
4
some naval warfare areas.”
The area that was deemphasized was sea control. Gradually, over the course of the
next fifteen years, the Navy structured itself in alignment with the logic embedded
5
in “ . . . From the Sea” and its two successors. However, this realignment was rather
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easy, as the forces in existence at that time, especially the Navy’s aircraft carrier and
amphibious forces, were, by and large, suitable for the execution of joint warfare in an
uncontested littoral. The force drawdown of the 1990s consisted mostly of disposing of
various classes of sea control–focused surface combatants; the force settled upon a set of
carrier strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), oriented around
big-deck aviation platforms. The transition was made all the easier because the Navy’s
dominant community at the time, carrier-based aviation, remained at the center of the
new paradigm.
During the succeeding fifteen years, nearly to the present, the Navy could concentrate
geographically as well as functionally. Deployments gradually narrowed to two focal
areas, the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, where “rogue states” might commit conventional aggression against U.S. allies. The lack of serious naval threat and the emergence
of precision-strike munitions in time allowed the Navy and Marine Corps to establish
the idea of a “sea base” (a concept that has since been raised to a quasi-paradigm status),
whereby American operations ashore in hostile or undeveloped areas would be supported from the sea, without the need for much infrastructure on land. Perhaps the
apotheosis of this concept was Operation Enduring Freedom, whose initial phase
was supported almost entirely by a naval task force some seven hundred miles from the
landlocked scene of operations in Afghanistan. Starting in the late 1990s, advocates of
network-centric warfare (NCW) added momentum to the Navy’s littoral focus by claims
that dispersed, networked forces could generate higher levels of combat effectiveness
with smaller, cheaper platforms. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, a key oracle of
NCW, promoted “Streetfighter,” a small, fast, networked ship that eventually emerged as
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This was only part of the transformation. DDG-1000,
starting life conceptually as an “arsenal ship,” was to be a survivable platform, mounting
a high-tech gun, that would provide significant naval gunfire support to forces deep inland. As “The Navy Operational Concept: Forward . . . From the Sea” said in 1997: “We
will be able to deliver a large volume of firepower through new ways of achieving very
6
high aircraft sortie rates and new weapons and platforms for delivering joint fires.”
However, even as the Navy adopted this new force paradigm and aligned itself institutionally to focus on joint warfare in the littorals, factors were emerging—technological, economic, and political—that would eventually force it to reconsider. Among the
factors most relevant for the present discussion were the progressive development and
proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, potentially including antiship capability; the ability of American cruisers and destroyers to conduct midcourse intercept of
some kinds of ballistic missiles; the emergence of China as an economic power and
its construction of a capable navy; the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and their downstream
effects; and the resurgence of an economically viable and potentially hostile Russia. As
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these factors progressively manifested themselves, Navy admirals became increasingly
uncomfortable with their service’s institutional vector. This discomfort culminated
in 2006 with then-CNO Michael Mullen’s call for the development of a new maritime
strategy. When it appeared in October 2007, the new strategy, while perhaps overly terse
and virtually silent on the particulars of force design, contained a new logic that ran
counter to the force paradigm set by the “. . . From the Sea” series of white papers.
The new strategy calls for “combat credible” forces (to be concentrated in Northeast
Asia and the Persian Gulf regions), “globally distributed, mission-tailored forces,” and
a global maritime-security network—all welded together to prevent or limit regional
conflict, render disaster relief, and provide other services necessary to foster and defend
commerce and security. Viewed in the context of emerging blue-water navies, terrorists bent on smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States and allied
nations, increasing exploitation of ocean resources, and interregional ballistic-missile
threats, this new strategy strongly suggests a navy very unlike the one that has emerged
since the Cold War.
A New Force Paradigm
It is, therefore, as a result of a changed strategic environment and a new but broadly
worded strategy that the Navy is now attempting to accommodate a fundamental forceparadigm shift. In the past, years and much experimentation with ship types have been
required to make the transition. There have been blind alleys. Whether battle cruisers
or small aircraft carriers, these blind alleys were functions of conceptual uncertainty as
to what the new governing weapon would be. That same uncertainty exists today; the
Navy is struggling to find ways to make its current force more secure against missile
and submarine attacks while at the same time its analyses are finding that a different
approach may be necessary. In order to make sense of what is occurring and to develop a
level of institutional confidence in its new direction, the Navy has reinstituted “Title X”
war gaming, an arena it abandoned in 2001, and has developed a new strategic planning
7
process meant to provide guidance to programmatic processes.
As has been the case for the past 120-plus years, the service has turned to its war college to help think through the problem. Studies conducted at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island, over the past few years have concluded that the combination of
emergent weapons technology, political realignments, and economic trends points to a
fleet that should possess different characteristics from the one in the water today—different even from some planned designs, like DDG-1000. These studies suggest that Navy
forces should adopt a different style of war fighting, one that is more dispersed and
flowing, not oriented to defensive bastions around sea bases of CSGs or ESGs. Moreover,
the access-denial problem is fundamentally different in the Persian Gulf from what it is
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in Northeast Asia, suggesting that the Navy should tailor its force by region and mission
area. Further, studies suggest, the Navy does not necessarily need to design every ship
for integration into a battle group. These findings are based, in some cases, on more
than five years of continuous, iterative, and highly detailed war gaming, but even so
they are still preliminary and must be subjected to additional gaming and analysis.
One kind of force paradigm that can be inferred from the results of these studies is a
navy that consists of four principal segments. The first segment, an “access generation”
force, would focus on employing missiles. The targets for these missiles would principally be opposing access-denial forces, whether ships, submarines, aircraft, or ballisticmissile sites on the shore. Given the difficulty of defending against modern missiles, this
force would adopt a highly dispersed and covert posture in order to prevent the enemy
from targeting it and to maintain combat credibility even in the most difficult crisis and
brink-of-war situations. The exact constitution and operational doctrine of this force
would be different in Northeast Asia from what it would in the Persian Gulf, due to the
fundamentally different natures of the opposing forces and the maritime terrains. Generally speaking, this force would be centered on submarines, especially the converted
Ohio-class SSGNs (formerly SSBNs) and surface ships such as the Arleigh Burke (DDG
51) class of guided-missile destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship. The key will be generating targeting data for the missiles these platforms carry, but that is a better combat
problem to have to solve than the defense of a carrier battle group.
Currently, the Navy relies on carrier-based strike fighter aircraft to perform the bulk
of its sea-control and power-projection missions. The Chinese and others understand
this and are working on ways to neutralize U.S. carriers and their embarked tactical
aviation. To date, the Navy’s response has been to focus on developing better defenses
for carriers against submarines and cruise missiles. Such an approach, while logical and
understandable, has always been problematic. History has shown that tactical defense is
the most disadvantageous type of sea fight. If the Chinese are able to perfect an antiship
ballistic missile, the problem could get worse. One solution is to disperse striking power
among greater numbers of platforms that are hard to find and hit. The SSGN, with its
ability to house 155 strike missiles, is a promising candidate. A strategy employing a
“grid” populated with DDGs, submarines, and LCSs and using advanced missiles for
both sea control and land attack might negate and neutralize investments in carrierkilling systems. Such an approach would make an overall naval operation more robust,
as there would be no key ship type, the loss of one or two of which would unhinge the
overall operation. Such an approach would also increase opportunities for deception,
instilling doubt in the minds of potential opponents. This would be especially valuable in crisis situations. Concentrated and vulnerable naval forces can quickly turn
into political liabilities, removing instead of adding to options. A hard-to-target force
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packing lethal missiles would be much more likely to provide the necessary deterrence
and influence.
The second force segment would be the “power projection” force, which would look
much like what the Navy has today: CSGs and ESGs centered on big-deck aviation
ships. However, instead of being the ubiquitous arbiter of naval power they are today,
they would become a specialized role-playing force, not unlike the U.S. Seventh Fleet in
World War II, which in effect constituted General Douglas MacArthur’s “sea base” in
his campaign up the Solomons and New Guinea toward the Philippines. That force was
capable of anything but confronting the main Japanese fleet. The new power-projection
force would generally operate in permissive environments but could support the accessgeneration force in certain instances.
The third force segment would be the “maritime security” force. Frequently supported
by elements of the first two segments, this force would have specialized units conduct
patrols for terrorists and criminals and help to catalyze a global maritime security partnership through extensive engagement. Other units, such as hospital ships, high-speed
vessels, and others, would conduct systematic operations to establish a stable political
and economic environment throughout the oceans and in the littorals. A recent Global
War Game at the Naval War College that involved international naval officers as players
revealed that our potential partner navies, especially those in Africa, regard any kind
of grey-hulled ship as threatening. Therefore, new (and cheaper) types of vessels should
be considered for global maritime partnership missions. Another insight gained from
that game was that a broad cross section of international navies consider their principal mission to be law enforcement. This might seem a U.S. Coast Guard function,
but because of severe limitations on the Coast Guard’s size and because these partner
services are navies as such, with defense missions in addition to law enforcement responsibilities, the U.S. Navy will have to find ways to engage in this arena. Therefore,
this force segment is as much characterized by the sailors who man it as by the nature
of its platforms.
The fourth force segment would be the series of maritime operations centers (MOCs)
that is now being established around the world. These centers represent a force element
in themselves, not simply command-and-control “overhead” for afloat forces; they will
carry out various kinds of information operations that are critical to maritime security,
power projection, and the screening of access-generation forces. In today’s networked
and media-saturated world, information is a weapon, much more than it was in the past.
Obtaining and denying information are central operational capabilities, as is the ability
to process and assess the meaning and significance of the avalanche of information
available to naval forces. It is no longer sufficient for naval staffs to generate plans and
issue orders; they must function as information clearinghouses and as operational units
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in their own rights. As an indication of this changing warfare environment, the Navy is
contemplating embedding task force commanders within the MOC and standardizing
its task force structure on a global basis to make networked and interconnected staff
operations more coherent. Another indication is the establishment of a maritime staff
operators’ course to train the personnel who will operate the MOCs.
Calculating Force Size
Traditionally, the overall size of the Navy has been determined principally by calculating the forces needed to fight the major theater wars that could most likely occur (Iraq,
Iran, Korea, etc.), with some additional forces for “presence.” Multipliers for maintenance and training cycles were added to arrive at the total force. However, this force is
focused on the Middle East and East Asia. Its ability to generate engagement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as well as ballistic-missile defense in other areas is
marginal. However, the new maritime strategy is supposed to provide for the defense of
global commerce and security on a continuous basis. Therefore, force-size calculations
must now shift to a different basis. Some writers have discussed “high/low” mixes and
dif ferent “modes.” Under the new force paradigm, some traditional ship types, such as
amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, will be employed at various times in operations
undertaken by the access-generation and maritime-security elements. Thus it is neither
accurate nor useful to talk about high- and low-end operations. The real question in
terms of programmatics under the new paradigm will be how much capacity is needed
in each element of the force. To use an old paradigm as an easy example, the Navy
would not have wanted to overspend on battleships if it was to be able to buy enough
cruisers and destroyers necessary for screening the battleships, let alone the logistic
forces necessary for the fleet’s successful forward operation. Moreover, there would have
been a point of diminishing returns at which the incremental naval power generated
by the next new battleship would not be worth its marginal cost. In this new paradigm,
a careful calculation must be made of how much access-generation, power-projection,
missile-defense, engagement, and disaster-relief capacity is needed worldwide. Clearly,
the traditional major combat scenarios (major combat operations, or MCOs) will figure
in the calculation of access-generation forces, but the Navy will have to establish a
defendable criterion for force sizing outside this framework if the new force paradigm is
to be achieved.
The new maritime strategy contains potentially useful logic for capacity calculations,
even if that logic is as much implicit as articulated. The fundamental premise is that
defense of the global system under current strategic conditions depends more than
ever on the collective and cooperative action of nations and their navies. In order to
catalyze and capitalize on this cooperation, the Navy must have at its disposal certain
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capabilities—such as ballistic-missile defense, disaster relief, and partner capacity
building—in all regions of the world. Each region’s exact requirements would be a bit
different from those of the others, but the steady-state peacetime defense scenario in
each would be treated like an MCO for force planning purposes. If we assume that a
transformed access-generation force will require fewer power-projection capabilities for
MCO purposes, trade-offs can be made that would shape the force without much, if any,
total growth in the overall tonnage, or at least overall cost, of the U.S. Navy.
To some this may sound like the Navy would be blunting its sword, but in an age of
antiship missiles and advanced surface-to-air missiles, its current principal ship type,
the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, and its principal weapon, the tactical strike fighter, may
not constitute as sharp an edge as they used to. The cost of keeping this ship type viable
as an access-generation tool is probably all out of proportion to investments by others in
threatening it. Recognizing the shift to the missile age is as difficult today for some officers as many officers in the 1930s found it to recognize that the airplane had superseded
the large-caliber gun. But the last thing the Navy or the nation needs is a naval defeat
like Pearl Harbor or the sinking of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales in 1941 to bring
home the lesson that times have changed.
The Centrality of DDG 51
One potential connecting link among the elements of the new force paradigm is the
guided-missile destroyer. There are a number of reasons why the future Navy should be
populated with a relatively large number of these warships. First, neutralizing ballistic
missiles, whether they are aimed at shore or sea targets, is a critical function worldwide.
This notion is supported by increasing Navy component commanders’ calls for the
stationing of ships with this capability in areas outside normal naval-presence hubs.
Since sea-based ballistic-missile defense is a proven capability, the Navy should procure
enough ships that can do it, not only to defend and support CSGs and ESGs but also
to establish a viable ballistic-missile defense posture in virtually every region of the
world. The key is to have enough of them to provide theater commanders flexibility in
responding to emergent situations, including timeliness of response. For various tactical
and technical reasons, they should operate in this role in pairs. Arleigh Burke guidedmissile destroyers are also useful for signaling and other forms of naval diplomacy, as
recently illustrated by the dispatch of USS McFaul (DDG 74) to deliver humanitarian
supplies to Georgia. The logic of the move, as delineated by a Stratfor.com analyst,
reveals the utility of the ship type:
It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians.
The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to the
south. That the ship was a destroyer is important. It demonstrates that the Americans have a force
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available that is inherently superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S. Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.
While it was a warship, however, it was only a destroyer—so it is a gesture, but not a threat.

8

One of the key aspects of U.S. maritime strategy since the end of the Second World War
has been the maintenance of naval forces forward, so as to keep them available to support American interests quickly. Timeliness of response has been a factor in a number
of situations, ranging from the invasion of South Korea by the North in 1950 to the arrival of aircraft carriers in the Red Sea and the northern Arabian Sea in response to the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Significant lag times in arrival of naval forces can lead
9
potential aggressors to think in terms of a “window of opportunity.” There is evidence
that in 1982 the Argentine junta made its final decision for invasion of the Falklands on
the basis of a report that the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror had just been
dispatched from the Mediterranean to the South Atlantic. Once it arrived, the junta
felt, nothing would be possible; therefore, it calculated, the interval between the ship’s
departure and its estimated arrival on the scene represented a window of opportunity,
10
one that could not be wasted. This logic suggests that U.S. naval forces be positioned
such that no potential aggressor can perceive an operationally useful interim before they
can be on station. This kind of responsiveness defines the necessary capacity—that is,
the numbers of ships—the Navy should possess. Given the ship-by-ship superiority of
U.S. Navy forces over their potential opponents, be they sea or shore based, the United
States does not need to dispatch a fleet or battle group; in many cases a small, tailored
squadron, even a single DDG 51, would suffice.
In today’s world, inherently peaceful operations like humanitarian assistance may be
threatened by cruise missiles. The fact that Hezbollah was able to surprise and hit an Israeli patrol boat with an Iranian-provided C802 coastal-defense cruise missile should be
a warning flare to all nations with navies that such weapons can be obtained by nonstate
actors and secretly positioned almost anywhere. Thus, nonmilitary or auxiliary ships
sent for peace operations may require missile-defense escorts, at least until the security
of the operations area can be assured.
Assuming that the capabilities of DDGs would be useful enough in every region for theater commanders to want at least two continuously available, and also that most cruisers
would be assigned to group defense, a minimum of seventy-five DDGs would be needed
for battle-group support, ballistic-missile defense, and independent missions. The Navy
has programmed sixty-two; a force growth of thirteen would be feasible. However, the
total number needed may grow even more if the Navy adopts the new force paradigm
outlined above in order to overcome the increasingly formidable antiaccess force the
Chinese are building.
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The general tone of thinking laid out in this article has, in part, I believe, caused senior
Navy officers to revise their positions on DDG-1000 and the DDG 51 class. This sea
change in the Navy indicates the early stages of a paradigm shift away from a force
centered on big-deck aviation platforms. Although assault ships (LHDs) and nuclearpowered aircraft carriers (CVNs) will continue to constitute a critical power-projection
capability for the United States into the foreseeable future, the Navy will increasingly
shift to dispersed but integrated surface and subsurface operations to constitute the
credible combat power required by its new maritime strategy.
CNO has justified DDG-1000 as a technology demonstrator, and this corresponds well
with the decision to build only three of them. Despite the current advantages of Arleigh
Burke in system configuration and cost, and its projected utility, it is still a gas-turbinepowered destroyer that employs chemical-based weapons. As the technologies of rail
guns, electromagnetic-discharge defenses, and electric drive develop, there will come
a time when a new class of vessel is needed to take full advantage of them. DDG-1000s
will provide the Navy and defense industry with valuable education in how to take some
of these technologies to sea. In the meantime, the Burke class and the LCS will help
make the paradigm shift for the U.S. Navy.
Fighting for Information
The new naval force paradigm will also feature a doctrine of fighting first for information. Not only must it be able to overcome opposition to get information (that
is, to conduct “opposed ISR”),* but it must be able to fight to deny information to the
enemy. Future sea fights for information will not be localized (the Chinese doctrine of
“localized and limited wars under informatized conditions” holds that although the direct combat space of wars will be limited, the “related war space” will be expanded), and
11
they will begin well before any overt outbreak of traditional hostilities. The protective
covertness that surface fleets have traditionally enjoyed is being threatened by new combinational arrays of ISR technologies including satellites, unmanned systems, over-thehorizon radars, the Internet, etc. The reach of these systems and networks will be global,
so the information fight will be global, even if the “kinetic arena” is geographically
constrained. An indicator that the Navy is starting to understand this can be seen in its
initiative, mentioned above, to establish a network of interconnected maritime operations centers that will be capable of coordinating the information fight on a global scale.
Under the new force paradigm, the MOCs will be a “screen” for naval forces. Given the
immense advantages in range and endurance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it is
quite possible that aircraft carriers also will be part of the protective screen for distributed surface and subsurface forces, launching from safe distances arrays of UAVs that
* ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 02 Ch2ChangingForce.indd December 2, 2013 9:57 AM

writing to think

29

will scout, relay, deceive, and even strike to help the subsurface and surface grid deliver
its killing missile power.
The information fight will affect all three elements of the new naval force. Beyond its
effects on the access-generation force as just discussed, the information fight is central
to global maritime security. Maritime forces around the globe, from all nations, must
have information on what and who is out there—on, over, and under the seas—in order
to prevent terrorism, drug running, human traf ficking, and poaching. Although current
efforts are encountering political obstacles, eventually a global maritime picture will
emerge. Here again, the centrality of the Navy maritime operations centers becomes
evident as they become clearinghouses for maritime situational awareness. When functioning as staffs for joint force maritime component commanders, the MOCs will play a
key role in the information fight associated with joint power projection. Thus the MOC
represents a distinct element in the new naval force paradigm.

The new force paradigm described here is not a technological fantasy. It is most fundamentally a conceptual shift, one that will be useful in steering experimentation and
investment along more affordable, and ultimately more useful, lines. We have in place
a maritime strategy that can be used to establish a defensible basis for force-capacity
calculations. The Navy has at its disposal, as it did in 1992, forces that can be readily
adapted to the new paradigm, and it has already begun changing its command-andcontrol structure to accommodate the full range of operations called for in the new
strategy. What remains is for the Navy to make the intellectual and emotional shifts to
the new force paradigm.
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CHAPTER THREE

Talking about Sea Control
The year 1990 was a significant one in naval history. It marked the transition from a
world in which the oceans were contested to one in which one navy had uncontested
command of the sea. The evidence for this shift is that during the run-up to the first
Gulf War with Iraq, the U.S. Navy positioned half of its total aircraft carrier striking
power in narrow seas, splitting it between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. If there was
any conceivable threat, such a move would have constituted strategic Russian roulette.
The incipient demise of the Soviet Union and the evaporation of its fleet, along with
Iran’s decision to stand aside, made the only threat to U.S. ships the stub oil platforms in
the Persian Gulf and some mines in the gulf’s northern reaches.
In the two decades since, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed total command of the sea, so much
so that it has stopped talking about sea control, even to the extent of forgetting how to.
With the emergence in China of a robust area-denial force of great range and a navy
capable of reaching beyond home waters, the time has again come to talk about sea
control. This article will try to support the dialogue by discussing naval operational
concepts that navies have used in the past and relating them to today’s environment.
Naval Operational Concepts
The first thing to understand about naval warfare is that it almost never occurs between two evenly matched navies or fleets. There is always some imbalance, and it
is the degree and nature of the imbalance that spawn the naval operational concepts
admirals employ to squeeze the most strategic value out of their fleets. Thus the following discussion will be organized against a presumption of imbalance, starting with the
concepts used by a fleet with great superiority and ending with those used by the weaker
side. Also, it should be noted at the outset that it is hard to separate naval operations
from merchant shipping; naval operational concepts frequently involve acting against
another’s sea commerce. This point will be blended in rather seamlessly in the concepts
discussed below. A third factor underlying this examination is sanctuary. Because naval
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2010, Vol. 63, No. 4
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warfare is characterized by the dominance of the tactical offense (he who shoots effectively first generally wins—a principle articulated by Wayne Hughes), sanctuary is needed to prevent the enemy from getting off a first shot or engaging in the first place. In an
1
age of aircraft, missiles, and nuclear bombs, sanctuary is harder than ever to achieve.
Blockade. A fleet that has great superiority may choose simply to bottle up an opponent’s fleet and his commerce by stationing forces off his ports. The goal may be
economic strangulation, or it may be simply to keep his fleet from getting to sea. This
worked well in ages before aviation, when ships could operate out of shore artillery
range (i.e., the enemy’s sanctuary). Aircraft greatly complicate the problem, missiles
and submarines even more. At some point a distant blockade becomes ineffective in a
military sense and turns into commerce raiding, in an economic framework. Moreover,
in an age where merchant ships have flags of convenience, multinational crews, international ownership, and cargoes that may change hands several times during a voyage,
economic blockade becomes problematic.
From the Sea. A fleet that enjoys command of the sea (that is, establishes conditions in
which the other navy cannot come out and challenge), or at least local sea control, but
does not have the possibility of land-based aviation support can nonetheless bring with
it everything it needs to project power ashore. In current terms, this is sea basing. The
Leyte Gulf operation in World War II is an example. Given today’s long-range aircraft, it
is doubtful that there will be any more pure “from the sea” operations, although the initial operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM approximated such an undertaking,
with the important exceptions that land-based tankers and reconnaissance aircraft were
available. The British operations in the Falklands in 1982 also came close. Smaller-scale
sea-basing operations might be mounted purely from the sea, and the modern expeditionary strike group is well designed for such a concept.
Air-Sea Battle. The stronger fleet, whether or not it encounters opposition, may be
supported by land-based aircraft to a significant extent. General Douglas MacArthur’s
Southwest Pacific campaign in World War II constituted a good example; his operational jumps reached only as far as the operational radius arcs of his land-based fighters.
Today it is hard to imagine any major naval operation that would not represent some
2
form of this concept. Of course, we can blend space and cyberspace into this concept
too—and surely will. The defensive converse of this concept would be the operation of
an area-denial force, like that which the Chinese are building, in the littoral. The idea
would be, using a combination of ballistic missiles and shore-based aircraft in conjunction with submarines and surface ships, to present the U.S. or other navy with a
multidimensional threat that would be too hard to deal with. In both the offensive and
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defensive versions, the coordination of land-based and sea-based forces is critical, but
that is something that has not often been satisfactorily achieved.
Decisive Naval Battle. In a contest for control of the oceans between two capable
navies, a decisive battle has been the goal of the stronger. This is what Nelson sought in
1805 as he chased the combined Franco-Spanish squadron, and it is what Yamamoto
sought in 1942 at Midway. Generally speaking, the weaker force will attempt to avoid
such an engagement, but every once in a while circumstances conspire to precipitate
one. Trafalgar was produced by Napoleon’s ordering Admiral Villeneuve to sortie, and
Midway was produced by Chester Nimitz’s recognition that an ambush was possible.
There might have been one off the Falklands in 1982, had there been sufficient wind
for the Argentine carrier to launch its strike aircraft and had the aircraft then inflicted
damage on the British carriers. In today’s world there is little or no chance of such an
engagement, except possibly among two smaller navies.
Fleet-in-Being. A navy that is strong but reluctant to roll the dice on a decisive battle
might elect to avoid engagement but still present a threat to the stronger navy that
would keep it from doing what it wanted (like projecting power ashore). In 1690
Lord Torrington, commanding the Anglo-Dutch fleet, adopted such a concept by
keeping his fleet upwind of the French. Although suffering a defeat at the battle of
Beachy Head, he kept his fleet intact, such that it constituted a threat to any invasion
operation (which would compromise the mobility of the French force) but could not be
brought to battle. Thus it achieved its strategic goal of preventing an invasion. The key
to making a fleet-in-being strategy work is sanctuary. Today sanctuary is hard to find.
However, diesel submarines might constitute a fleet-in-being if they went to sea and
“got lost.” If they could avoid detection they might constitute a sufficient threat, at least
for a while, to keep the stronger navy (presumably American) from projecting power as
it wished. A lone Argentine Type 209 submarine almost did this in the Falklands; the
British task force used up almost all its antisubmarine weapons on false contacts. Other
sources of sanctuary might be political alignments or dense umbrellas of missiles and
aircraft.
Commerce Raiding. A navy that is not strong enough even to constitute a fleet-in-being
might try commerce raiding (also known by the French term guerre de course). The Germans resorted to it in both world wars. This concept requires sustained and systematic
operations and therefore sanctuary for the bases of the raiders (since the early twentieth
century, usually submarines). In an age of jet bombers and missiles, achieving such
sanctuary is hard to imagine today, except perhaps for the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the
same factors that complicate blockade make commerce raiding almost infeasible in the
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current environment. In any case, if the U.S. Navy attempted to interdict Chinese commerce, nuclear escalation could become an issue.
Delay, Disruption, Denial, and Demoralization. If a navy is not strong enough for
anything else, it can attempt “delay, disruption, denial, and demoralization” (D4)
operations. That is, it can send out units to try to do enough damage to the stronger
force (which is presumably attempting to project power or blockade) to cause that force
to abandon the operation or at least delay it, giving the weaker power some strategic
breathing space. The effects of the “hits” may be physical, such that the operation cannot continue, or they may be demoralizing, either to the force itself or the attacking
nation’s public or leadership. The Argentine strategy after its fleet retreated to port was
of this nature, and it almost worked when the containership Atlantic Conveyor was sunk
by an Exocet. The Japanese Sho plan in World War II was also a D4 strategy. One of
the elements that make a D4 strategy dangerous and potentially effective is the resolute
acceptance by its implementer of the prospect that what it sends out will not come back.
A D4 strategy is normally not sustainable unless—and this is a big unless—the weaker
side has some kind of sanctuary that enables it to hide its forces until they are used
and thereby meter them out over time. Mines and coastal submarines are potentially
effective D4 tools. Such operations that are maintained for a substantial length of time
essentially constitute “irregular warfare” at sea.
Maritime Security. Though not universally recognized today as a true area of naval
warfare, maritime security has nonetheless been raised to a naval strategic imperative by the possibility that terrorists might sneak nuclear or other weapons into the
United States or a friendly nation by sea. Given the economic and political disruptions
caused by the 9/11 attacks, a seaborne insertion of weapons of mass destruction could
be regarded as having the strategic importance of a conventional invasion. Maritime
security thus occupies the same level of importance for the U.S. Navy as did fleet-based
defense of the hemisphere in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s time. Maritime security in today’s
world requires an almost seamless blanket of awareness and cooperation over all the
world’s oceans. Thus it is inherently an international naval mission; the U.S. Navy’s job
is to help catalyze this cooperation. In fact, as an operational concept, maritime security
today is different from the others in that it is absolutely dependent on the integrated
operations of both strong and weak navies.
Bastions and Maneuver. If the principle of dominance of the offense at the tactical
level holds true, which it has for the majority of naval history, logic says that trying to
establish strongpoints or bastions at sea is a losing proposition. Two exceptions—where
the defensive at sea has worked—have, by their rarity, the ef fect of proving the rule.
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The first is the clash between USS Monitor and CSS Virginia in March 1862, during
the American Civil War. These ships being the first ironclads, naval guns and shells
that could pierce armor did not yet exist, and thus the cannonballs of each bounced off
the other. Less than a century later, the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 was a
triumph of integrated air defense due to the slowness of Japanese bombers and to the
American use of radar to direct fighters, as well as of VT (proximity, or “variable time”)
fuses on antiaircraft shells. Today, although U.S. cruisers and destroyers carry the
incomparable Aegis weapons system, modern antiship missiles have capabilities and
characteristics that make them very hard to detect and shoot down. Submarines and
mines are still very difficult to find. Naval leaders must still consider very carefully the
fact that if “the other guy” knows where to find you, he can likely find a way either to
evade or saturate any defensive scheme. If nothing else, he may just get lucky. Therefore, when there is a sea-control threat, maneuver is a requirement until that threat is
neutralized.
That point raises the issue of the modern “sea base,” essentially a stationary strongpoint
at sea. In some U.S. Navy publications, the definition of the term is stretched to include
almost any grouping of ships at sea, regardless of how they are arranged or maneuvered.
Such definitions have more relevance to inter-service budget competition than actual
utility in naval operational art. A sea base is intrinsically a group of ships supporting an
operation ashore. Accordingly, its scope of operational maneuver is highly restricted,
as is the degree of tactical maneuver that can be tolerated if support to the shore is to
remain effective. But history has taught navies not to get themselves into situations in
which they must risk a disaster ashore in order to avert one at sea, or vice versa. This
was Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s dilemma right after the Guadalcanal landings in
1942: he felt constrained to remove his “sea base” of aircraft carriers before it could be
attacked by the Japanese, since his carriers were the only operational ones in the Pacific.
Thus, in theory, a navy should not attempt to project power ashore until it has achieved
sea control. But the theory almost never holds. A smart opponent will wait until the
attacker is lodged ashore and cannot maneuver without invoking the dilemma above.
This was the Japanese plan at Guadalcanal (from which resulted the first battle of Savo
Island, disastrous for the Americans), Saipan (and the battle of the Philippine Sea), and
Leyte (the Sho plan). The same dynamic was illustrated with the Argentine D4 operations during the British landings at the Falklands. Attempting to create and defend
bastions at sea entails risk.
Aircraft Carrier Doctrinal Roles
If there were no sea-control threat, there would be no need to discuss the doctrinal roles
of carriers. As a new and uncertain modern world emerges, it is time to review how
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aircraft carriers have been used during their history. They are high-value units, and
accordingly their use has always been governed by the degree of risk it is appropriate to
incur; the doctrinal roles for carriers are centered on this aspect of their operations.
Eyes of the Fleet. The original use envisioned (at least by battleship admirals) for carriers was behind the battle line, out of harm’s way, sending aircraft to scout and spot for
the battle line. Interestingly, this may be a future role for our carriers. They stay far out
at sea, beyond the range of missile-based access-denial systems, and send in ultra-longrange unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication relay in support of a grid of submarines, destroyers, and other craft “inside
the arena.”
Cavalry. In early 1942, aircraft carriers supported the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, as well
as a number of hit-and-run raids meant to disrupt Japanese operations. In these, the
carriers relied on the protective cover of a large ocean. The missions were such that the
carriers, if detected, could immediately run for safety; standing and fighting would have
been suicidal. So long as a carrier can remain unlocated, it can speed around and deliver
quick pulses of aerial bombardment.
Capital Ship. When in World War II a decisive naval battle became possible, as at
Midway, carriers would stand and fight. Nimitz’s definition of calculated risk nicely
captures the logic of committing capital ships to a desperate fight: “You will be governed
by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of
exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting . . . greater damage on the enemy.” Any capital ship is a “consumable” in such a
fight, but not cannon fodder. Thus, when there was a prospect of inflicting greater damage to the other fleet, carriers could be risked, and of course some were lost. By the way,
a capital ship is that ship type that is most capable in a fight for sea control and around
which the tactics of the fleet are centered. “Capital ship” is thus a doctrinal term related
to sea control, not a general phrase describing any big, expensive naval ship.
Nuclear Strike Platform. After World War II, in the “Revolt of the Admirals” era,
the Navy pressed its carriers into service as nuclear strike platforms. This was due not
only to interservice fights with the Air Force but also to genuine concern that the slow
B-36 bombers might not get through. The carriers had to survive to get to their launch
positions; after that, all bets were off. Carriers retained their nuclear missions until the
1980s, when the evolving global situation made the massive Single Integrated Operational Plan obsolete.
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Air Base at Sea. When carriers provide continuous support to operations ashore,
they are functioning as air bases at sea—that is, as a kind of sea base. As such, they are
constrained in their maneuvering and thus cannot tolerate any risk from sea-control
threats. This is the mode in which aircraft carriers have been operating for virtually the
whole post–Cold War era. Trying to use them in this mode in a sea-control situation
almost guarantees they will take hits. During the Falklands War, the British had to use
their carriers as sea bases, but because there was a sea-control threat from the Argentines, the carriers had to be kept out of harm’s way. This meant that their short-legged
Harrier jets could not provide adequate air defense for the San Carlos beachhead, and
a number of destroyers and frigates were lost as a result. When carriers try to function
as air bases inside the range arcs of sea-control threats, they must try to erect bastions
around themselves. As previously discussed, this is a debatable proposition.
Water Colors
Reference is heard in naval circles to three metaphorical “colors” of water: blue, green,
and brown. They denote generally the proximity of land: “blue” water, the oceanic,
reaches farthest from land; “green” water is the oceanic littoral; and “brown” water
comprises rivers, bays, and estuaries. In the Cold War, these colors had more specific
meanings. Blue water meant those areas of the ocean in which only other naval forces
could confront one’s own. Green water denoted those areas of the ocean in which
naval forces could be confronted and affected by land-based aircraft. Brown water was
that zone of the ocean that could be covered by ground-based artillery. This distinction had some vague planning value, but the advent of long-range jet bombers carrying
antiship cruise missiles made virtually all of the oceans “green.” In the era of total U.S.
Navy dominance after the Cold War, the “colors” of water all but disappeared, other
than in characterizations of a navy as “blue water,” which meant oceangoing, capable
of more than purely littoral operations. With the emergence of very capable sea-denial
forces and oceangoing navies that might turn out to be adversaries, there is utility to
readopting this shorthand, but with new definitions. The new basis of definitions would
be the kind of naval forces that can operate at an acceptable degree of risk in water of
each color.
Blue water would denote those areas of the ocean in which naval forces structured
around high-value units (usually aircraft carriers or large amphibious ships, but perhaps
in the future such things as arsenal ships as well) can operate. High-value units (HVUs)
concentrate a substantial proportion of the force’s of fensive combat power in a single
ship, the loss of which would likely unhinge a whole operation or at least significantly
reduce the odds of its success. These ships are normally surrounded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers, as well as perhaps submarines operating in more distant support;
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the idea is to create a defensive bastion around the HVU that can fend off attacks by
submarines, aircraft, other surface ships, and missiles. An HVU-centered naval formation relies on not only defensive firepower and electronic countermeasures but also
maneuver to defeat attacks. Such maneuver seeks to deny detection and targeting as
well as to force enemy units, especially submarines, to engage in such disadvantageous
actions as speeding up in order to attack. If an HVU and its escort are far enough out
at sea, the odds will be in their favor: they have plenty of room for maneuver, and an
opponent can muster fewer forces against them. Blue water comprises those areas of the
ocean where both of these conditions obtain. The weaker the opponent, the closer to
shore blue water exists.
If an opposing nation possesses powerful antiaccess forces, especially if they consist of
capable submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, and missiles, there comes a point at which
the ability of the screen protecting an HVU risks being saturated. Depending on the
sophistication of the antiaccess force—in terms of advanced missiles that are hard to
shoot down, numerous tactical aircraft, robust sea surveillance and targeting, etc.—the
distance at which saturation could occur varies. A small boat–based force can reach
out only a few miles; one possessing antiship ballistic missiles can reach out hundreds.
As an HVU-centered force moves inside the range arcs of various antiaccess systems,
the defense problem becomes more difficult. Instead of just submarines and long-range
bombers, the screen now has to deal with surface vessels (like fast missile boats), landbased tactical aircraft, and shore-launched missiles. Threats become not only more
diverse but also more numerous. As the force moves in, the likelihood of “leakers”
(missiles, aircraft, submarines, etc., that survive screen defenses to get a shot at the highvalue unit itself) increases. Depending on the strategic and operational situation, there
is a point at which the risk to the HVU becomes incommensurate with the nature and
value of its mission. It is at that point that blue water would turn green.
Green water, in the new scheme, would embrace those areas of the ocean into which
it is not rational to send HVUs. In green water, a different approach to naval warfare
would have to be taken; offensive power must be dispersed into a number of vessels that
have sufficient stealth and other characteristics that make them capable of operating
in these areas, where antiaccess systems are capable of “ganging up” on high-value
units. At first glance, this may seem to mean only submarines could enter green water,
but certain kinds of surface combatants might be usable as well. What seems clear is
that the offensive weapons of necessity in these waters would be missiles, torpedoes,
and mines (be they launched from manned or unmanned vessels). The “names of the
game” in green water would be hiding, deception, countertargeting, and ambush—and
also, conversely, reconnaissance, targeting, and communicating. Given the lethality
of modern antiship missiles, torpedoes, and mines, naval forces entering green waters
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would be at significant risk, whether attacking or defending. As space, missile, and
other technologies improve, the proportion of green water in the world will expand.
Brown water, in the new order of things, would not simply be “worse green water” but
zones in which oceangoing units could not operate effectively at all. Generally speaking, this would mean waters that are too shallow, narrow, or infested with mines. In
brown water, only smaller craft could operate effectively, whether or not there was any
actual opposition. While brown water clearly denotes rivers and some bays, it would not
necessarily be limited to them. Depending on opposition and other conditions, certain
seaward littoral areas, as well as straits and other choke points, might be regarded as
brown water.
These new definitions, if they became widely accepted, would represent a useful shorthand for planning and discussing sea control. The very fact of acknowledging that green
water, as just defined, even exists would lead necessarily to force-structure decisions
that would in turn produce a naval force that is at least a bit less centered on high-value
units than at present. Moreover, determining where potential naval missions exist in
brown water might yield a force that was not simply “riverine” in nature. Using these
water colors, with the proposed def initions, could enhance dialogue on sea control
and point to a force more usefully adapted to the emerging strategic and operational
environment.
The Discipline of Sea Control
When a navy’s sea control is challenged, life is more difficult. That navy cannot assume
free access to the littorals, and it may face the prospect of being attacked far out at sea,
depending on the particulars of a dispute. Since the best protection for a naval force is to
be unlocated in the vast ocean, the force must not only develop measures for achieving
this condition in wartime but must set things up accordingly in advance, in peacetime.
Thus a navy that contemplates opposition must attain an operational discipline that includes not only tactics and weapons but also command-and-control doctrine and nodes,
as well as integration with diplomatic circles. The U.S. Navy allowed this discipline to
erode in the Vietnam era, when it focused all its energies on power projection. Consequently, when a true sea-control challenge arose, in the form of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra
during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the U.S. Navy had neither the weapons nor the tac3
tics to deal with the situation. Only after the crisis (mercifully) blew over did the Navy
take up rediscovering sea control. Since 1990, however, the Navy has again focused on
power projection and, again, has lost the discipline of sea control. Perhaps this article
will stimulate a new rebirth of this discipline before the Navy is confronted with a new
challenge for which it is unprepared.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Command of the Sea
An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form
Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever
commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world and
consequently the world itself.
SIR WALTER RALEIGH

For in war . . . the common sense of some and the genius of others sees
and properly applies means to ends; and naval strategy, like naval tactics,
when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to attain ends. But
in peace, as in idleness, such matters drop out of mind, unless systematic
provision is made for keeping them in view.
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

The last great sea battle occurred in 1944. Since then the world ocean has been open to
free navigation by all nations as a matter of American policy. The ability to enforce this
policy—or perhaps better said, the absence of serious challenges to this policy—has been
in significant part a product of the superiority of the U.S. Navy. Despite a latent and
partial challenge during the Cold War by the Soviet navy, since World War II the degree
and persistence of U.S. Navy superiority have led most people to take it for granted and
have caused the old term “command of the sea” virtually to disappear from the naval
1
lexicon. However, the emergence of a powerful Chinese navy and an associated landbased sea-denial force is stimulating a new focus on sea control and overcoming antiaccess/area-denial efforts. New concepts, such as “AirSea Battle,” are being developed
and investments made in platforms, weapons, and systems. This activity is critical to
American strategic interests and prospects, and it must be informed by an understanding of command of the sea as a foundational concept of sea power. A reconsideration of
command of the sea is all the more necessary as political, economic, and technological
developments have significantly changed the nature of how sea power influences the
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2012, Vol. 65, No. 4
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dynamics of geopolitical interactions. This article will argue for an extended definition
of the term and its renewed application to naval strategy and doctrine.
The Evolution of the Term
“Command of the sea” denotes a strategic condition, and it is from this actual condition
that the logic flows, whatever words are used to describe it. Since ancient times, navies
have sought to control communications on the sea. Such control might be general—such
as the Romans and British achieved at various times—or it might be local and temporary. In either case the object of such control has been to protect one’s own commerce,
disrupt the enemy’s, move one’s own army, and prevent the movement of the enemy’s.
At various times and places belligerents have built substantial navies to carry out these
missions and in the dynamics of their competitions the notion of command of the sea
emerged. “Command” denoted a relative strength relationship between two or more
navies in which one enjoyed a significant superiority such that the freedom of action of
the others to carry out the four basic missions of sea power was constrained and that of
the stronger navy enhanced.
By the time the American naval historian and theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote
about sea power, international trade as a foundation for a nation’s economy had become
an inherent element in the concept of command of the sea. Although Mahan did not
use the term directly, his notion of “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the
enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling
the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the
enemy’s shores” encapsulates the strategic condition in which not only is the enemy’s
navy unable to interfere with the movements of one’s own army but his sea commerce is
2
so constricted as to starve his economy.
Mahan was an advocate of keeping the U.S. battle fleet concentrated in order to counter
3
any European adventurism in the Western Hemisphere. However, this was a tacit
admission that the United States of the late nineteenth century did not enjoy command
of the sea on a global scale. That belonged to the Royal Navy of Great Britain. Sir Julian
Corbett was a British historian who also developed naval theory. In his view, command
of the sea, conferred by the defeat or blockade of the enemy’s battle fleet, allowed one
to disperse one’s own naval forces to exercise sea control in specific areas as the need
4
arose. The dispersed fleet could also perform other functions, such as showing the
flag and projecting power ashore. Fleet dispersal highlights the other side of the naval
strategy coin—sea control. Whereas command of the sea denotes a specific kind of
general superiority, “control” is delimited in space and time. Command is associated
with capital ships and the main battle fleet; if the enemy cannot challenge one’s main
battle fleet, then one has some degree of command. Control is usually, but not always,
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fought for and exercised by smaller, more numerous combatants. This distinction tends
to be lost on many who see these terms as synonymous. Command has been traditionally about the relative strength of fleets, whereas control was and is about the condition
of a water space.
The introduction of the submarine and aircraft in the world wars threatened the idea of
command of the sea. If the enemy always has the ability to contest control in any area of
the sea, whether or not he has a viable battle fleet, there is nothing available to the stronger navy beyond a rather tenuous and local sea control. However, the unconditional
surrender and occupation of the Axis powers in 1945 eradicated their air and subsurface
threats. The fact that no other viable hostile navy existed at the time gave the navies of
the United States and the United Kingdom command of the sea by default. The absolute
magnitude of this command added yet another dimension to the concept.
A critical element of this article’s argument is the notion that the definition of command
of the sea can be extended to peacetime. Those who feel that the concept applies only to
wartime tend to base their view on Sir Julian Corbett’s assertion that most of the ocean
is uncommanded most of the time:
The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the
sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.
The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of
thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. That error is the very
general assumption that if one belligerent loses command of the sea that command passes at once
to the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of
such an assumption. It tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has
command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere
assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually
connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with
which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval
5
strategy comes to an end.

In Corbett’s framework, command is that condition imposed by one navy on another
during wartime, and though the effects may extend globally, the arenas of the contend6
ing fleets are limited to regions. Moreover, as revealed by the quotation above, Corbett’s
definition tends to weave between describing a condition of relative strength between
two fleets and the status of an area of water. In this author’s view, command strictly denotes the balance of power between or among navies. Water areas may be controlled or
not. Conflation of relative strength with water space leads to the kind of error that Corbett himself decries, the kind of error that led to allied efforts early in both world wars
to secure the sea-lanes. It turned out that all that could be done was to adopt the convoy
system and hunt U-boats from the air. Even the concept of sea control, concerned as it
is with military conditions in a specific time and space, is ultimately about ships and
whether they can be effectively defended or attacked. Command of the sea, then, is a
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statement about the relative power of navies and the perceptions that attend asymmetry
in power. Such asymmetry exists in both peace and war.
In today’s globalized world, one characterized by endemic struggle and conflict, nuclear
weapons, the Internet, mass communications, and ubiquitous sensing, the dynamics of
interstate, intergroup, and intercorporate relations have produced a world of continuous
contention, the characteristics of which are significantly influenced by who can do what
in the global commons. The geopolitical fact of American naval supremacy influenced
the history of the Cold War, just as it influences the dynamics of today’s world. Extending the definition of command of the sea temporally (into peacetime) and geographically (to global scope) appears to offer analytic utility in this environment, aiding in
the assessment of appropriate risk for naval forces and in the development of effective
maritime policies and strategies. In today’s world, sea power, even for nations with small
coastal navies, cannot be properly understood on any scale less than global. Command
of the sea of the kind achieved by the United States and Britain in 1945 is directly associated with overall military and economic superiority, which in turn allows a nation to
7
establish a world order on its terms. Given that the United States and Great Britain were
liberal maritime trading democracies, such command underpinned the achievement of
the Bretton Woods accords of 1944 and the subsequent evolution of the global system
of commerce and security. As Clark Reynolds puts it, “As in the past, however, international agreements depend on the willingness of the participants to live up to them and
especially upon the acquiescence of the great powers which are capable of commanding
8
the seas.”
The issue of potentiality is also central to the argument. Carl von Clausewitz asserts that
9
possible engagements are to be regarded as real ones because of their consequences.
Whereas Corbett regarded command as an operative fact in war, this article seeks to establish command of the sea as a condition in which the various actors perceive the U.S.
Navy as enjoying superiority and shape their actions accordingly. These actions may
consist of decisions on whether to build a navy to challenge that superiority or decisions
on whether and how to support, or at least go along with, American policies. Some of
this could be wrapped up into “suasion,” as described by Edward Luttwak: “Latent naval
suasion continuously shapes the military dimension of the total environment which
10
policy makers perceive and within which they operate.” However, for the purposes of
assessing risk in the development of naval strategies and doctrine, it is useful to understand modern command of the sea as a condition of naval superiority that influences
other nations’ decisions in a way that is congenial to U.S. interests, especially as it relates
to the maintenance of a global security system that supports the operation of a global
economic system.
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The onset of the Cold War generated a set of geopolitical parameters that provided context for the way American command of the sea made its presence felt. The development
of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons created massive disincentives for the United States
and Soviet Union to go to war directly with each other. The USSR, a continental power,
attempted to create buffer states and to export its ideology via subversion and proxy
wars. The United States was able to adopt a grand strategy of containment based on its
command of the sea—which conferred, among other things, the ability to transport
the U.S. Army to where it was needed. Moreover, this freedom of movement on the seas
was a major factor in gluing together the cordon of alliances that hemmed in the USSR.
The Soviets, for their part, built a large submarine fleet that was potentially capable of
contesting U.S. command. However, the nuclear balance made the actual use of this
capability problematic, and the established fact of U.S. command of the sea could not be
reversed short of war.
Nuclear weapons governed another facet of command of the sea as well—concentration.
The power of nuclear weapons meant that a whole fleet arrayed in a traditional formation could be wiped out at a single stroke. While methods of tactical dispersal were
developed, the larger issue was strategic dispersal. To play its part in the implementation
of a globe-girdling strategy of containment, the U.S. Navy had to disperse its forces into
multiple regions in any case. Each carrier battle group was more powerful than any local
force it could conceivably encounter. On only one occasion, the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
were the Soviets able to assemble a locally superior force. Even then, the constraints of
nuclear balance and emerging détente prevented the Soviets from leveraging their advantage. The command of the sea achieved by the United States at the end of World War
II put it in a military, geographic, and economic position of leadership and advantage
that could not be effectively undone by the Soviets in the nuclear age—short of risking
nuclear war.
The fall of the Soviet Union created a unipolar situation in which U.S. command of the
seas was, if anything, even more complete than at the end of World War II. The total
absence of competition made the whole concept seem obsolete and thereby invisible—
submerged, as it were, in a sea of peace. The U.S. Navy, though, maintained its global
pace of operations, an indication that there was still some geopolitical function that
needed to be performed. What was happening was that the process of globalization had
kicked into high gear, partly as a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse and in part as a
result of new global communications technology, including the Internet. The nations of
the world were becoming economically interdependent, and what the process needed
11
was comprehensive global security. The Gulf war of 1991 spotlighted the issue of
regional instability, and naval forces seemed to be on call almost everywhere. American
command of the sea, instantiated by a fleet sufficiently large to sustain capable presence
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in multiple regions, continued to define the geopolitical environment of the post–Cold
War era.
It should be noted that one of the earliest manifestations of command of the sea—preventing an enemy from moving his army by sea and driving his commerce from the
sea—had by now lost its salience. Fleet dispersal was by now an inherent modus operandi for the U.S. Navy. With American global leadership now a virtually unassailable
fact, all the factors associated with “command of the sea” disappeared below the waves,
and with them use of the term.
Command of the Seas Resurfaces
We must ask why command of the sea could now be relevant again. The answer lies
in the changed set of geopolitical circumstances. The issue is not simply that China is
building a more capable navy. The point lies in the nature of the global system that has
emerged and in the potential consequences for that system if the U.S. Navy suffers even
a local defeat at the hands of China, Iran, or some other power.
The process of globalization has created a closely coupled global economic system in
which the degree of economic interdependency among nations has made the smooth
and uninterrupted flow of resources, goods, and information critical to the economic
well-being of all nations. The system can be visualized as a set of nodes and connectors. The nodes are resource-extraction-and-production areas, manufacturing areas,
and consumption areas. These nodes are in some cases geographically focused, but
most often they are widely separated and geographically noncontiguous. Connectors
consist of commercial maritime shipping, airlines and airfreight carriage, mass media,
telephony, and the Internet. All this creates a complex economic topology that is tightly
interdependent. Consumption places demand on manufacturing, which in turn places
demand on resources. Within the manufacturing node, production has become highly
parsed, with components for particular goods being made in multiple countries and
being shipped, in an intricate global ballet of just-in-time delivery, ultimately to the
12
country that assembles the final product. The history of the last two decades is one of
nations joining the system, not leaving it. It is likely that this system possesses a degree
of adaptive self-healing capacity to contend with shocks like natural disasters. However,
it is not clear what the consequences would be if one nation or bloc of nations withdrew
from it or attempted to subvert it by imposing a different rule set.
China is a continental power that is pursuing a continental-style grand strategy. A
Eurasian authoritarian regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) must garrison its
own territory to ensure national integrity. Security for such a regime radiates out from
the capital to the national borders. Typically, continental powers from Rome onward
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have been unable to arrest their security strategies at their frontiers; they have always
felt compelled to establish buffers, in the form of neutralized states or occupied territories, which they eventually incorporate into an empire. This process also takes place at
sea, which appears to be manifest in China’s focus in its “near seas.” China’s ambitions
in this process have brought it into conflict with neighboring states that claim the same
islands and sea areas as Beijing does. Although China has benefited greatly from participation in the global system, for various reasons the CCP would like to change the rules
13
of that system or even create an alternative one, with China as its leader.
China’s People’s Liberation Army and its component navy (the PLAN) have, in pursuance of its buffering strategy, developed an array of missile, air, and naval forces
designed to deny the U.S. Navy access to the ocean areas adjacent to the Chinese mainland, including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, and even the western
portions of the Philippine Sea. In the first instance, these forces are meant to prevent
interference by the U.S. Navy if China feels it necessary to use force to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan. However, as its interests have broadened and its naval
power has developed, China has expanded its military objectives to keeping the United
States out of the near seas in order to solidify its greater territorial claims. While many
in the U.S. naval establishment regard the evolving operational challenge in East Asia
as a regional sea-control issue, there are larger implications with regard to the global
system that cause the matter of command of the sea to resurface in a new form.
The current American maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower,” says that the U.S. sea services will be deployed to defend the global system on
14
a day-to-day basis. In doing so, they will attempt to limit regional conflict, defend the
homeland, and prevent war among the major powers. The issue is systemic disruption.
According to Stephen Carmel, senior vice president of Maersk Line, “As the last great
age showed us, the forward march of globalization is not inevitable, but also not reversible. We cannot slide easily backwards into a better previous time when the pressure gets
to be too much. When globalization breaks, it does so violently, permanently altering
15
the trajectory of history.” In a potential naval fight between China and the United
States, the stakes become the functioning of the global system, given the importance of
East Asian manufacturing and container shipping hubs.
In light of the central role of the U.S. Navy in maintaining a stable security environment
in which the system, specifically its flows, can function, we may define command of
the seas as the condition in which the U.S. Navy, in conjunction with allies and partners, is able to maintain a global security environment that permits unrestricted global
systemic flow. In a negative sense, it denotes the inability of any navy or force to impose
a defeat on the U.S. Navy that would compromise the latter’s ability to carry out this
function. If we view a regional sea-control fight through the lens of China’s objectives,
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the U.S. Navy will have been prevented from interfering with whatever operation in the
near seas that it undertakes. From an American global perspective, this might seem like
a regional setback with respect to local sea control. However, the systemic implications
turn it into a global matter.
If China is able to chase the U.S. Navy from its near seas, it will change the political calculus of the world and acquire several strategic options. First, it could dictate an alteration of the rules under which the current global system operates. One of these would be
the status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the two-hundred-nautical-mile band of
sea abutting a nation’s territorial waters in which certain rights to exploit the resources
in and under the water are reserved to the coastal state. Currently, the EEZ is regarded
as a high-seas regime, except for reserved economic rights. China wants to expand
sovereign rights, to include the ability to exclude outside naval forces from the EEZ. If
it can enforce this claim, it will—aside from making virtually the entire South China
Sea its “internal waters”—have erased the ability of the U.S. Navy to operate globally
to maintain the security environment required by the global system. While not enjoying the kind of comprehensive command of the seas that accrued to the United States
in 1945, China would, to a significant degree, rob the United States of that command
necessary to underpin the Bretton Woods regime. The consequences for global flow are
hard to envision, but if Mr. Carmel is correct in his diagnosis, it would be anything but a
graceful degradation. The second option that opens up to China would be the formation
of a separate economic system. It could, for example, elevate the Shanghai Cooperative Organization to the status of a modern and more effective version of Napoleon’s
16
Continental System. Such a system would not be purely continental, as it is unlikely
that a continuing state of war would exist, such that the United States could interdict
the organization’s shipping. Such a project by China might or might not succeed, but the
attempt would likely disrupt the current system catastrophically.
If we “drill down” to operational matters, we can speculate on what the nature of a
U.S. Navy strategic defeat might look like. First, we must remind ourselves that China
is a nuclear power that, in lieu of a proven comprehensive U.S. missile-defense system,
can presumably inflict massive damage on the American homeland. All naval operations are delimited within this context. Second, U.S. naval conventional striking power
is substantially invested in eleven large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Chinese,
for their part, have heavily invested in various systems to knock these carriers out
of action.
With these considerations in mind, we can examine a plausible combat scenario. Postulate: a few years from now the true resource potential of the seabed in the South China
Sea is revealed, and it is massive. China decides to assert, fully and finally, its territorial
claims to the South China Sea and issues a démarche instructing all other navies to stay
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outside the “nine-dash line” that essentially cordons off the whole of that sea as Chinese
internal waters. Chinese antiaccess/area-denial forces deploy to the theater. The United
States, along with a group of Southeast Asian nations, condemns the démarche, and two
carrier battle groups, along with submarines and other naval forces, are dispatched to
challenge it. To do so, these forces must sail into the disputed zone.
Let us now assume that the Chinese allow these forces into the zone and then spring a
trap, shooting first with missiles and torpedoes, supported by mines. This “battle of the
first salvo” succeeds in disabling the two carriers and several surface ships. The president of the United States now has a decision to make. Does the United States continue
to “feed the fight” with more naval forces? Does the United States escalate with strikes
against Chinese area-denial systems on the mainland? Or does the United States decline
to challenge the military status quo and instead call for negotiations? The latter two
choices would be politically and strategically unpalatable, at least as long as the United
States sees an opportunity to stay in the fight via the first option.
But the question now arises of how much of its navy the United States is prepared to risk
in the fight. The criterion on which this judgment is made should be based on an understanding of the role that command of the sea plays in the functioning of the modern
global system and on a calculation of how much loss the U.S. Navy can absorb before
the edifice crumbles.
Before proceeding farther, it should be noted that there are those who refuse to contemplate issues such as this, being convinced that the U.S. Navy would be able to prevail
quickly and decisively, without significant loss, in any such contest. Whether such
outlooks are based on computer simulations or fear of admitting potential weakness
(whether to the Chinese or to other services, which might take advantage to seize more
budget share), they constitute a roadblock to thinking and could leave the national command authority unprepared in case the unthinkable happens. In any case, the purpose
of positing such a negative scenario is not to assert that U.S. aircraft carriers are vulnerable but to explore the dimensions of command of the sea. To do so, we have to get on
the other side of the loss of several carriers to see how the options play out. Any attempt
to discredit this argument on the basis of an assertion that “it would never happen”
would therefore be specious.
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, we must first ask ourselves what might happen if the U.S. Navy were successful, if it forced the PLAN to retreat from the scene and
was able to prevent land-based systems from achieving significant effects. Would China
then withdraw from the system—that is, put an embargo on trade with the United States
and its allies? Despite the emotional and cultural imperative of saving face, economic
survival might dictate that China keep its ports open and even continue to trade with
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the United States, if only indirectly. In any case, while a Chinese withdrawal from the
system would be damaging, it is plausible to think that the system would adapt and
remain functional. On the other hand, if the war escalated to the use of nuclear weapons
or China won the engagement, the system would likely break.
If a win of sorts is possible for the U.S. Navy, what cost would be acceptable? Beyond a
certain level of destruction, given the length of time needed to build, fit out, and work
up a modern warship, the U.S. Navy would become less than a global navy. At that point
it could no longer provide the security environment necessary for the global system
17
to operate. If the current U.S. Navy, at around 280 ships, is stretched thin and strains
to meet demands from regional commanders, the amount and kind of losses it could
absorb in a fight with the Chinese and still maintain command of the sea—in its modern instantiation—likely would be relatively low. This is especially the case for aircraft
carriers, whose capacity to project power ashore has made them such useful geopolitical chess pieces that President Barack Obama dictated that the Navy retain eleven in
commission, even in the face of huge defense-budget cuts. Almost paradoxically, the
utility of carriers on a global scale in maintaining the system’s security environment
makes them too valuable to risk in a regional sea-control fight, even though, or perhaps
precisely because, command of the sea is at stake. A posture that would align better
with the strategic architecture would be to create a naval force consisting of submarines,
smaller surface combatants, and unmanned systems that could impose losses on the
PLAN but could also absorb losses without jeopardizing command of the sea.
This brief thought experiment reveals an interesting inversion of naval strategic
imperatives that highlights how the nature of command of the sea has changed since
Sir Walter Raleigh concocted his syllogism. As codified by both Mahan and Corbett,
command of the sea was to be won by defeating or bottling up the enemy battle fleet.
This was a matter for the navy’s most powerful ships to settle. Once command of the
sea was gained, the seas became safe for smaller units, like frigates, to spread out and
exercise sea control in specific and local circumstances. In other words, one fought for
command of the sea—via battle, if possible—and exercised sea control, via dispersed
security operations. This general relationship held good at least through the end of
World War II. Now, however, as we see in our thought experiment, our most capable
ships, the carriers, are best used to exercise command of the sea—that is, maintain
the security environment—while smaller, more numerous forces may have to fight a
decisive battle for local or regional sea control, the outcome of which would likely have
profound global strategic consequences. This inversion is new and runs counter to
common wisdom. It must be understood if we are properly to assess risk and structure
fleet architecture.
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Assessing and Managing Risk
“Command of the sea” is a descriptive term. What it describes is a strategic condition.
As the world geopolitical environment evolves, so does the nature of the condition that
the term describes. Great and broad strategic conditions are not easily encapsulated by a
four-word term, so it is both necessary and useful to inquire more deeply into its definition and thus into the parameters of the condition. Such inquiry as we have outlined
reveals important relationships between strategic conditions and the nature and use of
naval forces.
Naval forces have always been expensive and relatively scarce. Their employment,
especially of the largest and scarcest of these, must therefore be attended by clearheaded
18
calculations of acceptable risk. Bottom-up examinations of potential tactical outcomes
using computer simulations have their uses, but these must not constitute the sole basis
for assessing risk. The enemy could always get lucky, and an understanding of risk from
the top-down strategic perspective allows us to understand the consequences of loss in a
way that provides better ability to better assess and manage risk.
The inquiry conducted in this article reveals that a new relationship has emerged between command of the sea and sea control, and the kinds of ships that are appropriate to
each function. Whether an aircraft carrier is a capital ship in the sense a battleship was
in 1922 is beside the point. Their unique characteristics, coupled with today’s changed
geopolitical circumstances, suggest that they should be used in a dispersed manner to
exercise command of the sea on a day-to-day basis, much as British frigates in 1812 exercised sea control around the periphery of the British Empire. While carriers will never
be numerous, the implication is that we should have enough of these ships to make them
readily available in most regions. The U.S. Navy may never again have more than eleven
of them, but assuming most nations have incentives to do their part to protect the global
system, their carriers, even including those of China, could be enlisted in the common
effort. More total carriers being operated by like-minded nations make the continuous
and systemic exercise of command of the sea all the more effective, because they will be
available in more places more often. Aircraft carrier building is more widespread today
than it has been at any time since World War II. But given their vulnerability to missiles,
torpedoes, and mines, why would nations devote their scarce resources to such ships?
Beyond national prestige, which is no small thing, it appears that there is a tacit understanding that they contribute to the overall security environment—a corporate command of the sea by an informal condominium of nations all of which, despite particular
differences in policy, share a common incentive to keep the global system operating.
The new logic of command of the sea also suggests a kind of strategic equivalence
between aircraft carrier forces and amphibious forces. Modern amphibious groups,
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especially when equipped with missiles, unmanned systems, and modern vertical/
short-takeoff-and-landing jets, have a legitimate capability to conduct autonomous
power-projection operations, thus increasing the capability of the U.S. Navy and others to exercise command in more places at more times, making that command more
effective and secure. Moreover, the flexibility of some new designs, such as the San
Antonio (LPD 17) class, offers the potential of significantly increasing the sea control,
shore-bombardment capability, and cooperative international expeditionary operations
capabilities of an amphibious group.
There may never be a fight for sea control between the United States and China. If
there is, it will be in the American interest to fight it with forces made up of units that
are relatively hard to find and hit and whose acceptable-risk profile is more compatible
19
with the conditions that would obtain in the East Asian arena. This would allow the
president to feed the fight without placing himself on the horns of a difficult strategic
dilemma. If the United States has the option of fighting—and winning—the war solely
at sea (on, under, and above it, using joint forces), the strategic risks of nuclear escalation
and rupture of the system are minimized. If such a posture is credibly attained through
force-structure investments, concept and doctrine development, and strategic communication, deterrence will be enhanced. In the end, the issue may not be U.S. ability to
seize sea control in the South China Sea but its ability to deny it to China—a less rigorous and presumably less costly requirement.
“Command of the sea” is not and maybe should not be a doctrinal term, but its utility as a tool for strategic analysis has reemerged. Some may be uncomfortable with its
hegemonic overtones, but in a global system environment it is ever more suggestive of
an informal partnership of nations, especially in view of the cooperative approach that
the current American maritime strategy espouses. A current and sophisticated understanding of command of the sea contextualizes doctrinal concepts and terms such as
“sea control,” “sea denial,” and others, which should improve programmatic analysis
and tactical development. “Command of the sea” is an old term that, in a new form, can
be usefully leveraged to enhance our understanding of the modern strategic maritime
environment.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Navies and Economic Prosperity
The New Logic of Sea Power
Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defences of peace must be constructed.
PREAMBLE TO THE UNESCO CONSTITUTION

Because navies are expensive, they must, from time to time, make an argument for
1
why their country should invest its public resources in maintaining one. There are a
number of different justifications that have been used over the course of history, including guarding the nation’s coast from the depredations of raiders or invaders, moving its
army to a foreign shore, and simply prestige—announcing to the world via the possession of a fleet that the nation is a significant power. It is also routinely argued that a
navy is needed to secure the nation’s economic interests by protecting its commercial
shipping. This argument has been leveraged by the U.S. Navy in conjunction with the
rollout of its current maritime strategy and is being employed by the navies of Canada
and the United Kingdom as they struggle to secure sufficient public investment to
keep themselves viable. Admiral Gary Roughead, the former U.S. Navy Chief of Naval
Operations, said: “So much of what moves on the world today in trade and commerce
and the resources that flow moves on the oceans. About 90 percent of everything that
moves, moves on the oceans. So how we protect the sea lanes, how confident we are that
goods can move from one point to the other and not be interfered with is extremely
2
important.” The notion that navies exist to protect merchant shipping has been around
a long time and has had, up to the end of the Cold War, a substantial element of truth to
it. However times have changed and the world strategic environment has evolved to the
point that the rug has been pulled out from under this argument. Yet navies persist in
using it because they have not delved deeply enough into the new connection between
sea power and economic activity to articulate a new argument. Thus, when admirals roll
out the traditional utility argument civilians do not find it compelling, although they
Corbett Paper No. 11, The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King’s College London, October 2012, available at www.kcl.ac.uk/, reprinted by permission
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cannot say exactly why. This article is an attempt to articulate the relationship between
navies and the economic prospects of their parent nations that actually exists in today’s
world. If this relationship is properly understood, perhaps more compelling utility arguments can be made by navies.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer
Mahan broke new ground in military literature with his book The Influence of Sea
Power upon History 1660–1783. His principal intellectual advance was to describe the
3
connection between war, sea power and the economic prospects of a nation. By doing
so, Mahan added an outer layer of analysis to the Prussian military theorist Carl Von
Clausewitz’s epic exploration of war’s essence, On War. It was not enough, Mahan
argued, to understand war solely by examining the clash of armies. One had to also
understand that armies are underwritten by the wealth of their parent country, and that
wealth is in turn enhanced by trade, which by the time Napoleon ruled France, had an
essential maritime commerce component. The flow or constriction of maritime commerce was, in turn, governed by the success or failure of navies.
Mahan went on to establish a sort of logical syllogism that described the relationship
between a nation’s economic prospects, its maritime trade and its navy. He described a
virtuous cycle in which a nation’s propensity for economic activity leads naturally to the
carrying of goods on the sea, both coastwise and across the ocean. The need to protect
this trade spawns a navy. The navy, by protecting trade, enhances it and thereby the
wealth of the nation grows. Sir Julian Corbett, the distinguished British interpreter of
sea power, based his theories on the same idea, if conversely applied:
Finance is scarcely less important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. It
has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and given victory to the
physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we are able to achieve towards crippling our
enemy’s finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this
4
end against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade.

Theodore Roosevelt read Mahan’s book, became a true believer in sea power and pushed
for a strong American Navy. He dispatched the Great White Fleet on a world tour to
announce America’s arrival on the world stage. Mahan’s book was also an international
best seller and he wrote many articles for popular magazines explaining his theories.
Thus was welded into the American psyche the idea that its navy sprung from and was
formed to protect its seaborne commerce. The subsequent experience of two world wars,
with their respective Battles of the Atlantic against commerce-raiding German U-boats,
only reinforced this notion.
After World War II the American merchant marine dwindled, causing considerable
angst among U.S. navalists, but the U.S. Navy, despite some ups and downs, remained
by far the strongest navy in the world. American prosperity, coupled with a lack of
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serious naval threat for over a half century, pushed Mahan’s syllogism to the back of the
national consciousness. However, from time to time, when naval affairs were discussed,
the syllogism was rolled out as a kind of shibboleth—sacred and unchallenged—even
though the reality on the seas had changed fundamentally. By the end of the Cold War,
the United States was almost bereft of a merchant marine, was incredibly prosperous
and possessed a navy whose size appeared to be all out of proportion to any conceivable
threat to American commerce. There was, apparently, some problem with Mahan’s
syllogism. And yet, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, naval officers and naval scholars seem to persist in embracing it in spite of clear evidence it does
not hold.
To understand why the relationship between war, economic health, maritime commerce and navies has changed, we need to go back to the early years of the twentieth
century, shortly after Mahan’s book had become a world best seller. It was an era of
unprecedented world trade and stability. The industrial revolution had transformed
much of the world and the empires of the colonial powers were at their zeniths. World
trade flowed virtually unmolested thanks to the Royal Navy’s unchallenged command
of the seas. Although the old Concert of Europe had broken down, peace still reigned
among the principal nations on the Continent. The world was in the process of linking
5
itself together as a unified global economic system based on free trade. It was, though, a
multi-polar world consisting of a number of great powers, each of whom had an oceangoing navy. Despite the peaceful concord of Europe, nations felt their merchant marines
needed protection. Thus despite the lack of war, Mahan’s syllogism held.
The First World War brought the whole edifice down. Navies contended for command
of the seas; commerce raiding disrupted trade, and the world system crumbled into
hostile blocs. The Second World War simply reinforced this condition, which wore on
into the Cold War. However, after 1945, the United States put together a new system of
alliances and economic structures to avoid another Great Depression and to inoculate as
much of the world as possible against the inroads of communism. It was able to do this
in part because of the complete command of the sea it had won by virtue of defeating
the Axis navies, and the lack of a significant navy by the Soviet Union. Here we see a
foundational notion of the new syllogism: command of the sea, as an indicator of overall
national power, allows a nation to set the rules of the international order. In the case of
6
the United States, it permitted the establishment of a liberal capitalist trading order.
The new “Free World” started to put back together the global system of commerce and
security, but it could not be complete in the face of the alternate economic system of
the communist bloc. Moreover, in this era, the U.S. Navy found itself forced to adopt a
new focus—nuclear warfare. In combination with requirements to support land wars in
Korea and then Vietnam, the absence of a compelling Soviet threat to its sea commerce
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and a withered merchant marine, the Mahanian syllogism invisibly fell apart. The U.S.
Navy would stay large for reasons other than protection of American shipping, notwithstanding the requirement to protect military shipping to reinforce Germany in case of a
Soviet invasion.
The fall of the Soviet Union precipitated the final phase of the reconstruction of the
global trade and security system that the First World War destroyed. China, even
though possessing a communist government in name, adopted capitalist economic
policies and became the world’s factory. The process of globalization reordered the
economic geography of the world, increasing economic interdependency and producing
areas of specialization. Today, East Asia, including China, Taiwan, South Korea and Ja7
pan, conducts a large part of the world’s manufacturing while the bulk of its oil reserves
reside in the Persian Gulf. Many key strategic ores are found in only one or two places.
Consumerism in North America and Europe generates consumption that creates the demand for Mideast oil and Asian manufactured goods. A globe-girdling system of financial institutions, laws and agreements as well as the emergence of the internet and global
media has generated a highly integrated and intertwined economic system. Commercial
shipping has similarly transformed, and today ships may be owned by multi-national
companies, sail under a flag of convenience, be operated by a diverse international crew
and carry a cargo that might change hands several times during its transit.
This economic geography both ashore and at sea has ripped apart Mahan’s syllogism.
Merchant shipping is not so closely aligned with a national flag any more, and because
virtually every functioning nation state has a stake in the effective operation of the
global economic system, commercial shipping moves unmolested and without threat
from any navy. But navies still exist, and the leaders of these navies must justify the
expense of building and operating them to their nations. Reflexively, they reach back for
Mahan’s syllogism to try and link their country’s economic prospects to investment in
its navy. It does not work because Mahan’s syllogism no longer holds.
If Mahan’s syllogism linking the existence of a nation’s economic well-being to the
possession of a capable navy is no longer valid, is there one to replace it? Fortunately for
naval officers, the answer is yes, although the new logic is not as straightforward as its
ancestor.
The first step in constructing the new syllogism is to understand and accept the world
in system terms. The difficulty for many naval officers as well as for their civilian
masters is that such acceptance implies a certain diminution of the state’s sovereignty:
a traditional bedrock of naval thinking. However, it is simply a brute fact that most
developed nations are no longer economically, if not politically, self-sufficient. This is
an uncomfortable notion, but one that is at the heart of the new logic. Acceptance of it
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opens one’s eyes to new patterns and possibilities for naval operations. It also opens the
door for a new and effective argument for national investment in navies. In fact, the
U.S. Navy’s 2007 maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
(hereafter referred to as CS21), is explicitly based on it.
The approach to strategy embodied in CS21 reflects the new geopolitical realities that
have been generated by the process of globalization. As Ellen Frost says, “Coming
to grips with this force calls for substantially transforming the way that U.S. leaders
8
think about the world and adjusting their policy instruments accordingly.” Traditional
military strategies are contingent; that is, they are meant to be invoked when and if
an adversary does something such as invade an ally. Day-to-day, they are on the shelf,
although the forces that would execute them may conduct peacetime exercises for readiness or deterrent value. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy adopted, in its white paper
entitled . . . From the Sea, what might be termed a doctrinal strategy, not specifying who,
where or why it would fight, only how. CS21, by contrast, is a systemic strategy, crafted
9
to be executed continuously in time of peace in order to defend the global system.
Understanding the modern linkage between navies and the effective functioning of the
global economic system requires us to develop a truly global viewpoint. This is not particularly straightforward because geographically, it is all too easy to think of the world
as a collection of different regions. However, to use a trite phrase, the world is more than
the sum of its parts, at least for the purpose of understanding how all the parts relate
to one another. What some key theorists have done is establish a functional schematic
of the world. Halford Mackinder in his seminal work on geopolitics showed the world
as a kind of Venn diagram in which the key geographic land masses were depicted as
10
circles whose size corresponded to both area and population. Underpinning this depiction was the notion that population and land area indicated industrial potential, which
in turn portended the military and naval power the land mass could produce if it was
brought under a single government. More recently, Thomas Barnett described the world
in terms of a “functioning core” of nations that were tied together by economic relationships as well as the networks facilitated by the internet. “The Non-Integrating Gap”
consists, in his view, of those countries that have not, for various reasons, become part
of the functioning core, including most of Africa, the Middle East and parts of Latin
11
America. In each case, the writer looked for some basis upon which to describe the
relationships that linked human civilizations on the various continents together so that
a comprehensible whole could be discerned. However, description is not enough; the
depiction must have utility in the formation of policy and strategy.
Systems thinking recognizes the interdependency of the various elements that contribute to a system. If we understand and accept that the world has knitted itself together
into a global system of commerce (and the necessary forms of collective security that
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accompany commerce), then we are prepared to recognize and acknowledge that a wide
range of factors impinge upon and even govern the effectiveness and efficiency of each
subsystem. Using this logic we can easily understand not only that resource extraction,
manufacturing, consumption and transportation are inextricably integrated elements
of the world economy, but also that the protection of one to the exclusion of the others
is not rational. The system as a whole must be protected. While it is true that no single
military service—or nation—has the capability to render holistic systemic protection
it is also true that the effects of each one’s operations ripple throughout the system as a
whole, either enhancing or diminishing its overall security.
For navies, then, it is not sufficient to think of their purpose only in terms of protecting shipping. Certainly, shipping must be protected, but if there is nothing to put in
those ships, their transits, safe or not, are meaningless. Therefore, it is as important
that manufacturing nodes and resource nodes be similarly protected and that efforts be
made to protect and enhance the nations and societies that constitute these nodes, not
to mention the nations and societies that consume their output. Thus we have an endto-end systemic-view of what we might call the “mission space” of navies. The better
the system works—the more secure it is—the better the world’s prospects for economic
prosperity. It does not work for just one nation. For the purposes of this discussion, the
important point is that the flow of finance, goods, information, etc. must be sustained
across the system. The flow can be interrupted by disrupting shipping (and air travel
and the internet), but commercial shipping, at least, is not significantly threatened in
today’s world. On the other hand, war among major powers, instability in resource areas
and major terrorist attacks in consumption areas all could significantly disrupt the flow,
with disastrous results for the world economy as well as international peace. Given the
dependency of most pension plans on the growth in the value of securities, it is not inaccurate to say that the well-being of much of the world’s greying population is dependent
upon the effective functioning of navies.
Having established the systemic context for the new syllogism, we can engage in some
reductionism to sort out some individual factors that can help us identify particular
naval capabilities that are needed, their magnitude and even their mode of application
(strategy). In doing so, we will focus, naturally, on threats to the system, proceeding
from the most to the least dire.
As intimated previously, war among major powers is potentially the most disruptive
threat to the global system. When one considers the almost eighty-year global system
“dark age” between the outbreak of the First World War and the end of the Cold War,
the impact of major power war becomes obvious. It would be arrogant and facile to
suggest that navies themselves can prevent such wars, but it should be noted that a naval
arms race between Great Britain and Germany played no small part in the chain of
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events leading to 1914 and the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. fleet in Hawaii was a
factor in the Japanese decision to attack in 1941. These two themes, naval arms races
and perceived naval vulnerability, constitute factors that have continuing relevance in
today’s systemic world.
Let us start with naval arms races. We must admit that nations build navies for a range
of reasons beyond protection of merchant shipping. These may include the desire to
protect a vulnerable coast line, deter depredations by other powers and even generate
prestige. There is, perhaps, one element of Mahan’s syllogism that continues to be true:
at a certain level of economic activity and wealth, nations start building navies. A capable, ocean-going navy is a sign that a nation has “arrived” as a major power. Whether
such navy building is a herald of future war or is a politically neutral phenomenon is
not clear, although the historical record is cause for concern. Today, China, Japan, India,
Brazil and other nations are building navies. They each have their reasons, but the prospects that such building programmes will lead to suspicion, alarm, fear and ultimately
war may depend very much on how the current leading navies and their parent nations
proceed.
An important reason the world system has been able to stitch itself back together after
the world wars is the military superiority of the United States. A liberal democratic trading nation, it has coupled this superiority with free trade policies to stimulate economic
growth. Capital, goods and people can flow freely around the globe, generating systemic
behaviour. A key element of American military superiority is command of the seas, a
term denoting the inability of any other navy to impose a strategic defeat on the U.S.
Navy on the high seas. It is this command, like that achieved by the Royal Navy in the
nineteenth century, which helped create the necessary conditions for system formation.
When it is lost, as it was in 1914 and 1941, the world fragments and falls into war.
The challenge becomes how to use command of the sea to manage or influence the
emergence of other navies such that true naval arms races do not occur. The right way to
do this is not completely clear but there appear to be several sure-fire losing strategies.
The first is for the United States to start the arms race itself by reflexively viewing the
emergence of the Chinese Navy or others as a threat. Policies and patterns of building
and deployment based on alarm and fear will generate reciprocal responses in China
and elsewhere. This is why CS21 does not mention China or any other nation by name,
something often criticized by those with an alarmist bent. Among the ways the U.S.
Navy can stimulate Chinese alarm is to openly consider interdiction of their seaborne
commerce in exercises, war games or articles. Not only would this strengthen the hand
of Chinese alarmists, but commerce interdiction would probably be infeasible on a
number of counts anyway. Another good way to invoke this kind of reciprocal security
dilemma is to link sea control and power projection. After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy
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focused so narrowly on power projection that it and some of its allied navies forgot how
12
to talk about sea control. While progress has been made in this area, there is still a
sense in the doctrine that U.S. forces will use land strikes to neutralize shore based antiaccess systems with sea control being an exercise in access generation that is prerequisite
13
to projecting power ashore. One can imagine the effect such talk has on a nation like
China that has suffered humiliation and exploitation from the sea at the hands of western nations. Already, the Chinese are reacting to the most recent U.S. concept of this
ilk, Air-Sea Battle: “If the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s
14
Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle.”
A second way to increase the odds that navy building will lead to war is for the leading
navies to allow vulnerabilities to emerge. The U.S. Navy did this in two ways during the
1930s and up to 1941. First, it was slow to recognize and accept that the bomb-carrying
aircraft had replaced the major calibre gun as the dominant naval weapon. Although
war games at the Naval War College and demonstrations by Billy Mitchell provided
clear indicators, it took the December 1941 disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of
the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales to force the new reality on the admirals. Today,
the new reality is that the anti-ship missile is the arbiter of what floats and what does
not. This is a condition that has existed since the early 1970s but has not been compellingly revealed due to the lack of an all-out naval battle, just as there was no all-out
naval battle between 1922 and 1941 to reveal the bomb’s superiority. Vulnerability can
also be generated by concentration. In 1941 the bulk of the U.S. fleet was concentrated
at Pearl Harbor, leading Admiral Yamamoto to think that a single knock-out blow was
possible. Although today the U.S. Navy is strategically dispersed around the world, its
principal combat power is concentrated into eleven aircraft carriers. Taking several of
these out would seriously compromise the strategic capabilities of the U.S. Navy, not to
mention the potential adverse effects of derailing U.S. policy as happened via the loss of
eighteen Special Forces soldiers in Somalia, or conversely stimulating escalation, possibly to the nuclear level. Moreover, a hit on a nuclear carrier that killed hundreds, if not
thousands, of U.S. sailors in a single blow might easily generate national outrage and
serve to escalate the conflict far above initial intentions. In naval warfare, history has
shown that the tactical offense has most often trumped the tactical defence, and thinking that aircraft carriers can be defended against the array of existing and potential
anti-ship missiles is not much different than the outlook of battleship admirals in the
15
fall of 1941.
The combination of vulnerability issues suggests that the U.S. Navy and any allied or
cooperating navies that seek to constitute a combat credible force in ocean zones threatened by anti-ship missiles will have to disaggregate their power into a dispersed grid of
submarines, destroyers and unmanned vehicles, themselves armed with highly lethal
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anti-ship missiles. Their purpose should be clearly articulated as defending the system
by deterring aggression via the sea by means of defeating—at sea—any attempt to do
so. Even the best anti-ship missile cannot hit what cannot be found. By disaggregating
naval combat power and equipping it to exert sea control—at sea—we thereby eliminate
both forms of naval vulnerability that contribute to naval arms races, and the deterioration of deterrence.
There is one other vulnerability issue that must be considered, and that is positioning. If
caught out of position when a crisis erupts, the reactive movements of naval forces can
catalyse rather than deter military action. In 1982, during the crisis leading up to the
Falklands War, fears that the British were gathering up naval forces to send south helped
put the Argentine Junta in a now-or-never state of mind, which precipitated their inva16
sion and the war. If catalysis is to be avoided, naval forces must maintain a persistent
presence in such areas where deterrence is necessary. This is why CS21 prescribes concentrated, credible combat forces be stationed forward in East Asia and the Persian Gulf.
The Navy’s inventory of ships, aircraft and other systems must be sufficiently large such
that this presence can be maintained indefinitely without “using up” ships and sailors at
an unsustainable rate.
If command of the seas is achieved and maintained wisely by not provoking alarm and
not allowing naval vulnerabilities to occur, the seas can constitute a massive geopolitical
shock absorber, preventing conflicts in one area of the world from spilling over into others, mainly by keeping hostile armies from moving by sea, and allowing one’s own to do
so. Even though this condition holds today as a function of American command of the
sea, there has emerged, since the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the
prospect of terrorists and their weapons being smuggled by sea to the shores of America,
Europe, China, Japan and other developed countries. Given the disruptive potential of
terrorist attacks, it is reasonable to regard them as only a step down from major power
war as a threat to the system. Although the attacks of 9/11 were perpetrated by the
radical Islamic organization al Qaeda, in the future such strikes might be staged by any
number of groups. Although neutralization of such organizations by intelligence or law
enforcement agencies is the preferred method, the lack of success to date in doing so for
narco-traffickers and other criminal enterprises leaves us to consider at-sea interdiction
as a necessary measure.
The seas, of course, are huge, and at any moment they are dotted with tens of thousands
of ships. There is not now nor has there ever been a navy of sufficient size to hermetically seal off the seas to smugglers. The only way to make the seas a barrier to terrorists
is to have every costal nation effectively guard its own waters and establish good teamwork between its navy, intelligence service and law enforcement agencies. Some nations
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do but many do not. Thus CS21 calls for building capacity in those developing nations
whose navies or coast guards are embryonic.
The mission of capacity building requires a very different kind of naval force than the
one needed to prevent major power war. The main “weapon system” of such a force is
the sailors and other personnel that train, educate and influence those in developing
countries that will become sailors. The sheer number of countries needing such assistance suggests these missions be conducted from relatively inexpensive ships that can
be procured in some numbers. In addition to actual naval forces deployed for capacity
building purposes, the navies of developed nations employ their shore training and education infrastructures. The importance of naval academies and war colleges in building
not only capacity but relationships cannot be overstated.
Beyond capacity building, making the seas a barrier to terrorists requires information
about who is at sea, what is in the containers and holds, and where they are. Not only
are new forms of surveillance needed, but also intensive information sharing so that two
and two can be put together to reveal suspicious activity. To manage this, the U.S. Navy
is developing a global network of maritime operations centres that will develop regional
pictures that will be shared globally. This, in turn requires an international effort to
develop trust and confidence so that information flows freely.
If an adequate degree of maritime security can be achieved, the seas will constitute a
geopolitical shock absorber in another way. In the wake of 9/11 the United States had no
equivalent of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Lord St Vincent, who supposedly advised a jittery parliament in 1801, “I do not say my lords that the French will
not come, I say only that they will not come by sea.” Without the assurance of the seas
as a barrier to further attack, it was as if New York City was connected to Kabul and
Baghdad by a land bridge. The Bush Administration was spooked by the prospect of a
WMD attack and rather stampeded itself into two simultaneous Eurasian land wars that
got the United States mired down and over-extended. The comfort of insulating oceans
can provide, among other things, a certain poise to the deliberations of the National
Security Council and time for cooling off and reflection before committing the nation to war. Moreover, in the wake of the pull-out from Iraq and an increasingly rapid
drawdown in Afghanistan, both the current and former U.S. Chiefs of Naval Operations
have advanced the notion of an “offshore option” for anchoring forward U.S. military
17
capabilities in the future. This would increase the proportionate contribution of naval
forces to the U.S. effort to maintain global stability.
The threat of terrorism emanates principally from an area of a world that has been
variously referred to as the “arc of instability” and Barnett’s Non-Integrating Gap. It
encompasses much of Africa and the Middle East as well as parts of Southeast Asia. It
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is where most failed states exist but also where much of the natural resources necessary
for the world economy are found. Thus the nations that constitute the global economic
system can ill afford a hands-off strategy of containment, hoping to seal off the area
against the spread of terrorism until it heals itself. Therapeutic incisions have been and
will continue to be necessary at various times and places.
Because of the undeveloped nature of this area of the world, along with the fact that
most of its inhabitants live within several hundred miles of the coast, naval force projection capability from a sea base will be necessary. The early phases of the Afghanistan
operations were of this nature and we can confidently expect that if and when the
world’s developed nations reach a consensus about going into Somalia to cure the piracy
problem, it will be a sea-based expeditionary operation. Thus, protection of resource
areas will require that some number of navies possess substantial sea-based expeditionary force capability, preferably of a kind that can integrate multi-national contributions easily. Rendering disaster relief, as was done in the tsunami relief effort in 2004,
the Haiti earthquake and the Japan tsunami, is also an important form of sea-based
force projection that mitigates economic damage to the system. It is likely that future
sea-based expeditionary operations will be international, and so that capability must be
conceptualized and practiced.
The mere presence of naval forces in areas of the world that are the source of resources, notably oil, seems to have a beneficial economic effect. Both routine presence
of naval forces and their responses in crises were shown to have a substantial eco18
nomic benefit in a 1997 study by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. It found that
the initial naval response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is likely to have increased
19
global GDP by over $86 billion. Perhaps the least dire threat to the global system is
piracy—albeit one that is currently seizing the headlines. Somali pirates, a manifestation of a failed state in the Non-Integrating Gap, hijack merchants and demand ransom for the crew and ship. The actual chance of a particular merchant being hijacked
20
is less than one in nine hundred, and shipping companies seem more inclined to pay
the ransom than install armed guards aboard their ships. However, the publicity has
galvanized nations and their navies to take action. A previous bout of piracy in the
Straits of Malacca was cured by the joint action of local navies. The Somalia/Gulf of
Aden situation is more problematic since there is no effective governmental authority
ashore. However, the emerging world response to it reveals some important facets of
an emerging global naval infrastructure that supports the global system of commerce
and security.
In Mahan’s day, the movement of major naval forces was noted by many countries,
sometimes with alarm, as it might presage invasion, or at least a round of coercive diplomacy. In fact, when the PRC announced it was dispatching a small squadron to the Gulf
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of Aden, there was alarm in some quarters in the United States and other countries that
this was a sign of an expansionist China. The Chinese themselves announced that their
ships would operate independently in the Gulf of Aden to protect their own merchants.
However, after several weeks on station two things happened: the alarm about their
movement died off and the Chinese commander suggested a cooperative zone defence
in order to make most efficient use of the international naval forces on station. Moreover, not only the Chinese are there, but the Russians, NATO, EU (different task force),
the Japanese, Koreans, Singaporeans and even the “rogue” nation of Iran. Everybody is
cooperating—why, how and what does it mean?
To start with, we must acknowledge the uniqueness of the Gulf of Aden situation. Somalia is a failed state that possesses neither resources nor location that would incite major
power rivalry over influence ashore there. There is a universal confluence of interests
centred on the protection of shipping. The unusual absence of major power competition
allows naval operations to follow their natural course and provide a unique opportunity
for us to see the security side of the global system in action.
The Chinese, Russians, Iranians and other naval forces have become virtually invisible in the Gulf of Aden because they have fallen in on an existing framework and
infrastructure of sea power that girdles the globe. This infrastructure (perhaps more
accurately the maritime security subsystem of the global economic system) consists
of both physical and intangible elements. On the physical side, there is the U.S. Navy’s
world-wide logistics system. It operates 24/7/365 and is composed of a web of bases,
husbanding (victuals) contracts and replenishment ships, augmented by the supply
ships of the Royal Navy, Japan and other allies. This system can support international
naval operations anywhere in the world. In addition, there are GPS and communication satellites as well as the ubiquitous internet. Among the intangibles are the UN
Law of the Sea that provides a clear framework for who can do what in whose waters,
any number of other international agreements governing a range of maritime issues,
and a world conditioned to see U.S. Navy and allied ships cruising the littorals of
Eurasia. Perhaps another intangible element is CS21 itself, which casts the United States
and its navy in a defensive posture (defence of the global system). This makes it easier
politically for other nations to deploy their ships on a cooperative mission and make
use of the U.S. Navy’s logistics system. It also appears that the navies of the world are
getting comfortable with looser coordination arrangements. Before the internet, strict
communications, protocols, and structured command and control schemes were necessary. With the internet, everyone can talk more extensively and in new ways such that
restrictive command arrangements are not so necessary. This in turn obviates the need
for formal agreements prior to conducting cooperative operations. With the political
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and technical barriers to entry low, nations become more willing to send their navies on
cooperative ventures.
Previously we discussed the seas as geopolitical shock absorbers, both to limit other nations’ options for aggression and to provide our own government time for reflection and
preserving the option of doing nothing. In the cooperative naval operations off Somalia,
we see another aspect of the phenomenon emerging in a very positive way. It turns out
that ships from the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean navies have taken to operating
together in the Gulf of Aden. Strange bedfellows indeed, but as both the Japanese navy’s
operations chief and a Chinese maritime scholar have said to the author on different occasions, cooperating on easier missions can build trust and confidence that will provide
a basis for achieving resolution of more difficult maritime issues between the nations.
This is indeed geopolitical shock absorbing of the most congenial kind.
We have now arrived at a point where we can put all of the elements of modern naval
endeavour together in a new syllogism. Navies protect their nations’ economic prospects
by operating cooperatively to defend all elements of the global system of commerce and
security. Their necessary functions range from averting naval arms races to rendering
disaster relief to, yes, protecting shipping. But it is not an every navy for itself process;
the more cooperation, the better. It may even turn out that sustained and habitual
international naval cooperation will someday make the concept of command of the sea
irrelevant. Until then, the U.S. Navy must exert careful stewardship over its command
of the sea, keep its global logistics system robust and develop the capacity to catalyse a
global maritime security partnership on a broad front by being in a lot of places at the
same time. Other navies must also look at the world in systems terms if they are to most
effectively develop utility arguments and determine how to most effectively target their
limited resources.
If one accepts the arguments that underpin the new syllogism of how navies support
economic prosperity, then reasons for optimism become clear. Naval building programmes in China, India and elsewhere do not have to lead to war as has happened in
the past in Europe; there is a reasonable prospect that the seas can be denied to terrorists; the seas can be used to bring the Non-Integrating Gap into the system; and the
emerging pattern of naval cooperating can not only secure the seas but reduce the likelihood of conflict and war.
None of this will happen if nations let their navies decay. The unique thing about navies
is that their optimum utility is in time of peace. When sea power is hitting on all cylinders, it is invisible. An investment in sea power is most appropriate and effective at a
point when threats are not apparent. In Mahan’s day the syllogism of sea power focused
on the sovereign interests of individual nations and its application led eventually to war.
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Today we see the world as a system, with a sea power logic that is expressed in systems
terms. Its application, that is, investment in navies structured along systemic lines,
promises a massive return in the form of an extended and improving peace and—despite
the current global economic woes—prosperity.
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CHAPTER SIX

Defense of the System
Changing the Geometry of Great Power Competition
The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in
Sparta, made war inevitable.
THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR1

Introduction
The rise of nations has always occasioned alarm and tension, and frequently produced
wars. Existing powers interpret a rising nation’s accretion of economic and military
power as a threat, and take measures to hedge against it. The rising nation sees such
measures as an existential threat and makes greater efforts to overcome them. Thus ensues a continuous cycle of strategic challenge and response that may spiral out of control
until a war breaks out. China and the United States potentially find themselves in such
a situation. Although China has pursued what it terms a “peaceful rise” strategy and has
adopted a number of policies aimed at reassuring its neighbors and indeed all nations
of its benign intent, its maritime territorial claims that conflict with those of others, as
well as the buildup of its navy, have spawned alarm and reaction. Many analysts in the
United States are convinced that China’s strategic aims are indeed limited and peaceful,
and that the extensive economic links between China and the rest of the world make
war highly unlikely. Others see the picture very differently. In their view, China will
not be self-limiting. It will develop its military and economic power and seek territorial expansion until some nation or group of nations impose on it constraints from the
outside. Given the complexities of national grand strategy, the vast and diverse nature
of China’s society, and the dynamic nature of even a highly structured and ostensibly
stable governing bureaucracy like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is likely that
the thinking within Chinese policy elites is not entirely settled on the matter.
Originally published in Peter Dutton, Robert Ross, and Øystein Tunsjø, eds., Twenty-First Century
Seapower: Cooperation and Conflict at Sea (London: Routledge, 2012), reprinted by permission of
the Taylor & Francis Group.
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The danger is that without intending to, the United States and China may stumble into a
future war that neither wants, but which arrives via a pathway of strategic challenge and
response cycles; individual actions and policies, each of which is intended to increase security. Thus, some intellectual methodology for escaping the so-called security dilemma
of spawning alarm and distrust in others through efforts to make oneself more secure
must be found. This chapter will propose a modest start down that road by proposing
the adoption of a particular organizing principle for maritime strategy: defense of the
global system of commerce and security. This principle has already been recognized and
2
adopted by the United States Sea Services and has also been proclaimed by the Chief of
3
the Canadian Navy. Although not a replacement for strategic hedging in war planning
and force development, system defense as an organizing principle changes the context in
which these functions take place, and may moderate the way each nation sees the other’s
efforts. This is not a complete solution to the problem of avoiding the security dilemma,
but it is a small step that involves little in the way of strategic risk on the part of either
nation, and could, if it proves useful in the maritime cooperation realm, mark the way
for more ambitious measures of strategic reassurance.
The notion that some such measure is worthwhile was clearly indicated by Dr. Wang
Jisi, dean of the School of International Relations at Peking University, at a conference
on maritime strategy between Chinese scholars and a group from the U.S. Naval War
College. He said that a good relationship in the maritime domain between China and
the United States must be approached both from a bottom up perspective, by which he
meant mechanisms such as an incidents at sea agreement, hot lines, etc., and from a top
4
down perspective. With respect to the top down perspective, he mentioned what he
called “strategic reassurance.” There are a number of ways to interpret such a term, or
perhaps better put, a number of facets to it. As the conference proceeded, one Chinese
scholar complained that a recent exercise between the navies of the United States, India
and Japan indicated the United States was trying to “encircle” China. Clearly, some
Chinese, at least, believe the United States has a particular strategic organizing principle
or approach that it has used before in the defeat of the Axis powers as well as against the
Soviet Union. Conversely, many in the United States see the Chinese as expansionistic,
attempting to build continental style buffer zones, even at sea. If each nation persists in
thinking the other is pursuing one of these traditional strategic approaches, strategic
reassurance cannot be achieved. Just as clearly, each nation would like to have some assurance that the other is indeed not doing so.
Although the articulation of a strategic organizing principle is simple, its instantiation is
another matter. While it is easy in retrospect to identify the strategic plan, approach or
principle a nation used in a war, struggle or era, it is harder to ascribe a specific strategic approach based on any particular policy or action. Grand strategy emerges from a
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pattern of decisions and actions over time and frequently across several administrations
or regimes. Individual leaders may or may not act in specific cases on the basis of a
formally articulated principle or strategy. Often, patterns of decision making over time
exhibit coherency not from adherence to a plan but in the cumulative responses to a set
of incentives, pressures, values and ideas that constitute the decision-making environment. Professor Walter A. McDougall said recently:
In other words, was Auguste Comte correct when he insisted that demography is destiny, or Robert
Strausz-Hupé, when he insisted that you cannot argue with geography? We quote such lines to good
effect, but are they operationally true in the sense of being impersonal forces that move events? One
need not be a rigid determinist to grant that, especially in retrospect, there is often a logic to strate5
gic interactions that the players sensed, if at all, by sheer instinct.

Among the elements of this logic is a certain geometry of conflict that arises as a function of geography. That geometry has traditionally involved internal and external positions on a global scale, with Eurasian continental powers in the center pushing out and
insular sea powers on the periphery enveloping and pushing in. This pattern has been in
place at least since the Napoleonic Era and constitutes a kind of default context within
which the strategic decision making of great powers takes place. However, the globalization process that has gained steam since the end of the Cold War is changing the economic geography and consequently the geopolitical geometry of the world, opening up
an opportunity for great powers to escape the traditional cycles of conflict. Geopolitical
geometry is a convenient basis for crafting an easily grasped organizing principle that
can underpin grand strategy. An example of such is George Kennan’s notion of containment which he advanced in his famous “Mr. X” article.
This chapter will attempt to establish “defense of the global system of commerce and
security” as a viable alternative to two traditional strategic organizing principles, or perhaps better stated, approaches to strategy that have been based on geopolitical geometry:
continental and maritime. It will examine the prospects for defense of the system being
adopted by the United States and China as a shared organizing principle for strategy and
policy.
Strategic Reassurance
Since strategic reassurance is the goal of a new strategic organizing principle, some attention must be paid to the term and its constituent elements. The term is of relatively
recent provenance, being first defined in March of 2001 by Banning Garrett in Arms
Control Today. He established the term as follows:
In order for two states wary of each other to solve policy problems, they may need to first struggle
to demonstrate that, despite differences over specific issues, their long-term intentions toward each
6
other are benign—in other words, they may need to engage in strategic reassurance.
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This is perhaps an overly ambitious definition, as two major powers whose spheres
of interests may overlap may not be able to render definitive, long-term judgments to
themselves, much less to each other, on how benign their intentions are. For the purpose
of this chapter, it will be limited to the national security policy, planning and decisionmaking realm, which is still extensive. Within this realm, strategic reassurance will
denote the condition in which each nation’s security leadership has sufficient confidence
that it understands at least the true short term strategic aims of the other such that it
could correctly interpret the intent of actions by the other nation as well as feel able to
refrain from actions that might otherwise invoke or exacerbate a security dilemma.
In his article, Garrett focuses principally on measures the United States might take to
allay strategic mistrust surrounding its deployment of ballistic missile defense systems.
Certainly, in the area of nuclear weaponry, strategic reassurance was a key issue in the
days of “mutually assured destruction” where each side in the Cold War had reasonable
confidence it could hold the other at risk. However, the potential deployment of highly
accurate Trident D4 missiles and operational status of the Strategic Defense Initiative
was viewed by the Soviets as evidence of hostile intent by the United States and therefore destabilizing. China has similar worries about U.S. ballistic missile defense and its
naval intelligence activities in the South China Sea. If the United States was freed from
worry about nuclear retaliation, Chinese leaders must fear it would be free to incite
Taiwan independence or commit other strategic outrages, achieving perhaps a strategy
of encirclement in which China is again at the mercy of a Western power. Thus, strategic
reassurance in the realm of nuclear deterrence might take the form of a pact on limited
deployment of missile defenses such that the United States could be assured of intercepting any missiles North Korea might launch at it while limiting it such that at least one
Chinese warhead could get through.
Strategic reassurance is now a policy toward China adopted by the Obama Administration. Outlined by Deputy Secretary of State John B. Steinberg, it
. . . rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to
welcome China’s “arrival” . . . as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of
the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and
well-being of others.

Steinberg goes on to enumerate a number of areas in which the United States and China
might adopt policies that would lead to strategic reassurance, including resource and
monetary policy. Beyond the specifics of missile defense, a later part of Steinberg’s
speech addresses the broader issue of security planning:
In the face of uncertainty, policymakers in any government tend to prepare for the worst to focus
on the potential threat down the road, and of course, some of that is necessary. But we also have
to make sure that by preparing for the worst, we don’t foreclose positive outcomes; that we leave
7
ourselves open to the positive, and avoid the trap of self-fulfilling fears.
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While the Administration’s policy toward China may indeed be strategic reassurance, all policy-making and strategic-planning organizations within the government
must adopt it, requiring acceptance of risk and a culture change in some cases. If such
changes do not occur, United States actions will not match its words and the Chinese
will quickly perceive the dichotomy. The United States would appear to the Chinese as a
hegemon attempting to undercut Chinese development in order to retain its global primacy. The Chinese, in turn, would presumably adopt their own versions of worst-case
planning scenarios, further propelling the cycle of mistrust.
Of course, the Chinese would have to keep their end of the tacit bargain. In theory, they
have been doing so with their doctrine of “peaceful rise.” Clearly, China has genuinely
desired an era of peace and stability in order to allow her economic development to
take place, so to that extent the doctrine seems genuine enough. However, as China
has achieved economic success, it has found itself with the resources to modernize
and expand its armed forces, including its navy. As it has attained a degree of security
and self-confidence through naval strength, it has more aggressively asserted what it
considers its traditional and rightful claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere along
its bordering oceans. However, these claims cannot be considered in isolation from
China’s “resource strategy,” which has increasingly taken the form of mercantilist policy
aimed at monopolizing access to various resources and bypassing global commodity
markets. Moreover, the presumption of vast energy resources under the Spratly Islands,
for example, makes China’s claims to them seem more expansionistic than historic.
This generates strategic mistrust by virtually all other nations, spawning suspicions that
the doctrine of peaceful rise is essentially a ruse to buy time until China has sufficient
power to become hegemonic and potentially imperial.
Strategic reassurance requires not so much stated policy but a national security strategic
planning culture that can abandon the worst-case scenarios that arise from the strategic
orientation of the particular country. For a continental power, it means being able to
set aside the invasion and encirclement scenarios and abandon the quest for geopolitical buffers and mercantilist economic “bastions.” For maritime powers, the challenge
is to accept the growing strength of a continental power without engaging in balancing
or containment strategies. Both of these acts of strategic risk taking would face serious
opposition by conservatives and hawks, just as Obama’s policy of strategic reassurance
8
has drawn criticism from right-leaning pundits. The arguments of conservatives have
a certain salience because the policy of strategic reassurance as currently defined and
articulated requires of strategic planners an act omission based on faith that reciprocity
will be forthcoming from the other side. This is difficult in lieu of any definite concept
or organizing principle that would replace the continental and maritime models, and
provide planners with some basis for managing risk in their processes.
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Geopolitics and Security Planning
Once humans gained global mobility, the nature of national strategy changed for those
nations rich enough to possess a powerful navy. The competition between two early
global powers, Spain and Portugal, prompted Pope Alexander VI to establish a dividing
line that later encircled the globe from north to south in hopes of peacefully allocating
newly found lands. This artificial frontier was necessitated by the fact that the oceans
are all connected and the ships of each power could move freely about them, virtually guaranteeing a clash. Since that time, the interaction between the continental and
maritime strategic approaches has been about movement (encirclement) versus frontiers
(exclusion). In today’s world, the essentials of strategic maneuver that characterize the
continental and maritime strategic approaches still retain their saliency, but technological developments have superimposed on them added dimensions. Nuclear weapons,
space and the internet each introduce a new virtual geography that must be considered
in conjunction with the physical geography of the globe. It is not enough for an authoritarian continental power, for example, to establish geographic buffers; it must also erect
information buffers in the form of internet censorship. Maritime maneuver, similarly,
cannot any longer rely on the anonymity of the high seas; space must be taken into account. These added dimensions complicate the process of strategic maneuver, but grand
strategic approaches and principles that incorporate them have yet to be explicitly articulated, although the new approach identified in this chapter inherently integrates them.
In the meantime, strategists work with the traditional approaches at their disposal.
Continental powers have never needed a geographical theorist to instruct them on the
need for buffering and expansion, nor have maritime powers required tutelage on the
dangers of a single continental power becoming too dominant. However, geopolitical
theorists have articulated the two strategic approaches, allowing them to be analyzed
and discussed. Most fundamentally, the relationship between geography and the dynamics of the ascent of nations to power as well as the perceptions of strategists generated by that relationship is at the heart of understanding how a new relationship might
be articulated and a new set of perceptions created.
The Continental Approach
Continental powers arising on the Eurasian “World Island” have generally possessed
authoritarian governments. Because of this, the continental strategic approach—the net
vector of perceptions, principles, policies and actions—starts at the capital and radiates
outward. Maintaining the regime in power is job one. Because a Eurasian power of any
size is necessarily an empire of sorts—a collection of smaller cultural enclaves—the
logic of internal security does not differ fundamentally from the logic of external security. Thus, the establishment of neutralized buffer states around the national periphery is
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not that much different than keeping restive internal elements under control. While the
threat of invasion by external powers has been very real and has contributed to the “psy9
chosis of impending attack,” the threat of internal dissolution is also a major factor in a
continental-style strategy. The continental approach is thus oriented on the central position, essentially the capital, with its vectors of security interests radiating outward from
there. The internal side of the continental security equation is based on garrisons within
cultural enclaves—strong points—and control and even suppression of the movement of
populace. This general logic tends to carry over into buffer zones outside the continental
power’s borders, including maritime buffers.
Besides being authoritarian, continental powers have also tended to have their own
economic systems that have been either exclusionary, such as Napoleon’s continental
system and the Soviet command economy, or mercantilist, such as modern China. The
approach to economics mirrors its approach to political security—exclusionary in one
way or another. Mercantilism, the attempt to corner markets on resources or to exclude
competitors from various arenas of economic activity, can be regarded as a form of
strong point or bastion logic in that each exclusive deal with a resource supplier keeps
other parties from having access to that particular mine, well or other resource source.
It is a matter of keeping others from having access to something of value to one’s self.
It has been mostly the case that continental powers are substantially land-locked, Germany and the Soviet Union being the primary examples. On the other hand, Napoleonic France had extensive coastlines and at times a very capable fleet, but still hewed
to a continental approach to grand strategy. Perhaps the most striking case is Imperial
Japan. Being an island nation akin to Great Britain, and possessing a highly capable
fleet, she nonetheless adopted a continental-style strategy of expansion from a central
point and tried to defend her maritime acquisitions to the south and east with a system
of island strong points.
Just as the geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder understood “the dominant value of
10
sea power,” continental powers have been concerned about gaining access to the seas.
Because of the logic of buffering and garrisoning, however, even the existence of open
access to the sea is problematic because it could constitute an avenue of invasion, and
of course such has been the case. This results in a continental power trying to establish
strong points of various kinds to maintain access to the open sea and prevent contending powers from entering. Moreover centralized or exclusionary regional economic
systems like Imperial Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or the Warsaw
Pact constituted economic bastions that overlaid and supported the center-out security
bastion logic that is the heart of the continental approach.
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Modern-day China’s policies indicate that her security strategy establishment is following the continental approach. She is an authoritarian power that has internal integration issues with Tibet and of course Taiwan, and shares a land border with significant
geopolitical competitors, India and Russia. The discussion in her modern literature on
maritime strategy focuses on the “first and second island chains” as geographic barriers
keeping her from gaining free access to the world ocean or potentially barriers for keep11
ing the U.S. Navy at bay. Talking about geographic features in this manner is consistent
12
with the continental approach.
Although she has adopted a capitalist economic structure, she preserves a mercantilist approach to obtaining resources and has manipulated her currency to maintain a
favorable trade balance—all exclusionary practices. Having suffered invasion from the
sea on several occasions, she is attempting via extensive oceanic territorial claims and
exclusionary interpretations of the UN Law of the Sea to establish oceanic buffer zones.
These policies have brought her into dispute with regional nations and into maritime
conflict with the United States, the world’s principal maritime power.
The Maritime Approach
Since the time of the Napoleonic Wars, nations following the maritime approach have
been capitalist democracies, notably Great Britain and the United States. Essentially
free of internal integration problems, and possessing powerful navies that ensured their
insularity, these nations have viewed their security in a manner geographically opposite
of that of continental powers. Because they relied on international trade to build their
economies, the basis of their security posture is the world ocean. Because the seas are all
connected, and because the principal threats have emanated from continental powers,
maritime powers have oriented on the external position. The external position, based
on extensive global trade and a network of allies, is about movement rather than strong
points. Maritime powers have always been able to find allies whose location presented
continental powers with multi-front strategic problems, and have used the mobility of
sea power to adopt advantageous strategic lines of approach as opportunities presented
themselves. Being liberal market economies, maritime powers have found it easier than
authoritarian continental powers to attract allies, regardless of the form of government
those allies possessed. Command of the seas allowed them to maintain credible and effective contact with allies.
For the first century of its existence, the United States was a continental power as it
completed the process of consolidating its hold on its North American territory. The
Monroe Doctrine was a continentalist policy aimed at excluding European powers from
the Western Hemisphere. The Spanish-American War represented a shift in orientation to a maritime approach, which was further impelled by World War I. Although its
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citizenry possessed a strong isolationist outlook between the World Wars, the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor decisively propelled the United States into the maritime approach. Its subsequent adoption of containment of the Soviet Union was perhaps the
ultimate expression of that approach.
Globalization and the System
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself in the position of a
maritime hyperpower with no countervailing Eurasian continental power to contend
with. As a liberal trading democracy oriented on the maritime strategic approach, it had
no agenda to assert continental-style control over the world, although the combination
of World War II, the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War left it with military garrisons
around the globe. The general thrust of its policies was to encourage industrialization
and economic development of what had been termed “Third World” nations during the
Cold War. The ensuing spread of economic development was termed “globalization.”
Perhaps the most significant geopolitical effect of globalization was the emergence
of economic interdependency among nations. Although abetted by the complex of
international economic accords such as Bretton Woods, aimed at preserving democracy
in the face of the communist challenge after World War II, the current global system
is best understood as a phenomenon rather than a construction. Jiang Zemin captured
the essence of this when he said, “Economic globalization, being an objective tendency
of the development of the world’s economy, is independent of man’s will and cannot
13
be avoided by any country.” The proliferation of economic development and global
economic growth in general has produced a new economic geography that calls for new
strategic approaches.
Due in part to industrialization, the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first
decade of the twentieth saw the emergence of an increasingly active global system of
trade. However, it took place in an international context in which the sovereign state was
almost the sole repository of political power. World War I brought that phase of globalization to a halt, followed by a 76-year “dark age” in which two contending economic
systems led the world, and in which continental powers contended in traditional ways
14
with maritime powers. After 1990, in the “unipolar moment” enjoyed by the United
States, not only did nations start down the road toward economic interdependency, the
state itself started to lose its monopoly on political power. International organizations
such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization, and trans-national
organizations such as multi-national corporations and Al Qaeda have achieved a degree
of power formerly held by states. The newly forming system is forcing states into closer
coordination and cooperation on a range of issues related to security.
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The effective functioning of the global system of commerce and security, as it exists today, is more important to the long-term prospects of most all states than was the global
system of 1914. Although the system is complex, it can be simplistically and schematically characterized as consisting of flows of trade, finance and information among three
types of nodes; resource extraction, manufacturing and consumption. These nodes are
connected by merchant shipping, airlines, mass media, cell phones and the internet.
Although in many cases, resource extraction, manufacturing and consumption geographically coexist, it tends to be the case that certain geographic areas emphasize one
function over the others and so the flow among them must take place if the countries
comprising the nodes are to prosper.
The U.S. maritime strategy says the system is vulnerable to a range of potential disruptions. The cascading effects emanating from the disruption of air travel in Europe due
to the eruption of a volcano in Iceland is a case in point. It should also be noted that
although it is natural to think that a maritime strategy like CS21 (A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower) would focus on connectors, notably commercial shipping, in
reality there exist few significant threats to its flow, with the principal exception being
closure of the Straits of Hormuz. While piracy in the Gulf of Aden is distressing, it is far
from a level that would cause actual disruption to the system. Rather, it is instability and
conflict within and between the nodes that pose the greatest threat of systemic disruption. Principal among these is war among the major powers. Additionally, a 9/11-style
attack on the United States or other major consumer countries might stifle demand,
causing ripple effects in manufacturing, and major instability in the Middle East or Africa could disrupt access to resources the system needs. It is the recognition not only of
the criticality of maintaining flows, but also that virtually all countries have a stake in
proper functioning that prompted U.S. Navy strategists to adopt defense of the system
as the strategic approach upon which to base its strategy.
As a broad geopolitical strategic approach, defense of the system shares one characteristic with its continental and maritime siblings; it is a continuous process that spans peace
and war. Additionally, reflecting the fusion of economics, politics and geography as the
other two do, defense of the system can transcend the policies of individual administrations or regimes and characterize the long-term strategic vector of a nation.
On the other hand, there are some fundamental differences that lead to its potential
utility in making mutual strategic reassurance possible between the United States/China. The first difference is that whereas both the continental and maritime approaches
are inherently exclusionary, defense of the system is inherently inclusive. As one example, maritime security is critical for defense of the system (far less critical to the other
two), and this task is so large and so diffuse in its conduct that no navy, regardless of its
power, can do it alone. Therefore, the broadest possible maritime cooperation is needed.
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Moreover, maritime domain awareness, disaster relief and other systemic maritime missions are an inherent part of system defense and are not the sole provinces of big navies
or structured alliances. Every navy, regardless of size or makeup, has an important part
to play in systemic maritime security. Similarly, the process of cooperation has shifted
from formal and hierarchal alliance structures that have high cost of entry to loose, collaborative networks that anyone can join for the cost of a laptop and cell phone.
The second key difference between system defense and the other two approaches is that
it is not a zero-sum game. The continental and maritime approaches are ways of limiting and neutralizing competitive powers. Gains by one power almost always come at
the perceived expense of the other. In the system defense approach, defending the flow
is a collective good that benefits not only the major powers but all the nations that are
functioning members of the system. While the adoption of the system defense approach
does not eradicate competition it would at least reduce one endemic source of potential
conflict—an inherently adversarial strategic planning structure.
Sharing an Approach—Is It Feasible?
At first glance, defense of the system may appear to be artificial and idealistic. Whereas
it may have value in selling maritime security cooperation to smaller nations, as a basis
for strategic planning for those nations that have the wherewithal to engage in power
politics, it is easily seen as invoking too many risks. Its other liability is that it is new
and it was first articulated by Americans. All of these factors can make the approach an
object of suspicion to security planners who are inherently conservative and an object
of skepticism and derision to pundits who are wedded to a more traditional view of
the world. All of these and other factors would seem to make mutual adoption of the
approach by the United States and China a pipe dream. However, closer examination of
the changed geopolitical realities of the modern world reveals some fundamental problems with pursuing either continental or maritime approaches, problems that may make
system defense a more practical and attractive alternative.
Any nation that adopts the continental approach faces the inherent problem of limits
and when to stop. In ancient times, the quest for local security exploded into empire
15
building. Success, as Brantly Womack states, is a poor teacher of limits. If a continental
power is successful in ringing itself with buffers, how does it then protect the buffers? In the case of ancient Rome, buffers were added to buffers until it ruled the known
world. Neither Napoleon nor Hitler could abide the idea of a powerful Russia lurking
to the East and were impelled to invade. History aside, even if a continental power
elects to stop and adopt a status quo stance, it faces the problem of dynamism. The
world outside is constantly changing, and new political and religious movements as well
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as developing technology and shifting demographics all serve to erode and undercut
geopolitical barriers.
The problem of barriers extends down to the means of erecting and maintaining them,
particularly at sea. Throughout the history of naval warfare, the offense has trumped
16
the defense, and the advent of anti-ship missiles only continues this trend. Thus any
power that sought to keep other navies out of a large area of bordering ocean would have
a very difficult time of it. This is especially true in the undersea realm, as the oceans
are anything but transparent even with today’s technology. The advent of unmanned
systems and nanotechnology will make the problem that much harder. In the realm of
cyberspace, although China has attempted to erect electronic barriers to information
flow that are analogues to physical barriers, it is not clear whether these will be viable
over the long run. Just as historic barriers, whether castles, forts or the Maginot Line,
all succumbed to the technology of offense and maneuver, modern barriers and strong
points, geopolitical or otherwise, are likely to suffer the same fate. In a systemic world,
systemic style defenses are needed.
A third difficulty that attends the continental approach is that it inevitably produces
conflict between the major power and its neighbors. It was one thing for the United
States, in its continental phase, to adopt a declaratory Monroe Doctrine that was essentially underpinned by the Royal Navy, and which was motivated more by the desire to
protect fledgling democracies in Latin America than it was by United States’ desire for
hegemony. It was quite another thing for the Soviet Union to subvert the Eastern European democracies after World War II and turn them into communist buffer states. The
recent Russian incursion into Georgia indicates the continental approach is anything
but dead. China has a somewhat different set of problems and has tried to take a more
sophisticated and peaceful approach to buffer building, but has nonetheless run into
conflict with its neighbors and with the United States. China’s territorial claims in the
South China Sea and East China Sea have ignited disputes with Japan, the Philippines,
Vietnam and others. Her policies with respect to her asserted rights in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) have generated naval incidents with United States forces. More
broadly, China’s sheer economic growth coupled with her need to improve regional
economic infrastructure to support that growth has increased the sense of exposure
and vulnerability among neighboring nations. The danger of this for China is that they
could be driven into the arms of a United States that felt impelled to balance or encircle
her using a maritime approach.
The laundry list of modern geopolitical difficulties facing a continental power notwithstanding, the maritime approach is similarly burdened. To begin with, just as continentalist barriers promised to be increasingly porous in various ways, so has the insularity
upon which the maritime approach depends become a victim of modern conditions, as
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the attacks of 9/11 so spectacularly demonstrated. The nightmare of terrorists sneaking weapons of mass destruction around by sea is all too conceivable. In the aftermath
of 9/11, the Bush Administration was stampeded into a continental approach—looking
to neutralize threats at their origin and establish buffers—by invading Afghanistan
and Iraq. At the time there was no admiral who could assure them, as Lord St. Vincent
assured a jumpy British Parliament in 1801, that although the enemy might come, they
would not come by sea. Maritime security is rapidly improving today, but it will never
produce the kind of secure insularity that was possible in the days of fleets and command of the sea.
Another bedrock of the maritime approach is allies. Historically, a common threat
drove nations into alliances, even great powers that would otherwise be competitors.
Smaller nations jumped on the bandwagon. The fact that the expansionist continental
powers also had an alternate economic system helped draw clear lines between good and
evil for most nations. Today, in a systemic world the lines are anything but clear. Most
nations are part of the global economic system, and even nations that have authoritarian regimes such as China do not espouse militant and hostile ideologies as did the old
Soviet Union. This makes it hard for a maritime approach to gain strategic purchase. In
the case of China specifically, her contributions to the global system, and specifically
the economic well-being of the United States, are enormous. There would be massive
economic costs to any attempt at encirclement and isolation.
As with the continental approach, there are naval obstacles to adopting the maritime approach. An inherent part of encirclement is the interdiction of merchant shipping. Prior
to the onset of globalization, seaborne commerce was generally carried in ships flying
the flag of the country that owned the cargo, making interdiction and commerce raiding relatively straightforward. Today’s situation is much different. Flags of convenience
rule the waves, the nationality of crews and masters is likely to be different than that of
the flag, and who actually owns the ship and cargo is murky at best. Moreover, the huge
cargoes of crude carriers are often on the global oil spot market and could change hands
several times en-route. Container shipping has gone to a hub and spoke system meaning
that any particular ship’s cargo is likely to be very multi-national. For these and various
other naval warfare reasons, chasing enemy commerce from the seas a la Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s theory, if not totally infeasible, is at least a lot more complicated.
The multiplicity of modern difficulties that attend either of the traditional strategic
approaches may make strategists at least listen to arguments for adopting defense of the
system. It is not without its own set of risks and difficulties, but they are different than
those previously mentioned and may be more tolerable.
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Perhaps the key difficulty with defense of the system is that it is not a wholly sovereign
approach. No single nation can pull it off alone, if for no other reason than being part of
the global system means a nation must necessarily sacrifice some elements of sovereignty, especially in the economic sphere. In the maritime arena, maritime security
requires a globally cooperative effort. The oceans are simply too large for one navy, no
matter how powerful, to police them adequately. Other missions such as disaster relief
and humanitarian assistance have also become collaborative international enterprises.
The nature of many collaborative projects in defense of the system tends to equalize the
participants. In the maritime security business, the United States is not the kind of overwhelmingly influential presence it was as the leader of a military alliance in the Cold
War. It must get used to being a peer, not because its power has declined, but because
the nature of the business has changed. Nations as diverse as Italy, Singapore and Brazil
are new key players in the world of maritime security.
Defense of the system is also bedeviled by the absence of a clearly assignable enemy
(although this is also one of its virtues). Certainly Al Qaeda and other such movements
are a threat to the system, but they are covert and diffuse and hard to hem in with clean
definitions and characterizations. War among major powers is a principal threat to
the system, but war is a condition, and increasingly hard to nail down when it exists
and when it doesn’t. Are we in a war on terror? Are we already in a cyber-war? Climate
change, resource scarcity, volcanoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods and pandemics
are all threats to the system—but to what degree, and who can say where or how the
next one will strike? Planning for defense of the system is not like planning for a war;
it’s harder. Besides the lack of a clearly definable villain, it requires a systemic strategy
rather than a traditional contingent strategy. Wars are episodic whereas threats to the
system are continuous. This takes strategic planners into some intellectual terra incognita that is likely to be very uncomfortable.
Finally, defense of the system puts powerful nations in a form of the prisoners’ dilemma.
The prisoners’ dilemma is a game theory situation in which two prisoners are being
interrogated separately. If both cooperate—that is, each refuses to rat out the other—
the law has no case and they are released. If, however, one talks and the other doesn’t,
the talker gets lenient treatment and the ratted out person faces hard time. Obviously,
if the prisoners could communicate during interrogation, they could assure the most
favorable outcome because each could assure himself the other was not talking. On the
other hand, if both talked, each would do some hard time but less than if he kept silent.
If both China and the United States cooperate in adopting the defense of the system
approach, then the geopolitical risks that accrue to each from the other are substantially mitigated. However, if one decides to abandon it and secretly pursue a continental
or maritime approach, it might gain at least a temporary strategic advantage over the
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other. The way out of the prisoners’ dilemma is the free flow of information so that
each knows what the other is planning to do. This is not easy to achieve in the world
of strategic planning where levels of classification tend to be high. On the other hand,
the first step has already been taken by the United States with the publication of CS21,
in which it not only declares that defense of the system is an organizing principle, but
also refrains from naming China as a specific threat. If China reciprocated with some
kind of analogous unclassified strategic document, then at least both nations would
have made public declarations of the new approach to which the world could hold them
accountable. The most recent Chinese national defense white paper does not appear to
17
make any progress in this direction.
If we were to draw up a game theory matrix of the strategic options of both China and
the United States, we would list the strategic options for both sides and bounce them
together. Key to this analysis is the judgment that a true maritime approach to grand
strategy is not feasible for China regardless of how big a navy she builds. The maritime
approach requires allies, and as an authoritarian power, China is not likely to be able to
attract them. Similarly, while the United States may persist in an offensive version of the
continental approach (new versions of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), it is unlikely
to revert to isolationism, the defensive form.
Thus China can either follow its current course of continentalism with an expanding
maritime capacity, or adopt defense of the system. The United States can continue a de
facto offensive continentalist approach, a maritime approach (sometimes described as
offshore balancing) or defense of the system. If we mentally game out the interactions
between each of the options for both sides (specific outcomes or payoffs left to the imagination of the reader), we would find some potential outcomes more favorable to the
United States and some more favorable to China, with the box containing the outcome
generated by both pursuing defense of the system as being most favorable to each (neither prisoner rats out the other). However, in looking at the matrix of presumed results
as a whole, it appears that there would be a tendency for the United States to revert from
defense of the system to a maritime approach as a kind of default response to persistent
and aggressive continentalism by China and a tendency for China to revert from system
defense to the continental approach in response to perceived United States encirclement.
In other words, even if one or the other adopted defense of the system, it would not persist in this approach if it perceived the other was adopting some other approach—just
like a prisoner would quickly start talking to interrogators if he perceived that the other
one was starting to talk. The idea is to move from the most adverse outcome cell to the
least worst, which is the one in which both prisoners squeal on the other. The outcome
of this cell is conflict and war—expensive to both sides, with the ultimate winner likely
being the United States, albeit a banged-up and poorer United States. China might or
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might not implode, but its economic development would come to an end and internal
instability would rack it for decades.
Clearly, great powers are going to engage in some form of strategic hedging—that is,
preparing for the worst case. To invoke the prisoners’ dilemma analogy once more, if
strategic hedging is interpreted by the other as “talking to the interrogator,” then the
cycle of mistrust kicks in. The question becomes how prudent and appropriate strategic
hedging could be kept from being interpreted as “talking.” Clearly, strategic hedging
for both the United States and China involves the building and maintenance of strong
navies. This, in and of itself, should not be the cause for alarm. Rather it is how these navies are used that is the indicator of whether a nation is adopting one strategic approach
or another. A continentalist navy will attempt to erect barriers to keep others as far away
as possible. A maritime navy will attempt to hem in an opposing navy. The game theory
outcome box governed by both powers pursuing defense of the system would feature
each navy welcoming the other into its “turf.” From a hedging point of view, the United
States must accept China’s right to have a strong navy that can prevent invasion of her
territory and operate globally in support of legitimate sovereign interests as well as
system defense requirements. China, reciprocally, must accept the presence of the U.S.
Navy in East Asian waters in support of existing alliance arrangements and also system
defense needs. U.S. intelligence gathering and aircraft carrier operations in close proximity to China will inevitably be interpreted as “hemming in” operations, while Chinese
threats to use missiles against U.S. forces as well as collision incidents send the message that China is establishing keep out zones on the high seas. If defense of the system
was indeed the strategic approach of both nations, neither of these kinds of operations
would be needed and the naval tactical geometry of conflict would be avoided.
Declarative maritime policy is a start, but it will be the pattern of actions and policies
over time that will either build or erode strategic reassurance. The basic difficulty with
the defense of the system approach in this regard is that since it is necessarily cooperative, actions by the United States, say, to establish collaborative maritime security rela18
tionships with East Asian nations could be easily interpreted by China as encirclement.
Similarly, Chinese persistence in its current position on EEZ rights and exclusions
would be interpreted by the United States as buffer building. Both countries would have
to develop confidence-building measures that would indicate a true adherence to the
approach. One such measure might be to agree that any joint naval exercise conducted
between the United States and regional third parties would be at least observed, if not
participated in, by China. China, for its part, would have to adjust its interpretation of
the UN Law of the Sea provisions concerning the EEZ to match that of the United States
and most other nations. Neither of these measures would have any significant effect on
China’s island claims or the status of Taiwan. So long as neither country is intent on
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encirclement or exclusion, provisions such as these do no strategic harm. However, it is
open to question whether they would be acceptable to each country’s military leadership, and what the reactions to such measures by other nations in the region would be.
If the difficulties in adopting defense of the system are significant, so are the potential
benefits. The main one has already been mentioned—it avoids the zero-sum game. The
system is global, and while not all nations are functioning smoothly as members, and
while globalization has not been a uniform blessing to all peoples, its benefits for the
majority of nations and regions are very real and very great. Living standards around
the world are higher and growing because of it. The costs to any nation that wishes to
secede or to overturn it are much greater than before and may even be lethal. The great
and emerging powers of the world need each other, and the defense of the system approach is a way of aligning strategic planning with existing economic realities.
There is another potential benefit for China in adopting the defense of the system approach. The historical record shows that other than Rome and the Persian Empire (and
for them only partially and for relatively short periods) continental powers have not met
with success in developing naval power. The problem has not been so much that such
powers did not develop strong navies (which some did), but that they were not able to
19
develop effective strategies for using them. This is perhaps partially a function of the
nations’ accrued histories. Even where a successful transition from the continental to
the maritime approach has occurred, the United States being the principal example,
20
it is all too easy for leadership to lose its poise and revert. Defense of the system may
represent a strategic “halfway house” that provides context and coherency to a nation
that either does not have the resources or the political will to adopt fully the maritime
approach. Moreover, as a kind of “anti-Mahanian” concept, in that it requires neither a
strong capital ship fleet nor strings of bases, it allows a kind of gradualist approach to
execution. In terms of developing execution strategy, which has been a traditional weakness of continental powers trying to go to sea, defense of the system is far more tolerant
of errors since it is a collective and collaborative enterprise and allows for some strategic
flexibility. As mentioned at the outset of this paper, Canada, the second largest country
in the world in terms of land area, and possessing a relatively small navy, is adopting defense of the system as its approach. It has neither the population nor economic
power to build a big navy, and for most of the past century has been a participant in the
maritime strategies of Great Britain and the United States. Adopting the defense of the
system as its organizing principle allows Canada to justify the maintenance of a globally
deployable fleet of modest size while not having to function as an accessory to anyone
else’s foreign policy. Defense of the system allows even tentative initial efforts such as
the Chinese naval deployments for anti-piracy operations in the Persian Gulf to have
strategic coherency and utility.

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 06 Ch6System.indd December 2, 2013 9:59 AM

88

the newport papers

Conclusion: Prospects for Adoption
Despite the difficulties of pursuing the continental and maritime approaches in this
day and age, and despite the practical benefits of adopting defense of the system as a
strategic planning organizing principle, there will be considerable friction to overcome
in doing so. Influential voices in the United States are already opposing the policy of
strategic reassurance, and a pundit like Robert Kaplan has recently said,
Each of these states [of East Asia] is seeking to adjust the balance of power in its favor. This is why
United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s rejection of balance-of-power politics as a relic of
the past is either disingenuous or misguided. There is an arms race going on in Asia, and the United
21
States will have to face this reality when it substantially reduces its forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Similar debates are no doubt occurring within the Chinese government. Most fundamentally, shifting to defense of the system requires a change in strategic planning
culture, something that is likely to be difficult for both the United States and China. An
additional challenge for the United States is the periodic turnover, not just of administrations but of political philosophy, yawing between liberal and conservative.
Despite cultural inertia and opposition of various kinds there are reasons to think the
new approach has a fighting chance at adoption. First, it has been embraced by the U.S.
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the three largest and most powerful organizations of their kind in the world. Moreover, the U.S. maritime strategy, signed during
the Bush Administration, survived the transition to the Obama Administration. The
widespread international approbation the strategy has received will likely moderate any
internal bureaucratic influences to make arbitrary changes in order to advance careers
or make personal marks. Importantly, Canada’s adoption of it could spark a chain
reaction of adoption by other navies, creating a certain momentum the Chinese would
notice. While China would certainly not want to be seen jumping on any United States
inspired bandwagon, the opportunity for putting their own spin on it and its collaborative vice affiliated nature might tip their scale in its favor.
Of course, adoption of this approach by everyone would not eradicate conflict. China
will still want to assert what she sees as her legitimate rights and claims and to achieve
recognition and acceptance as a great power whose interests and opinions are respected.
The United States will continue to promote democracy and human rights, thus worrying and irritating an authoritarian China. However, through its adoption, the geopolitical geometry of conflict would change, and avenues for dispute resolution, previously
obviated by the interplay of the continental and maritime approaches to grand strategy,
might become feasible.
Defense of the global system is simply the articulation of an idea—albeit one that reflects the emergent realities on the ground and at sea. Like its traditional counterparts,
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the continental and maritime approaches, it is a way to rise above the trees and see the
strategic forest. Being simply an idea is no small thing, though, for as the preamble to
the UNESCO Charter states: “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”
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CHAPTER SEVEN

The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets
Definition of an optimist: a naval aviator with a savings account.
QUIP POPULAR IN NAVAL AVIATION

As we approach 2011, the centennial year of aviation in the U.S. Navy, the jet engine and
jet-powered aircraft have become ubiquitous. Today millions travel safely in jet airliners, and the military jet fighter is almost a cultural icon. However, in the late 1930s the
prospect for powering aircraft with anything but piston engines seemed remote, except
to a few visionary engineers in Great Britain and Germany. In the early 1940s their work
resulted in the first flights of jet-powered aircraft, but due to the low thrust of their
engines these aircraft were outclassed by existing piston-engine fighters. Additional
advances in engine design in Germany resulted in the fielding of the Me-262 Swallow
fighter, which, although not as maneuverable as the American P-51 Mustang or other
Allied fighters, had a top speed 100 mph faster, due to its jet engines and swept wings,
giving it significant operational advantages. After the war, aeronautical engineers from
all the Allied nations studied German technical advances and worked to incorporate
them into their new generations of fighters.
When the U.S. Navy introduced its first operational jet, the McDonnell F1H Phantom,
in 1947, it began a transition phase that turned out to be extended and very costly in
terms of aircrew lives and airplanes lost. The higher speeds and altitudes of jets presented a new set of problems to the aircraft designers and manufacturers, as well as to
the Navy squadrons that operated them. In 1946, nobody knew that a high-performance
jet fighter needed such appurtenances as a stabilator (instead of an elevator); irreversible, hydraulic flight controls with artificial feel; redundant hydraulic systems; pitch and
1
yaw stability augmentation; ejection seats; air conditioning; and others. Learning these
lessons required a trial-and-error process that resulted in the fielding and rapid obsolescence of a series of different jets, each reflecting solutions to the defects discovered in
earlier models.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2010, Vol. 63, No. 2
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F8U-2N Crusader.
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It is central to the story presented in this article to consider how long this “transition”
to jets lasted. Some histories of naval aviation regard the transition to jets to be substantially complete with the phasing out of the last propeller-driven fighter, the F4U Corsair,
while others maintain that the transition lasted until the introduction of the F-8 Crusader and F-4 Phantom II—the first Navy carrier-based fighters that were the equals of
their land-based counterparts. Another way of looking at it is through the lens of safety:
one might declare the transition to have been complete when the Navy aviation accident
rate became comparable to that of the U.S. Air Force. The logic behind this reasoning is
that whereas a multitude of factors—technical, organizational, and cultural—constitute
the capability to operate swept-wing jets, the mishap rate offers an overall indicator of
how successful an organization is in adopting a new technology. Using this criterion, the
Navy’s transition process lasted until the late 1980s—which was, not coincidentally, the
era in which the F/A-18 arrived in the fleet in numbers. This article argues that tactical
jet aircraft design and technology presented Navy aircrews, maintenance personnel, and
leaders with several major challenges that were in fact not substantially overcome until
the introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet in 1983. These challenges included such technical problems as engine reliability and response times, swept-wing flight characteristics,
and man/machine interface issues. The Air Force also encountered these challenges, but
the Navy’s operating environment and, indeed, its organizational culture kept it from
achieving a fully successful transition until well after the Air Force did.
Between 1949, the year jets started showing up in the fleet in numbers, and 1988, the
year their combined mishap rate finally got down to Air Force levels, the Navy and
Marine Corps lost almost twelve thousand airplanes of all types (helicopters, trainers,
and patrol planes, in addition to jets) and over 8,500 aircrew, in no small part as a result

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 07 Ch7Jets.indd December 4, 2013 10:43 AM

writing to think

95

F/A-18 Hornet.
U.S. Navy

of these issues. Perhaps the statistics for the F-8 Crusader, a supersonic fighter designed
by Vought in the late 1950s, provide a good illustration of the problem. The F-8 was
always known as a difficult airplane to master. In all, 1,261 Crusaders were built. By
the time it was withdrawn from the fleet, 1,106 had been involved in mishaps. Only a
2
handful of them were lost to enemy fire in Vietnam. While the F-8 statistics might have
been worse than those for most other models, they make the magnitude of the problem
clear: whether from engine failure, pilot error, weather, or bad luck, the vast majority
(88 percent!) of Crusaders ever built ended up as smoking holes in the ground, splashes
in the water, or fireballs hurtling across a flight deck. This was naval aviation from
1947 through about 1988. Today, the accident rate is normally one or less per hundred
thousand hours of flight time, making mishaps an unusual occurrence. This is in stark
contrast to the landmark year of 1954, when naval aviation (that is, Navy and Marine
combined) lost 776 aircraft and 535 crew, for an accident rate well above fifty per hundred thousand flight hours—and the rate for carrier-based tactical aviation was much
higher than that.
During this extended transition period, naval aviation participated in three major wars
and numerous crises, and, of course, many planes and crews were lost to enemy fire.
However, the vast majority of aircraft losses over this period were due to mishaps, many
of which were associated with the technical and organizational problems just mentioned. In other words, the airplanes that populated the flight decks of aircraft carriers
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from the introduction of the F1H Phantom through the retirement of the F-14 Tomcat
were, with few exceptions, hard to fly and maintain and would kill the unwary crew.
Many men and a few women gave their lives trying to operate these machines in the
challenging environment of the sea. This history is meant to recognize their sacrifice
and honor their service.
The Operational Imperative
U.S. naval aviation ended World War II at the pinnacle of success; its propeller-driven
aircraft were the best in the world, and the requirements of carrier suitability did not
compromise their performance versus that of land-based fighters. By the early 1940s the
Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics had received word of jet engine developments in Germany
and Great Britain and had commissioned Westinghouse and Allis Chalmers to build
American versions. However, the high fuel consumption, low power at takeoff, and poor
reliability of early engines did not make them attractive for use in carrier-borne planes.
Moreover, when details of German aerodynamic advances, specifically the swept wing,
became known, Navy planners felt that high landing speeds and adverse handling characteristics would make aircraft equipped with them unsuitable for carrier use.
On the other hand, the Navy was faced with a new opponent, the Soviet Union, that had
also capitalized on captured German knowledge. If the Soviets were to build a highspeed jet bomber, carriers might be defenseless if they could not launch high-speed
interceptors from their decks. As the Cold War came into being, this knowledge pressurized the development of jet aircraft, adding to the rapidity with which it took place
but also imposing brutal material and human costs.
An additional source of pressure was the new U.S. Air Force, whose leadership in the
postwar environment believed that the combination of the atomic bomb and the ultralong-range bomber rendered naval aviation irrelevant. The Navy had long regarded
strikes against land targets to be a fundamental mission of its own air arm, and the
prospect of being sidelined in the business of nuclear attack seemed to threaten the
very existence of naval aviation. In April 1949 the secretary of defense, Louis Johnson,
canceled the construction of USS United States, a very large aircraft carrier that had
been designed to support a new generation of big Navy jet bombers capable of carrying
the large and heavy nuclear weapons of the day. This cancellation, along with Air Force
efforts to push the huge B-36 bomber program at the expense of the other services,
produced in October 1949 an incident that has been termed the “Revolt of the Admirals.” Admiral Arthur Radford and other aviation flag officers, as well as the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Louis Denfeld, testified before Congress arguing
the need for an atomic delivery capability for naval aviation and alleging the deficiencies of the B-36—in direct contravention of the secretary of defense’s wishes. Although
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Admiral Denfeld was subsequently fired by the secretary, Congress was sufficiently
convinced of the Navy’s utility in strike warfare to authorize in 1951 the construction
of USS Forrestal, the first of the “supercarriers” that could adequately handle the heavy,
fast jets. However, the Navy still needed a jet to perform the mission of nuclear strike,
and development pressures continued.
The early Cold War operational environment was challenging for naval aviation, to say
the least. Knowing that the Soviet Union was working on jet fighters and jet bombers
that could carry nuclear weapons and drop them on naval formations, the Navy needed
to develop fighter/interceptor aircraft that could defend the carrier and its escorts
from attack while sailing into position to launch its own strike, and also strike aircraft
that had enough range to hit meaningful targets and enough speed to survive enemy
defenses. These general requirements propelled naval aviation development efforts from
the late 1940s through the 1970s. During this period, the actual employment of naval
aviation in two wars—Korea and Vietnam, as well as later in Desert Storm—demanded of Navy jets the flexibility to conduct conventional bomb delivery, close air
support, and dogfighting. Thus carrier jets morphed over time to designs that were
more general in purpose, resulting ultimately in the F/A-18 Hornet, an aircraft that is a
true strike-fighter.
Thus there was no opportunity for naval aviation to rest on its laurels after World
War II. In combination with a massive postwar demobilization, it had to forge ahead
with a program to adopt the new engine and aerodynamic technology. It attempted to
reduce strategic risk, by letting multiple contracts to different aircraft companies in
hopes that at least one of the designs would be viable. On the other hand, it accepted a
high degree of operational risk, by ordering series production of various models before
flight-testing was complete. The net effect of this strategy was that between 1945 and
1959 twenty-two Navy fighters made their first flights, whereas over the following forty3
six years only five did so. Some of the designs spawned during the early period, such as
the F2H Banshee, were useful machines and had lengthy service lives, while others, like
the F7U Cutlass and F-11 Tiger, were disappointments and saw only brief service.
As mentioned previously, the first years of the jet era in the Navy were disastrous in
terms of aircraft and crews lost, but the Navy had little choice but to continue sending
jets to sea. The gas-guzzling nature of jets made getting them back aboard the carrier
in a timely manner a matter of utmost urgency and increased the pressure on carrier
captains, admirals, and their staffs to adapt to an operational tempo very different from
what had been the norm. In 1950, a future vice admiral, Gerald Miller, was on a carrier
group staff operating F9F-2 Panthers in Korea. On one occasion the group staff meant
to swap sixty-four Panthers from an outgoing carrier to one just coming into the theater.
The weather was bad at airfields ashore, and heavy seas were causing the flight decks
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to pitch. The staff work and planning did not adequately take into account the limited
endurance of the new jet-powered aircraft. Miller’s description of what happened next
illustrates the consequences of learning to operate jets in a wartime environment:
We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried to bring them down and it was a tough job of
getting them on board. They were running out of fuel and there was no base on the beach to send
them to. We had to get them back on board those two carriers, and we broke up those planes in
some numbers.
It was awful. It was so bad, I can still remember the admiral walking over to the opposite side of the
bridge, putting his head down on his hands and shaking. It was so bad he couldn’t even get mad. It
was a horrible mess. Well, that was all because of the size of the ship, the nature of the airplanes and
straight deck operations. We started from debacles of that kind to get something better.
Considering the upheaval in the navy caused by demobilization and the introduction of new technologies, it’s amazing that we kept together as much as we did. . . . We worried, but we did proceed
4
with the jet program.

At the same time that naval aviators were attempting to master the new jet aircraft, they
were also grappling with two new missions that increased the degree of difficulty even
more: night or all-weather operations, and nuclear weapons delivery. In a sense, these
two missions were connected, in that it was felt that when the call came, weather or
darkness must not be allowed to stand in the way of getting the nuclear weapon to its
target. These two missions exerted considerable pressure on aircraft design and on the
risks naval aviation was willing to endure to put these capabilities to sea. Coupled with
the hazards inherent in jet-powered aviation in those years, they significantly contributed to the loss of aircraft. Gerald O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), describes the environment in
Composite Squadron Four (VC-4, based at Naval Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey),
the Navy’s East Coast night/all-weather fighter squadron in the early 1950s:

F9F-2 Panther.
Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum
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All naval aviators are routinely exposed to, or involved in, aircraft accidents. That’s accepted as
almost a hazard of the trade. In carrier work, where dangers abound, accidents tend to be more
frequent. In the night carrier operations of those days, accidents were so frequent that they were
considered commonplace and unexceptional. Whenever a det [detachment of four to six aircraft
sent out on a carrier] departed, the aircraft they flew off were more or less written off. No one
expected that all of them would ever come back to Atlantic City. . . . Unfortunately, the same negativism tended to extend to the pilots as well, whose safe return wasn’t much better than the aircraft.
Between pilots lost, the pilots maimed, and the pilots who decided to throw in their wings, precious
5
few dets ever returned with the same resources they took with them.

Naval Aviation Culture and the Transition to Jets
In order to understand the catastrophic price the Navy paid in its march to operate
swept-wing jets from aircraft carriers, we must look at the organizational culture onto
which this new technology was grafted. After all, the majority of the mishaps that occurred were due to aircrew errors of some sort, whether precipitated or exacerbated by
design problems or the result of gross error, negligence, or irresponsibility not connected with design issues.
Naval aviators always viewed themselves as daredevils. The difficulties of taking off
from and landing on ships were unequaled in the land aviation domain, and naval
aviators therefore considered themselves exceptionally skilled—and expendable. The
accident rate (if not the sheer number of mishaps) in naval aviation from its inception to
World War II was hardly less than the awful rates experienced in the early jet era. Naval
aviators always regarded themselves as a different breed from their surface-ship brethren, but for all that they shared, and still do, the Navy’s culture of independence and
self-reliance. The simplicity and relative inexpensiveness of early naval aircraft allowed
this culture to thrive; flight instruction was personal, and aviators had few detailed
procedures or rules to follow in mastering their aircraft. “Seat of the pants” flying and
individuality in technique were the orders of the day. Since piston-engine aircraft all operated essentially in the same way and roughly at the same speeds, especially when landing, and since they rarely flew at night or in bad weather, pilots could transition between
aircraft easily and informally. Mr. Richard “Chick” Eldridge, a member of the Naval
Safety Center staff for several decades, remembers his Navy flight training in 1943:
“To my recollection, there was little emphasis on aviation safety. What safety information was imparted to the fledgling aviator came from the primary instructors. Lessons
learned usually came in the form of ‘gems of instructor wisdom.’ You were simply told
6
to fly certain maneuvers in a specific way or wind up as a statistic.”
The first thing to change was the technology. Culture change lagged by more than a
decade, and the result was a virtual bloodbath. In addition to the specific challenges of
flying jets must be added greatly increased speeds. Things happen much faster in jets,
and a different mind-set and discipline are called for to avoid disaster. Pilots who had
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spent a good deal of time operating at propeller-aircraft speeds tended to have more difficulty adjusting to jet speeds than those who were introduced to jets early. The author
observed this during the Navy’s transition from the piston-engine S-2 Tracker carrier
antisubmarine aircraft to the jet-powered S-3 Viking. The more senior pilots seemed
to have the most difficulty, and indeed a number of them either quit, had accidents, or
failed to pass flight checks. This was a serious issue as well for the fleet introduction of
the A-3 Skywarrior. Initially, in addition to carrier pilots, the Navy brought into the A-3
program senior aviators from the land-based patrol community. A series of accidents
and difficulties involving former patrol pilots prompted the commander of the Sixth
Fleet to write a letter to the CNO recommending that only carrier-trained pilots be as7
signed to A-3 squadrons.

A-3 Skywarrior.
Courtesy National Naval Aviation Museum

In the early years of the jet transition, naval aviation remained wedded to its individualistic culture. Structured programs of training, detailed reference manuals, and disciplined evaluations of pilot performance did not exist in any coherent way across naval
aviation. But jets, with their higher speeds, challenging handling characteristics, and
ever more complex systems, required just that. The horrible accident rates eventually
drove the Navy to do something. Meanwhile, the Air Force, which had been suffering
an increase in mishaps also, formed a Flight Safety Directorate, with 525 personnel, and
undertook to impose discipline on the aviation corps by punishing crews after mishaps
when fault and culpability could be assigned. The Navy’s first effort at a flight-safety
agency was puny by comparison, with only twenty-five personnel. However, in 1953
a war hero, Captain James F. “Jimmy” Flatley, wrote a highly critical and influential
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report on naval aviation safety that generated organizational and procedural changes
8
that in turn went far to change the culture. Along with them, a more structured program of flight training was introduced, eventually culminating in the establishment
of replacement training squadrons that provided intensive and detailed instruction for
newly “winged” aviators in the aircraft they would fly in the fleet. These squadrons
would also become centers of flight and maintenance evaluation of fleet squadrons
based with them. A variety of other measures also served to professionalize and discipline the naval aviation culture, including formal training for squadron safety officers,
improved accident investigation techniques, specially trained medical personnel (called
“flight surgeons”), the publication of a safety magazine to share stories of accidents and
near misses, and top-down leadership that countered the laissez-faire cultural heritage.
However the “ready room” culture was resistant to change. Thus the authors of a
1961 Naval Aviation News article felt compelled to say, “Some people view the idea of
everyone in Naval Aviation doing everything ‘the one best way’ with some misgivings.
They fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it may reduce the accident
rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability to ‘think on his feet’ and deal flexibly
with emergencies and combat situations. Experience in other fields has proved that fear
9
unfounded.” A major element of the resistance to change was the fact that adaptation
to the new technology had a value content—that is, it made irrelevant certain skill sets
that had been associated with being a “good” aviator. The issue was not so much the
difficulty of learning new skills as reluctance to abandon old ones that were associated
with professional virtue. The naval aviation culture that had grown up from 1911 to
1947 was intense, parochial, and value-centric. Moreover, likely because of the acrimonious relationship that developed between the two services in the late 1940s, there was a
reluctance to view anything the Air Force did as appropriate for naval aviation.
The Navy has always placed considerable responsibility and authority in the hands of
the individual officer. An imperative of war at sea, this delegated style of command and
control has both enhanced and afflicted U.S. naval aviation. Throughout its history, outstanding decision making by relatively junior officers has made the difference in battle,
such as when, during the battle of Midway, Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky
decided, in the air, to take his strike group in the direction a Japanese destroyer was
headed and thus found the enemy aircraft carriers. Faced in the 1940s and ’50s with new
technology that demanded new types of procedural discipline and centralized management, the culture was slow to adapt, and many naval aviators lost their lives as a result.
Finding the Right Combination of Ingredients
The development of aviation technology between the Wright brothers’ first flight and
1947 was amazingly fast. In just forty-five years aviation progressed from machines
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that were hardly more than powered kites to jets that pushed the speed of sound. This
rapid development meant that individual models of combat aircraft became obsolete
fairly quickly. This had been the case prior to and during World War II, and it was
to be the case over the early years of jet transition in the Navy. The initial echelon of
straight-wing jets had an operational life span in the fleet of only a few years, although
some of them had longer, second lives in the reserves or specialized shore-based uses,
such as in training commands. In the late 1940s and the early ’50s, as whole squadrons
transitioned from propeller airplanes to jets, pilots who had developed habits molded
to straight-wing propeller planes that were slower, lighter, and simpler and burned fuel
more slowly were put into fast, gas-guzzling jets. It was a lethal combination.
As the centennial of naval aviation approaches, it is interesting to observe that it has
been jet powered for over half of its history. The transition was long and brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft. However, it was, by any measure, a success. Throughout
the Cold War and a series of hot wars—Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and others—
naval aviation has been able to provide effective tactical airpower from the sea. Its ability to do this despite a long and difficult process of learning how to operate jet aircraft at
sea is a tribute to the brilliance of various aircraft designers, the ingenuity of countless
“airdales,” the sailors who struggled to keep those complex and touchy machines flying,
and the bravery (and perhaps foolhardiness) of the crews who would climb into jets that
were hard to fly and lacked reliability and in those aircraft perform missions that took
them to the edge of what man and machine could do.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

The Future of Aircraft Carriers
The aircraft carrier has been around in various forms since the First World War. Its
emergence as the key denominator of naval power is legendary, and its continuing prestige in this role is even yet spawning building programs among established and growing
navies. The aircraft carrier is the largest and most complex of all warships and in most
cases the most expensive. In addition to the cost of the ship itself, that of the embarked
air wing must be considered, not to mention the extensive logistics and training infrastructure needed to keep carriers operating and useful. A recent Naval Postgraduate
School study has shown that approximately 46 percent of the Navy’s personnel—officer,
1
enlisted, and civilian—are assigned to positions either on or supporting its carriers.
For these and other reasons, there has been almost constant debate over the past ninety
years within navies, between navies and air forces, and within governments over the
advisability of investing in carriers. As the prospects for major cutbacks in defense
spending loom, the debate will again heat up. Both proponents and opponents of carriers have refined their arguments over the past nine decades, but these are now starting
to wear thin as the geopolitical environment and the technology of war have changed.
Also, the arguments both for and against have tended toward the theological, with many
tacit or unacknowledged assumptions underpinning the argumentative maneuvers. In
an attempt to improve the quality of the coming debates, this article will examine the
prospects for future utility of the ship type, including that of the embarked air wing,
from a different angle. Instead of making a holistic judgment on the future utility of
aircraft carriers, it will focus on the ways they have been, are, or could be used. Within
the bounds of security classification, it will also attempt to sort out the risk factors that
attend their use. Others may then proceed to decide whether a continued investment in
them is justified.
In order even to begin to analyze the future of aircraft carriers, a definition of the
type is warranted. It is easy to accept that the imposing, nuclear-powered Nimitz-class
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4
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carriers (CVNs) of the U.S. Navy are truly aircraft carriers, operating as they do robust
mini–air forces of sixty to eighty tactical jets and support aircraft. Similarly, the French
Charles de Gaulle and the Brazilian São Paulo are clearly aircraft carriers, if significantly smaller. The former Russian Varyag, now being refurbished by the Chinese, is also
clearly an aircraft carrier, meant as it is to handle fixed-wing jets as well as helicopters.
There are a number of similar ships around the world that are meant to support operations of short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) jets. However, the definition becomes
less clear in the case of ships that are capable of supporting STOVL jets but whose stated
purpose is either amphibious assault (the U.S. Wasp and Tarawa classes, for example)
or antisubmarine warfare (the Japanese Hyuga-class “destroyers,” which have ship-long
2
flight decks). Principally, though these latter ships are designed to operate helicopters,
they could have—and they have in fact—operated STOVLs. However, despite their ability to operate STOVL jets, these ships cannot be considered true aircraft carriers, since,
as will be seen, they cannot adequately perform the doctrinal roles that aircraft carriers
have historically fulfilled.
A Short Doctrinal History of Aircraft Carriers
Most histories of aircraft carriers focus on the progressive development of their physical
characteristics and their performance in battle. However, in order to understand the
issues that will influence their future, it is necessary to understand how the doctrinal
roles of aircraft carriers have evolved. Since navies in general and the U.S. Navy in particular do not publish doctrine along these lines, it is necessary to infer it from the way
the carriers have been used.
The normal way to discuss doctrinal roles of aircraft carriers is in terms of “sea control”
and “power projection”—this terminology being congruent with the way the U.S. Navy
describes its strategic missions. However, these terms are too broad and indiscriminate to allow clear analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of aircraft carriers. Power
projection could mean either one-time strikes or sustained, “level of effort” operations
to prosecute air campaigns against enemy infrastructure or in support of ground forces
with interdiction and close air support. However, it makes a critical difference whether
operations against land require a carrier to constrain its movements or not. Thus terms
like “power projection” and “strike,” and even “sea control,” are too broad to be useful
in this discussion. For the purpose of this article, they are subsumed, as appropriate,
within the roles described below.
The six doctrinal roles aircraft carriers have performed are presented below in roughly
the order they were adopted.
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Eyes of the Fleet. In their earliest instantiation in the U.S. Navy, aircraft carriers were
conceived of as platforms whose aircraft would be used to locate the enemy fleet before
it broke the horizon so that one’s own battle line could maneuver to engage at best
advantage. Once the battle lines were engaged within visual range, aircraft would spot
the fall of shot, adjusting the fire of major-caliber guns more quickly and accurately and
at longer ranges than could observers high in the battleships’ masts. In this role, the carrier would operate with its own fleet’s battle line interposed between it and the enemy;
without substantial defense of its own, the carrier could not be subjected to risk. Its air
wing would consist almost solely of scout planes, which was appropriate in view of the
limited performance of the aircraft of the day. However, it did not take long to realize
that the advantages of aircraft scouting and shot spotting were so great that an opposing
fleet would obtain its own carriers and embark on them fighters to shoot down scouts.
Thus carriers quickly became homes to fighter aircraft that could fight for and win air
superiority over the enemy fleet so that the scouts could do their mission.
Cavalry. In some of the fleet battle experiments in the 1930s and throughout most
of World War II, the carriers took on the mission of conducting hit-and-run raids,
3
the most famous of which was the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in early 1942. Operating
in a manner not unlike the cavalry of Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest in
the Civil War, the fast carriers depended on speed and stealth to sneak into waters in
which the Japanese fleet held sway in order to attack bases and otherwise disrupt enemy
logistical operations. In this role, the carriers could not risk getting into a decisive
engagement, any more than a Civil War cavalry brigade could risk becoming snared in a
dismounted fight with infantry.
Capital Ship. A “capital ship,” rightly understood, is a ship type that can defeat any
other ship type. In the days of sail and dreadnoughts, it was the type of ship having
the most and biggest guns. It is the ship type around which fleet doctrine and fleet
architecture are established. The question is what kind of killing weapon the capital
ship supports. In the early 1920s, as naval aviation was gestating, it became clear from
war games at the U.S. Naval War College that if aircraft performance kept increasing, a coordinated attack by carrier aircraft with armor-piercing bombs could sink a
battleship before it ever got in range of one’s own fleet. This notion was validated by
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and by the sinking of two British dreadnoughts
by Japanese land-based aircraft. Subsequently, the great carrier battles of the Pacific
determined the outcome of the war as much as great sailing-ship battles had those
of earlier conflicts. Used as capital ships, the acceptable risk profile for aircraft carriers changes substantially—they become consumables, just like any other capital ship.
However, in subjecting themselves to risk they must be able to inflict such harm on the
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main enemy force that it is not capable of further contesting “command of the sea” at
an acceptable level of risk to itself. Since the battle of Leyte Gulf, carriers have not been
used in this role.
When nations commit their capital ships to a battle, it is generally for command of the
sea, having achieved which, by virtue of defeating and seriously weakening the opponent’s main fleet, a force may use the seas for its own strategic purposes. Fighting
for sea control in specific instances may still be necessary. The carrier battles of World
War II were generally aimed at securing command of the sea; however, the carriers still
had to function as local sea-control platforms, a role in which they were very effective.
However, it should be noted that as the American fleet approached the Japanese home
islands, threats from land-based defenses required ever greater concentrations of carriers to secure sufficient control of the sea to allow amphibious operations to take place.
Nuclear-Strike Platform. The advent of nuclear weapons caused significant turmoil
within the U.S. military establishment. The newly independent Air Force argued that its
intercontinental nuclear bombers made aircraft carriers obsolete. The Navy, for its part,
sought to defend the carrier force by making it a part of the nation’s nuclear war plans
and deterrent posture. As a nuclear delivery platform, the carrier would operate a bit
as it did in the cavalry role, depending on speed and stealth to reach a point at which it
could launch its nuclear bombers. After that launch, it would attempt to survive as best
it could, either to get back to the United States or to be ready for additional tasking. The
point is that in this role, just as in the cavalry and capital-ship roles, its mode of operation was to deliver a pulse of power and then scoot—standing and fighting was a recipe
for destruction. Keeping risk acceptable was a function of the ability to stay unlocated
and untargeted. The ballistic-missile nuclear submarine replaced the aircraft carrier
in this role because the risk of it being found before it could fire its missiles was all but
eliminated.
Airfield at Sea. Three traditional rules govern how a fleet should be employed:
1. Keep the fleet concentrated.
2. Do not tie a mobile fleet to a piece of ground.
3. Do not become decisively engaged with land forces unless decisively superior.
These rules can be violated, but the conditions have to be right—namely, there can be
no significant opposition at sea. In order to support a ground fight ashore or conduct a
continuous air campaign (power projection in the “level of effort” mode), aircraft carriers have to break at least rules 2 and 3, and in order to maintain a carrier on station
for months or years, as was done in Vietnam, they must break rule 1. The requirement
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to feed aircraft continuously into a land fight essentially robs the aircraft carrier of its
maneuverability, due to the relatively short range of carrier-borne tactical jets. During
the wars in Korea and Vietnam and all operations since the fall of the Soviet Union, in
the almost complete absence of at-sea opposition, U.S. aircraft carriers have operated
exclusively in this role. The one exception was the U.S.-Soviet face-down in the eastern
Mediterranean in conjunction with the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and an assortment of Arab powers. In that crisis, three American carrier groups were positioned
to be ready to assist the Israelis with land strikes. Meanwhile, the numerically superior
4
Soviet Fifth Eskadra positioned itself to sink or disable the carriers. This represented a
fundamental paradox in doctrinal roles for the carriers, and they faced tactical defeat
had hostilities broken out, having insufficient sea room to maneuver so as to adopt
a capital-ship posture. The key to using carriers in the “airfield at sea” role is to take
explicit account of their inability to tolerate much risk at all.
Geopolitical Chess Piece. It has been the habit of American presidents and their advisers in the gamut of crises since World War II to move aircraft carriers around to demonstrate American concern, resolve, or outright anger. The particular benefits of using
carriers in this way are that they operate on the high seas, where permission to move
is not needed from other countries, and that because they carry their own fuel, weapons, and maintenance, they are ready on arrival at the scene of a crisis to deliver power.
Moreover, since modern U.S. carriers are large and imposing, and have been unchallenged on the seas, they “show the flag” to great effect—they provide excellent “visuals.”
Here too, however, precisely because they need to be visible in this role, and because
they normally must be ready to function also as an airfield at sea, carriers cannot tolerate any significant risk. This was the difficulty in the Yom Kippur War crisis mentioned
previously. The Navy and the nation are so used to operating carriers with impunity as
airfields at sea that as new sea-denial threats emerge (as did the Soviet navy) the potential for a role/risk disconnect is magnified.
Another definition of “capital ship,” though not unrelated to its operational definition,
is that of a ship type whose power, expense, and prestige are so great that it becomes the
yardstick for measuring a nation’s naval power. This definition is essentially a different
slant on the “geopolitical chess piece” role. This view arose especially during the age of
dreadnoughts, when the Washington Treaty attempted to rein in naval arms races by
5
formally limiting the tonnage of battleships. Aircraft carriers became the objects of
this type of thinking, and this is one of the reasons that a number of emerging navies, as
well as established navies under pressure from shrinking budgets, are electing to devote
higher proportions of their resources to building them.
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However, for the United States, this thinking could become a geopolitical trap. The
Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers are built at only one yard, in Newport News, Virginia.
Currently, they are being built at the rate of one every five years, in order to maintain
the Navy’s inventory of them at eleven. One of these carriers, including its air wing,
costs about as much as ten nuclear submarines or almost twenty guided-missile destroyers. When debates arise about how many carriers this nation really needs, one of the
arguments employed to oppose reductions is that if it does not keep building these
ships, it will lose the workforce needed to construct hem. Not having the capability to
construct a large nuclear-powered carrier would, some argue, put the nation at strategic
risk. However, this line of reasoning seems to be based more on the general notion that
carriers represent national strength than on any specific strategic or operational necessity. Even if it does not build another carrier after USS Ford, the United States will have
nuclear carriers around for at least the next fifty years. It does not seem reasonable to
presume that the strategic future of the United States hinges on a few thousand shipyard
workers in Virginia.
Other Roles for Aviation Ships
In World War II, the majority of the aircraft carriers the United States built were termed
“escort carriers.” These small ships could carry only a few aircraft and were used mostly
for antisubmarine (ASW) work or for air support of amphibious operations. Because of
their limited capacity and slow speed, they could not be adequately used in any of the
six doctrinal roles outlined above. In the 1950s, a number of World War II fast carriers
of the Essex class were converted to antisubmarine carriers. These ships carried mostly
sub-hunting aircraft, with a few jets for self-defense. Other Essexes were turned into
helicopter carriers, for helo-borne assaults over the beach. Once these ships had passed
their useful service lives, vessels designed from the keel up as helicopter carriers were
put into service; progressively newer designs have entered the fleet ever since. Some new
versions of the through-deck aviation ship now complicate the matter of designation.
The recently commissioned Spanish “strategic projection ship” Juan Carlos would seem
to blur doctrinal boundaries, because it features a “ski jump” for operating STOVL jets.
Nevertheless, the ship’s design focuses on amphibious operations more than any of the
doctrinal roles mentioned above.
Aside from ship designs or conversions with specific mission focuses of ASW or
amphibious assault, regular aircraft carriers, by virtue of their inherent flexibility,
have been pressed into service in a number of collateral missions in recent years, most
prominently disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In this mode they mostly
operate helicopters, although other aspects of their capability come into play, such as
communications, freshwater distillation, and medical capacity. It is worthwhile noting
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at this point that the impetus behind the forthcoming new Chinese aircraft carrier may
have been more frustration at inability to participate in the 2004 tsunami relief effort in
Indonesia (where the Nimitz-class carrier USS Abraham Lincoln played a key part) than
a desire to face down American carriers.
In considering the future of aircraft carriers, we should understand that aviationcapable ships engaging in specialized or collateral missions will always be needed to
some extent. Whether ships used for these purposes look like aircraft carriers or not, the
calculus for the advisability of building them will be different from that which governs
true aircraft carriers.
The Impact of Future Technology
Armed with an understanding of their doctrinal roles, we can proceed to assess how
current and future weapons and systems technologies might affect the utility of aircraft
carriers. It is a matter not simply of whether the carrier can be defended or not but of
whether it can fulfill the doctrinal role the nation requires of it.
Antiship Ballistic Missiles. Professional journals have been full of articles analyzing
the potential impact of the recently developed Chinese DF-21F intermediate-range ballistic missile, fitted with a maneuvering reentry head that has an antiship seeker built
into it. The purpose of this missile is thought to be not so much to sink the carrier as to
achieve a “mission kill,” causing fires and damage to the air wing and topside structures. If the missile system is perceived to be effective at this, then its existence and the
presence of its mobile transporter/erector/launchers would constitute a deterrent to
U.S. interference in an invasion of Taiwan or in other Chinese initiatives within about
a thousand miles of China’s coast. Assuming that a terminal, hit-to-kill defense is not
feasible against it, this missile would seem to threaten seriously the future utility of the
aircraft carrier anywhere within its range. On the other hand, having a seeker, it could
be vulnerable to decoying. If this is the case, the probabilities for missile success are
reduced. This leads us to think in terms of what role the carrier might be playing as it
sails into DF-21 threat range. If the carrier is functioning as cavalry, a capital ship, or a
nuclear-strike platform—that is, delivering a pulse of power and then escaping—the risk
tolerance inherent in those roles might be compatible with the reduced but still significant threat posed by the DF-21. If, however, the carrier is being used as either an airfield
at sea or a geopolitical chess piece, its mobility sacrificed and the risk incurred likely
would be incommensurate with the role.
Submarines, Antiship Cruise Missiles, and Other Access-Denial Systems. The effect of
these systems is similar to that of the DF-21. Current and anticipated defensive systems
for the carrier are likely to be able to handle small numbers of these weapons. However,

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 08 Ch8Carriers.indd December 2, 2013 10:11 AM

110

the newport papers

when larger numbers are employed against the carrier—and this will probably only happen in littoral waters—the likelihood of “leakers” increases. Once again, depending on
the role the carrier is playing, the risk may be tolerable, especially if the carrier is free to
maneuver. If a combination of geography and doctrinal role constrains its mobility and
maneuverability, the risk climbs quickly.
Some have advocated, on these grounds, that smaller carriers ought to be built in larger
numbers to achieve “tactical stability,” the condition in which the defensive capabilities of the ship and its contributions to the overall offensive power of the force are in
balance. Games at the Naval War College have cast some doubt on this logic, quite
apart from considerations of the relative efficiency of large and small flight decks. It
appears that doctrinal role is a governing factor. In general, it seems that if mobility is
compromised by doctrinal role, the net risk to the force is the same, whether the force is
composed of one or two large, or four to six small, carriers. Nothing changes, except in
the inefficiencies and added cost of multiple small carriers.
Improved Air-Defense Systems. In one important sense, the viability of tactical airpower is the essence of the future utility of aircraft carriers. New types of surface-to-air
missile systems have made operation of nonstealthy aircraft within their range excessively risky. Also, new generations of fighters, notably the Su-27, its derivatives, and even
newer designs from Russia and China, have eroded the technical advantages traditionally enjoyed by American aircraft. New types of air-to-air missiles, fighter radars, and
sophisticated crew/system interfaces have similarly lessened the advantage our superior
training has conferred. All of this calls into question the utility of aircraft carriers as
strike (cavalry) platforms or airfields at sea against a well armed opponent. The same
trend holds in the arena of war at sea, at least with respect to surface-to-air missiles,
and may compromise the viability of the aircraft carrier in the capital-ship role. To
fight modern, high-tech air defenses, sea or land based, missiles may be the only viable
answer, although very stealthy unmanned aircraft operating from aircraft carriers may
also be viable, especially if equipped with short-range attack missiles.
Short-Takeoff/Vertical-Landing Jets. The advent of the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) promises to enhance significantly the overall capabilities of a ski jump–
equipped carrier. The question is whether this increase in capability would both allow
such smaller aviation-capable ships to function as regular aircraft carriers and change
the calculus of the various doctrinal roles. It appears that the F-35B will offer increases
in range and load-carrying capability over the AV-8 Harrier, the British-developed
“jump jet” that has served a number of navies and the U.S. Marines for decades.
However, these increases do not come close to bringing the F-35B into the same class
as conventional-takeoff-and-landing carrier aircraft, and the range and endurance
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of even these are short enough to require the carrier to get in rather close to the fight.
The principal advantages of the F-35B will be its increased connectivity, sensing, and
stealth—all good things, but not sufficient to change the logic inherent in the doctrinal
roles. Moreover, the small number of aircraft that can be carried on the ski-jump carriers limits their ability to perform some of the doctrinal roles. They will likely remain
useful support ships for amphibious and antisubmarine operations, especially operating
helicopters, and will constitute prestige platforms for small navies to show the flag.
Unmanned Aircraft (UAVs). What could potentially change the calculus of doctrinal
roles is the unmanned aircraft. For a given “deck spot” (the square footage an aircraft
takes up parked on a carrier’s flight or hangar deck), unmanned aircraft offer double or
triple the range and endurance of manned aircraft. Moreover, without the need to accommodate a human, their form can be considerably more stealthy, and their operations
do not need to take into account crew-rest factors, at least to the extent that they do in
manned aircraft. What this may offer in terms of doctrinal roles is a return of the carrier as the eyes of the fleet, operating a wing of long-range UAVs for reconnaissance and
perhaps line-of-sight communications relay. A carrier could then remain outside most
threat “envelopes,” with much more scope for maneuvering to keep from being targeted.
The longer range of UAVs (including unmanned combat aerial vehicles, or UCAVs)
would also allow the carrier to function as an airfield at sea with less risk. In terms of
command and control, however, UAVs that require a constant “man in the loop” would
not offer as much flexibility to the carrier as those with higher degrees of autonomy.
Future Doctrinal Roles
The traditional rationale for aircraft carriers is that they provide tactical airpower
independent of land bases and that—no small thing—they are ready to do so on arrival.
While all of this is true and constitutes concrete benefits of having aircraft carriers,
the real arguments for and against them reside in their doctrinal roles. Which of the
traditional roles are obsolete? Do the remaining ones justify continuing investment in
aircraft carriers? Are there emerging or potential roles for carriers that would justify
building more?
As has been mentioned, the development of unmanned aircraft may revitalize the
primordial role of aircraft carriers as eyes of the fleet. Operating a wing of various kinds
of UAVs, the carriers could conduct what is known as C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) or establish a
grid of airborne relay nodes that would support a fleet battle network if satellites were
destroyed or intense jamming occurred. Because of the vulnerability of land bases to
ballistic missiles, and at increasing distances from potential war zones, the arguments
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that the Navy has used in the realm of tactical airpower to justify carriers also serve for
carrier-based C4ISR. As with tactical airpower, regardless of how long aircraft range
is and how much in-flight refueling is available, if land bases are distant from the area
of operations, it takes far more aircraft to generate a continuous presence in the battle
space and operations are far less responsive and flexible than they would be if based
from a nearby carrier. A local source of UAVs, if land bases are far away, is invaluable
operationally and strategically.
The cavalry role for carriers, practiced as late as the 1986 El Dorado Canyon strikes
on Libya, has become a victim of the missile age. In the most recent round of strikes on
Libya, Tomahawk cruise missiles were used. Now possessing guided-missile submarines
that can carry over a hundred Tomahawks, the Navy does not have to accept risks of
running a carrier surreptitiously into hostile waters to carry out a strike or subjecting
manned tactical aircraft to robust air defenses. In a similar manner, the introduction of
the ballistic-missile submarine made the carrier nuclear-strike role obsolete. Whatever
the trade-offs between tactical aircraft, manned or unmanned, and missiles, the lethality of modern air defenses and the difficulty of moving naval forces undetected militate
strongly against using carriers in this role. It does not appear that a carrier operating
UCAVs would offer any significant advantage in the cavalry role over a submarine carrying cruise missiles.
As for the capital-ship role, in the missile age the whole concept may be obsolete. There
has been a constant ebb and flow of technical and tactical superiority of the offense
and defense at sea, but mostly the offense now dominates—modern antiship missiles
are very fast and hard to shoot down. Certainly, they are dependent on the successful
functioning of their seeker heads; these can be decoyed or blinded, and the prospect of
6
close-in directed-energy defenses may tilt the balance in favor of the defense. However,
a successful defense of the carrier does no good if the carrier cannot in turn succeed in
attacking enemy naval forces. Improvements in air-defense technology by Russia and
China and the prospects for their proliferation will make the tactical offense progressively more difficult and risky. It should be recalled that in the great carrier battles of
World War II, the aircraft losses were brutal, on the order of 70 percent for the Japa7
nese and 28 percent for the Americans. In the late 1970s, as naval aviation developed
aircraft-centric antiship tactics in the aftermath of the wake-up call of the 1973 episode,
it became clear that a single strike on a single formation of Soviet ships might cost a
8
quarter of an air wing. Whereas we were able to replace such losses in 1942–45, no such
thing would be possible today, given the complexity and expense of modern jets.
The upshot is that the seas, at least certain areas of them, are becoming a no-man’s-land
for surface ships. Whether or not submarines ought to be considered capital ships is
beside the point; the carrier will likely not be one. On the other hand, for scenarios short
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of high-end missile combat, there is no ship more able to exercise general control of a
large ocean area than an aircraft carrier, fanning out its air wing to scout and identify
surface vessels. Carrier aircraft probably are the best counter, for example, to the smallboat swarms that some countries, like Iran, have adopted, assuming the carrier can
operate out of range of the densest littoral defenses.
Currently, the “airfield at sea” is almost the exclusive role for the large aircraft carrier, essentially fused with that of the “geopolitical chess piece.” This (combined) role
will continue to be highly useful into the future, so long as the intensity of defenses
stays below a certain threshold. If either high-tech air or naval defenses proliferate, the
number of areas and scenarios in which carriers can function in this role will decline. If
this happens, the value of the carrier as a geopolitical chess piece will erode proportionately. This is a key uncertainty about the future and a central difficulty in assessing the
future value of aircraft carriers. If a ground fight occurs close to the coast and a carrier
could move in with impunity to provide air support, perhaps through-deck amphibious
ships flying STOVL aircraft would suffice. But their capacity to generate sorties and the
number of targets they can strike are nowhere near what is possible for large carriers
with catapults and arresting wires; moreover, if deep penetration is needed, as has been
the case in Afghanistan, nothing less than a large carrier operating conventional aircraft
will do. Because of miniaturization, advanced electronics, and advances in missile,
mine, torpedo, and submarine design, it is becoming easier to hide naval defenses. A
particular case in point is the Club-K cruise missile marketed by the Russian company
Novator. Four missiles could be housed in an innocuous-looking shipping container,
hidden in plain sight and ready to be fired from trucks, railroad cars, or commercial
9
ships. Similar advances in covertness can be expected in other weapons types. The
implication is that it will be difficult or impossible to “sanitize” an area where a carrier
can function as an airfield at sea.
What new doctrinal roles might emerge for the aircraft carrier? One that comes to mind
is a variation on “eyes of the fleet.” If the struggle for sea control migrates to below the
surface, an aircraft carrier might be highly useful as a submarine-support vessel. The
carrier would not only provide C4ISR services for submarines but disrupt air and surface ASW efforts by the enemy, perhaps even conduct ASW itself. Especially if operating long-range UAVs, the carrier might be able to maneuver more widely and thereby
perform this role at an acceptable degree of risk—or better put, at a level of risk commensurate with the doctrinal role.
Another potential supporting role for the carrier is as a mother ship for the littoral
combat ship (LCS). The LCS has limited sea-keeping capability and must have a source
of logistical support relatively close by, especially if it is to operate at high speed and
high combat tempo. If a squadron of LCSs must enter a high-threat area where there are
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no bases and where regular logistical ships would be at excessive risk, a nuclear carrier
might be the answer. Having considerable fuel and ammunition-storage capacity, high
sustained speeds, and self-defense ability (with its escorts), a carrier could range around
undetected or untargeted until a covert rendezvous with one or more LCSs could be
arranged. While a logistical support system that employs submarines might be the ideal,
this arrangement may be the most feasible in the short term. In conjunction with this
role, the carrier, operating both manned and unmanned aircraft, could provide tactical
scouting for littoral combat vessels as well as a secure and robust local battle network.
A New Calculus
This assessment of doctrinal roles is revealing. Certain roles for the carrier are already
obsolete, and others are eroding. A few new roles are emerging, but these place the
carrier in a new position in relation to the rest of the fleet. Whereas the carrier has
been the central pivot of the fleet since World War II, the arbiter and yardstick of naval
supremacy and the keystone of fleet architecture, it will gradually become a more narrowly useful role player. There will be, for the foreseeable future, situations that demand
an aircraft carrier, so it can be said with confidence that the ship type will be needed.
However, the constriction in its roles and in the locations and circumstances in which it
could be appropriately used (i.e., where doctrinal role and risk intersect) indicates that a
new calculus is needed to determine how many the U.S. Navy really needs.
This article has dealt only obliquely with the issue of small versus large carriers. The
author has served on both types and is convinced that nonnuclear ships under about
eighty thousand tons sacrifice too much total combat capability to be worthwhile
investments as aircraft carriers. On the other hand, aviation ships that can support operationally significant numbers of helicopters and STOVL jets will be useful in amphibious and antisubmarine operations as well as a host of others, including disaster relief,
noncombatant evacuation, and various types of humanitarian assistance.
An embedded implication in all this for amphibious operations should be noted. If
things are too hot to allow a carrier to operate as an airfield at sea, they are too hot for
an amphibious assault. If the number of times and places a carrier can operate as an airfield at sea decrease, they decrease as well for amphibious operations. Any assumptions
about the ability to “roll back” enemy defenses must be severely tempered by the likelihood that new technologies will produce weapons that can be hidden from preemptive strikes—like the improvised explosive devices and car bombs that have been such
intractable problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is no question that some capacity
for amphibious operations from the sea will be needed in the future, but a rigorous and
objective analysis of the number of times and places in which they would be possible is
warranted, and as with carriers, a new calculus for sizing that capability is needed.
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Another key consideration that would govern carrier force structure is deployment
posture. Since World War II, the United States has maintained a forward-deployed
posture for the Navy, at times severely stressing its capacity. The Navy has found that for
each carrier it wants to keep forward, it needs two additional ones to account for crew
deployment tempo, training, and maintenance requirements. In theory, then, any carrier force level ought to be divisible by three. However, an additional carrier is needed
to compensate for the extended yard periods required for nuclear refueling. That adds
up to ten CVNs, but Congress has legislated that the Navy maintain eleven, the “extra”
carrier being available for surge operations. There is currently a carrier homeported
forward in Japan, which provides additional scheduling flexibility. In practice, however,
the demand for carriers by the combatant commanders, coupled with the Navy’s Fleet
Response Plan deployment scheme (which seeks to maximize the number of carriers
available for surge operations), makes even eleven carriers seem insufficient. But the
increasing expense of tactical jets and delays in their development, as exemplified by
the JSF, means that there will not be enough aircraft to populate eleven flight decks
adequately, let alone a higher number.
In the future, as the doctrinal roles of the aircraft carrier change and become more narrowly defined, the number of carriers needed forward at any time may decline. Using
the reverse of the standard Navy calculus, for every carrier not needed to be stationed
forward, the total inventory could, in theory, be reduced by three. The savings would be
enormous, and, if this analysis of doctrinal roles is correct, there would be no reduction
in the overall war-fighting effectiveness of the Navy, assuming the money saved could
be reinvested, at least in part, in missiles, submarines, and surface ships. On one hand,
a reduction of one carrier on station would take the Navy to a force of eight CVNs. On
the other hand, if new doctrinal roles do materialize, a higher number of carriers may
be warranted. USS Enterprise, the first nuclear carrier, commissioned fifty years ago, is
on a forward deployment as this article is written. There is no reason to think that the
Nimitz-class carriers will have shorter service lives, and the newer ones may last even
longer. There is at least reason to think that a number of these ships will outlive the
utility of any given type of embarked aircraft. This makes it difficult to assess the return
on investment of additional new construction beyond Ford or its follow-on ship. If the
possible doctrinal roles for the aircraft carrier become too risky or are significantly
constrained in terms of where and when they might be feasible, the value of so expensive
a platform will be called into question.

The purpose of this article has been to explore the future of the aircraft carrier using the
framework of doctrinal roles. It appears that despite changing technology there will be
a continuing need for the ship type, although the obsolescence of some doctrinal roles
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and the anticipated constriction of its use as an airfield at sea may limit the numbers
that are justified. New doctrinal roles may emerge, depending on the flexibility of mind
shown by the naval aviation community. However, even if these new roles do pan out,
they may not justify significantly greater numbers of ships. Moreover, the carrier’s day
as the supreme arbiter of naval power and the determinant of fleet architecture may be
coming to a close. Its continuing utility will increasingly be in support roles. Once this
shift occurs, it may actually be easier to arrive at an objective determination of numbers
required, as much of the emotional and political baggage surrounding them will have
been shed.
If we mark the emergence of the aircraft carrier as sovereign of the seas at the British
carrier strike on the Italian fleet at Taranto in 1940, we see that the carrier has enjoyed a
period of dominance of over seventy years, substantially longer than that of the dreadnought. To paraphrase Yogi Berra, the future of the aircraft carrier isn’t what it used
to be, but it is fairly clear the type will be around more than long enough to celebrate a
century and a half of service.

Notes
The author wishes to extend his appreciation to
Captain (Ret.) Wayne Hughes, of the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School, and Dr. Thomas C. Hone for
their keen insights and useful suggestions, which
have improved the quality of this article.
1. Juan Carrasco [Lt., USN], “A Manpower Comparison of Three U.S. Navies: The Current
Fleet, a Projected 313 Ship Fleet, and a More
Distributed Bimodal Alternative” (master’s
thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 2009), p. xvii, available at edocs
.nps.edu/.
2. See Vice Adm. Yoji Koda, “A New Carrier
Race? Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga,”
Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 (Summer
2011), pp. 31–60.
3. For the interwar exercises see Albert A. Nofi,
To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet
Problems, 1923–1940 (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 2010).
4. See Lyle Goldstein and Yuri Zhukov, “A Tale of
Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973
Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean,” Naval
War College Review 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004),
pp. 27–63.

5. Aircraft carrier tonnage too was limited by the
treaty, indicating that the carrier had already
become identified as a type of capital ship.
6. Obscurants might do so as well, as argued by
Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications
of Obscurants: History and the Future,” Naval
War College Review 63, no. 3 (Summer 2010),
pp. 73–84.
7. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2000), pp. 102–106.
8. The author was a weapons and tactics officer
in the A-7 community at that time; this assertion is based on personal experience in both
planning and conducting exercise strikes.
9. It should be noted that Russian officials
have denied that these missiles could be
launched from a shipping container. See
“Club-K Container Missile System,” Kontsern
Morinformsistema-AGAT, www.concern-agat
.ru/, for the company’s position. It is interesting, however, that the company has used in
its advertisements web videos of the missile
being fired from shipping containers.

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 08 Ch8Carriers.indd December 2, 2013 10:11 AM

CHAPTER NINE

Pigeonholes and Paradigm Shifts
Getting the Most Out of Unmanned Aircraft
The assimilation of a new technology by an organization is a complex undertaking. Besides the opposition of people who view it as a threat, a subtle phenomenon that sometimes occurs is a failure of the organization to fully leverage the technology because of a
failure of imagination. The new technology is at least initially forced into existing roles
and functions—slotted, that is, into established intellectual pigeonholes. In this way, the
organization, while adopting a new technology, will fail to take full advantage of it. This
1
article will explore potential uses of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that go beyond
seeing them as merely unmanned versions of existing manned aircraft in order to help
the Navy take full advantage of this new technology.
Pigeonhole 1: Pilots
In the original Star Wars movie Luke Skywalker piloted an X-wing fighter with his
trusty droid R2-D2 in the back. Single-seat aviators of the era (like the author) noted
with some glee the allegorical automation of the naval flight officer. It appeared that
the function of piloting was inherently human, system management being something
a robot could handle. However, even at their current stage of development, the flight of
unmanned aircraft is considerably more automated than, say, radio-controlled model
airplanes, which indeed must be flown. UAVs such as Global Hawk are capable of autonomous takeoff, navigation, and landing. It is the pilot function that has been automated;
it is the naval flight officer function that still requires human decision making. This is
the leading edge of a paradigm shift: pilotless aircraft operated by pilotless squadrons
or perhaps not by squadrons at all. The shift may go further, possibly obviating the
need for any kind of “winged” specialist. The Navy has been operating, after all, a large
fleet of highly lethal unmanned aircraft since the 1950s that has been controlled almost
exclusively by surface warfare officers. These aircraft are called missiles. As UAVs attain
Appeared in slightly different form in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (July 2012); reprinted from
Proceedings with permission; copyright © 2012 U.S. Naval Institute/www.usni.org
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more and more autonomy, the nature of human oversight will change, being involved
less with the physics of their functioning and more with the broader decisions of when
to launch, how many, where to place them, and targeting. It is not clear that, at this level
of decision making, an aviation specialist is either necessary or desirable. This notion
would appear to bust some naval aviation rice bowls and would very likely find ready
opposition in some circles. However, it is not difficult to imagine a future Navy in which
the UAV “squadrons” are manned solely by maintenance personnel and the craft are
controlled by naval “general staff” officers who inhabit a maritime operations center
(MOC). This kind of arrangement could up the odds that UAVs would be used efficiently and perhaps more creatively.
A serious question that will attend the use of armed UAVs that have increasing degrees
of autonomy is where in the “kill chain” moral agency should exist in the form of
human decision making. Failures in the form of blue on blue or the inadvertent
targeting of non-combatants have occurred with both manned and unmanned aircraft. It is not evident at this point how and where moral agency ought to be exerted
with autonomous or semi-autonomous armed aircraft, but what does seem clear is that
this question ought not to be hostage to traditional notions of who should control
what. Existing naval cultural norms concerning centralization and delegation should
be subordinated to the central issue of assuring effective moral agency in the kill
chain, and our organizational paradigms will influence how effectively this question is
answered.
Pigeonhole 2: Aircraft Carrier Doctrinal Roles
The Navy’s allergy to written doctrine, or at least to adhering to it, is well known. However, that does not mean that the Navy does not have doctrine. A tacit form of doctrine
that has been around for most of its history involves the roles assigned to different types
of ships. Aircraft carriers, while an extremely versatile ship type, have historically been
used in a limited set of doctrinal roles. When USS Langley was commissioned, she was
assigned to the doctrinal role of “eyes of the fleet.” In this role her aircraft would scout
for the enemy and spot the shot of the battleships. Subsequently, as naval aircraft gained
2
capability, the aircraft carrier assumed other roles: capital ship, nuclear strike platform,
3
geopolitical chess piece, and airfield at sea, to mention the most prominent ones. Other
ships have their own sets of roles. In the post–Cold War era, because of the lack of any
significant naval opposition, the aircraft carrier has been almost exclusively used as
an airfield at sea. The Northrop Grumman X-47B is a prototype UAV that is meant
to operate from an aircraft carrier. In a sense, this craft is an unmanned version of an
4
F/A-18 Hornet or F-35C Joint Strike Fighter. One would expect, therefore, that while the
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fleet introduction of the X-47B would enhance the functioning of the carrier air wing, it
would not change the doctrinal role of the carrier.
But what if we imagined a different doctrinal role for the aircraft carrier? What might
UAVs, with their doubling or tripling of range and endurance over manned aircraft,
allow us to do with the CVN that cannot be done now? One possibility that comes
to mind is a return to a version of the carrier’s original role, eyes of the fleet. Due to
technological advances such as the Chinese ballistic anti-ship missile that presents an
increasing threat to the carrier in China’s near seas, the U.S. Navy might elect to conduct a sea fight with its own new set of anti-ship missiles. These missiles, launched from
5
submarines, aircraft or surface ships, will need C4ISR support. If the Chinese succeed
in shooting down our satellites and are thus able to disrupt our networks, we will have
to reconstitute them locally. If we had a wing of long-range and endurance UAVs on a
carrier, it could populate the battle space with both ISR and line-of-sight communications relays for the battle-force network. While some of these services could be provided
from land-based UAVs such as the Navy’s version of Global Hawk (Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance, or BAMS), the same logic that favors local carrier-based aircraft over long6
range land-based bombers also favors carrier-based C4ISR UAVs.
Resurrecting Old Pigeonholes
What other uses might the Navy find for UAVs? It has been said that if you want a new
idea, read an old book. In this case the old book is a set of former naval concepts that
never quite worked out because the technology of the day was insufficient to make them
viable. The application of UAVs, however, might give them new life.
Son of Akron and Macon
Akron and Macon were two giant dirigibles the Navy operated in the 1930s. Their
distinguishing feature was the capability to launch and recover biplane fighters via a
“sky hook.” These fighters would be used to extend the scouting horizon of the dirigible
and for self-defense. Tragically, both dirigibles were lost in storms, and the notion of
an “aerial aircraft carrier” died with them. UAVs may allow us to resurrect this concept, not with modern lighter-than-air mother ships but with C-130s and C-17s. These
transports have rear ramps that can be lowered in flight. UAVs could be launched and
recovered while in flight. The operation of UAVs via these aircraft opens up many opportunities for leveraging their capabilities. We could, for instance, deliver hordes of
mini-UAVs that could not otherwise get to a desired area of operations. Large transport
aircraft could recover larger UAVs that were launched from subs or other ships that
could not recover them. The possibilities abound.
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Son of Arapaho
Arapaho was originally an Army concept for embarking an aviation detachment on
a container ship. The Navy subsequently took the idea into consideration as a way of
7
creating a convoy self-escort capability (in the Cold War days). All the aviation support
capability would be in containers and a helo/Harrier flight platform would be mounted
on top. An Arapaho unit would presumably be able to provide some degree of protection against air raids and submarines. In the 1980s this idea did not gain traction in part
due to the limitations of technology.
Today, UAVs might make the concept viable. While we are unlikely to need convoy selfescort, we might consider a small anti-mine, anti-pirate, or anti–small boat swarm UAV
detachment. The very small on-scene personnel requirements would comport well with
the limited berthing capabilities of merchants. If we containerized anti-ship missiles
8
such as suggested by a Russian company we would need the kind of on-board over-thehorizon targeting (OTH-T) capability that Son of Arapaho could provide. The combination of containerized missiles and on-board OTH-T could turn any ship into a potential
surface combatant and greatly complicate an enemy’s sea denial and control problem.
They could do it, and maybe we should too. There are probably dozens of other possibilities; Son of Arapaho is simply a pump-priming idea.
Son of I-400
In World War II the Japanese devised a way of putting a single float plane on a submarine. They constructed a tubular hangar on the sub’s deck and stuffed three float planes
with their wings removed inside it. The idea was that the sub could approach the West
Coast undetected, surface, quickly assemble the airplane, and send it to bomb targets in
the United States. The major limitation was that the sub could only carry three aircraft,
so its potential operational and strategic effect was likely to be nil. The U.S. Navy, for
its part, adopted a similar concept in the 1950s for carrying and launching the early
nuclear-armed cruise missiles like Regulus. Once Polaris SSBNs hit the fleet this idea
was abandoned.
The converted Ohio-class SSGNs of today are a modern version of the concept. Capable
of carrying over a hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles, they are a potent source of striking power. Coupling UAVs with new kinds of missiles in the SSGN gives the concept a
new twist. UAVs with a submerged launch capability could provide a number of C4ISR,
deception, and defensive services for the sub. The UAVs might be expendable or could,
as mentioned earlier, be recovered in the air by a C-17. If the sub itself could recover
them, the SSGN starts looking at least a little bit like a submersible CVN. One of the
doctrinal roles of the CV in World War II was “cavalry,” doing hit and run raids on
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Japanese-held islands and even the home islands. In this their actions were very analogous to the way Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest used his horsemen. Today,
a CVN is likely to be too visible to re-adopt that doctrinal role, but the SSGN could do it.
Son of Jeep Carrier
In World War II the U.S. Navy operated a large number of aircraft carriers, the majority
of which were small light carriers or escort carriers. These ships provided sea-based air
power for functions such as amphibious landing support and anti-submarine protection that the large carriers were too scarce and valuable to support. After the war their
numbers quickly dwindled in favor of very large aircraft carriers. Starting in the 1970s,
the notion of a smaller carrier again resurfaced in the guise of a “sea control ship.” That
concept never got off the drawing board due to resource constraints and opposition
within naval aviation ranks. Later, Admiral Art Cebrowski, the oracle of networkcentric warfare, again proposed a small carrier that could be built in numbers and oper9
ate in threatened littoral waters. This concept again foundered in the face of opposition.
Could UAVs breathe new life into the idea of a small carrier?
The Navy currently operates a fleet of ten large-deck amphibious ships (LHA or LHD),
from whose decks the Marines have been operating helos and Harrier jump jets for
10
decades. The F-35B STOVL jet will significantly improve the capabilities of the
Marine air wing, but it will not turn the LHA into a kind of aircraft carrier, due mostly
to limitations in range and payload, not to mention doctrinal constraints imposed by
the Marines. Short takeoff technology, even abetted by a ski jump, will always limit
range, endurance, and load-carrying capability barring unforeseen technical advancements. This is why U.S. carriers have catapults and arresting gear and why the Royal
Navy has recently and wisely switched its proposed Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft
carriers to a catapult and arresting gear configuration. However, mounting catapults
and arresting gear for manned aircraft on LHAs is not likely to be either feasible or
cost-effective.
UAVs could change this picture. There exist small-scale catapults on trailers for UAVs.
It is not hard to envision a scaled-up version of these being craned aboard an LHA to
operate a wing of UAVs that might be half the size and weight of a Predator or X-47B.
These would likely have at least the range and endurance of an F-18. Recovery would
have to be worked out, but regular arresting gear would not be needed. If such a wing
was embarked, the LHA starts looking at least a little bit like a jeep carrier. The sky is
the limit, so to speak, on the doctrinal roles that might be adopted by a UAV-operating
LHA. It would appear that UAVs also change the nature of the debate over large versus
small carriers.
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Son of Bismarck
Most everyone knows the story of the German battleship Bismarck. She was essentially
the last of the surface raiders, having been done in by British aircraft carrier and surface
fleet power. Her predecessors Graf Spee and Emden met similar fates, and the submarine
inherited the mission of commerce raiding. Besides being on the surface and easier to
find than submarines, the problem was numbers; there were never more than one or
two of them operating at any particular time. Moreover, although Bismarck carried four
Arado float planes, these were not effectively utilized, and none of the raiders received
effective air support from land bases, so they operated effectively in the blind.
Perhaps the best surface combatant in the world today is the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke–
class destroyer. Its combination of Aegis weapon system, SPY-1 radar, and an array of 96
missile tubes makes it highly flexible and lethal. The late block hulls support embarked
helicopter detachments and all of them can operate a small UAV called the Scan Eagle.
The Burkes have been slotted into two doctrinal roles: high value unit escort and ballistic missile defense ship. However, if they embarked more capable UAVs that could
provide greater C4ISR reach, and they were equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles,
they could become a modern version of a surface raider. Bismarck had to get within the
visual horizon to attack her targets and knew not what was lurking just beyond, stalking
her. A Burke surface raider would suffer no such limitation. It could reach out hundreds
of miles. Such reach would allow it to maneuver in any number of ways to prevent the
enemy from identifying and targeting her. The U.S. Navy has 61 of these ships and is
building more, so it could literally flood a sea fight problem with them. Their targets
would most likely be enemy combatants vice merchants. Operating singly or perhaps in
pairs, and in cooperation with submarines and other units, they would add enormous
complexity to an enemy’s sea denial or sea control problem.
Conclusion
New kinds of missiles, satellites, cyberspace, and robotic technologies, as well as emerging navies, are going to change the nature of naval warfare whether we like it or not. The
Navy’s imperative is to imagine new ways to leverage these technologies that will give
us major operational advantages over an enemy. We must realize that other countries,
some potentially hostile, are developing or buying UAVs. All the ideas presented in this
article could be turned around and used against us, so we had better think through the
counters to them even as we develop them for our own use.
UAVs are going to change things, and they will provide us with opportunities to use
our ships in new ways. We must proceed by examination through war gaming and by
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subsequent fleet experimentation. In order for this to be most effective we must attempt
to remove our blinders and envision new uses and new relationships.

Notes
1. There are a number of acronyms associated
with unmanned aircraft, including UCAS
(unmanned combat air system), UCAV
(unmanned combat air vehicle), and UAS (unmanned air system). For the purposes of this
article, all such designations will be subsumed
under the acronym UAV.
2. Capital ship is defined for the purposes of
this article as the ship type most capable of
contending for command of the sea in general
and for seizing and maintaining local sea
control.
3. Robert C. Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft
Carriers,” Naval War College Review (Autumn
2011), pp. 13–27, www.usnwc.edu/.
4. Norman Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air
Systems (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2010). Friedman makes the case that
the X-47B is a significantly new technology because of the potential for swarming
operations.
5. Command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance. A T is sometimes appended
to indicate targeting.
6. Aircraft carrier proponents have long pointed
out that if local land bases for tactical aircraft
are not available, long-range operations from
more distant bases are not as effective as those
from a nearby carrier. The advantages of local
tactical air from a carrier include greater
flexibility in changing missions and the ability to surge quickly in response to emergent
conditions.
7. Jim Bencivinga, “Rigging US Container
Ships to Defend Themselves in Time of War,”
Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1981,
www.csmonitor.com/.
8. This concept emerged on line with a computer
graphics–based video on YouTube, www
.youtube.com/watch?v=N6dKCkv1fzs, and
reported by the UK Telegraph, at www
.telegraph.co.uk/.
9. “Cebrowski: Develop Small Aircraft Carriers
from High-Speed Ships,” Inside the Navy,
August 9, 2004, p. 1.
10. Short takeoff, vertical landing.
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CHAPTER TEN

Tales from the Platform
I am proud to say that I served for seven years as a U.S. Navy landing signal officer.
I often said that I would have been happy to retire as a thirty-year lieutenant if they
would just let me wave aircraft the whole time. That gives you some insight into the
depth of my career planning. In any case, after serving as the Carrier Air Wing (CAG)
landing signal officer (LSO) in Air Wing Seven, I had to move on. I retired after thirty
years of service and would do it all over again if I had the chance. But regardless of the
subsequent achievements and satisfactions that a Navy career brought me, my heart was
always on the platform. I proudly devoted a whole section of my retirement shadow box
to my years as paddles: a pickle switch and the “rectum non bustus” patch. However, it
wasn’t all fair winds and following seas out there, especially in the years I waved (1973–
1980). In the interest of preserving for future generations some idea of the mayhem we
experienced, I offer the following absolutely truthful account of some notable episodes.
There are no morals to these stories; they just happened.
Night Phantoms, or How I Learned to Love My Net
Like a lot of carrier aviators, I quickly came to idolize my training command and Replacement Air Group (RAG) LSOs. They were the ones that inducted us into the tribe
of tailhookers, keeping us alive during the process. Naturally, I wanted to be like them.
Upon completing the A-7 RAG (VA-174 at NAS Cecil Field) in late September 1973, I
was “must-pumped” to VA-66 (Waldos) aboard USS Independence, then sailing in the
Eastern Mediterranean. I promptly informed the skipper that I wanted to be an LSO.
The squadron LSO immediately sent me out to the platform to observe a night recovery.
At this point, I need to say a little about the characteristics of the F-4 Phantom. A great
jet, it was pointed out to me that it was proof that if you put enough power on it, you
could make anything fly. From an LSO’s perspective, that meant power was everything,
kind of like the Hornet is now. After a lot of nights waving Phantoms, I concluded that
Landing Signal Officer Newsletter, 2011, reprinted by permission
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there was something about how the pilot sat in the airplane that made F-4 drivers feel
high and fast at night when they were in fact on glideslope and on speed. It was a beautiful airplane to have in the pattern in the daytime, but at night it seemed to always be a
struggle for survival. Of course, I knew none of this as I climbed onto the platform for
the first time.
Per normal, the fighters were first in line to recover. The first couple of passes were
uneventful and I was caught up in the excitement of the whole thing. Then Diamondback 104 shows up on the ball. He was a bit high and fast, exacerbating the normal F-4
illusion, and the pilot made an MFC (do they use this term in the coed Navy?—it means
a sharp correction that succeeds but probably shouldn’t have been tried). It was like the
pilot decided his best move was to shut ’em down at the start and go for a relight in the
middle. Remember, power is everything on a Phantom. The jet immediately went from
flying to falling and the controlling LSO, a fighter guy named Dan Gabriel, yelled for
power once and then hit the wave-off lights. Diamondback 104 responded by dipping
his left wing and came straight at us. Charlie Cook (the CAG LSO and the best paddles
I ever saw) convulsively mashed the transmit button on his handset and yelled at the
six of us others on the platform, “Hit the net!!” Now, I don’t know if the radar intercept
officer (RIO) was taking a nap or what, but if I had been in that back seat, I would have
yanked on the command eject handle a nanosecond later. He didn’t, which is why I am
still alive to write about the incident.
Hit the net we did, except for Charlie and Dan, who both crouched down on the platform yelling, “Burner!! Burner!!” Of course, it was pitch black, and with six of us hitting
the net at the same time, it wasn’t going to be pretty. I landed in the net with nobody
on top of me so I was instantly up and running full speed inboard. I don’t know where
I thought I was going (there was only a small, circular “escape” scuttle that was closed
anyway), but I was going there at warp one. The night being pitch black, I did not see
the stanchion that held up the LSO platform, and hit it with the right side of my face.
I bounced back into the net and was instantly up and running full speed inboard again.
Being a slow learner, I again slammed into the stanchion, again with the right side of
my face.
While my own little battle with structural steel was taking place, Diamondback 104 did
jam the throttles into burner and, God bless the J-79, got the Phantom into a climb, just
enough to miss the round down by two feet and the LSO platform by the same amount.
Good thing there was no port angle aircraft park on the Forrestal class. We climbed
back up on the platform, just a bit shaken, but Charlie and Dan just stood up and went
on to the next approach like nothing had happened. Diamondback 104 eventually came
back around and trapped with a fair 2 wire.
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In the aftermath, the right half of my face turned dark purple, making me look like
a harlequin clown for the next week or so. Charlie and Dan were singed by the F-4’s
afterburners and looked like they had been out in the sun too long. The next day I asked
Charlie what the pilot had to say in the debrief and he said, “Nothing I wanted to hear.” I
became an LSO anyway.
FCLP Date Night
After three cruises in 2½ years in VA-66, I got orders to VA-174, where I figured I would
be an LSO. My commanding officer (CO) in the Waldos advised me to abandon waving
because the word was that the executive officer (XO) of 174, then Cdr. John McCain
(now senator), didn’t like LSOs, since one had disqualified him, keeping him from a
command at sea. Thus I spent my first year in 174 as a weapons training officer, figuring
my waving days were over. But then all the LSOs got out because the airlines were hiring
and I got pressed back into service at the paddles. Well, because there were so few of us
left on active duty, I started to do back-to-back boat detachments (usually to Lady Lex
[the training carrier USS Lexington], a ship I liked a lot), necessitating lots of time on the
edge of the runway. Much of the time having no second LSO around to write book, and
spending almost no time with my wife on this “shore duty,” I asked her one night if she
would come out to the field with me. I had her write book, which she picked up rapidly.
This became too convenient, so we had these “date nights” sitting in the LSO truck at
the end of the runway. She developed an eye, so I let her start waving. In those days,
a woman’s voice saying, “Roger Ball!” was unheard of, and you could see some wing
waggles as guys reacted with surprise. Bless her heart, she got me through the lean times
in 174. She is an honorary paddles in my book.
Vasectomies and Waving Do Not Mix
I am guessing the title of this section is already making the male LSOs reading this
wince. In late 1978 I reported as CVW-7 LSO aboard the recently-commissioned USS
Eisenhower, and by the following spring we were on cruise in the Mediterranean. By
this time, I was thirty years old, with two sons, and my wife and I decided that two were
enough—especially since it appeared that it was her lot in life to be a functional single
parent. Vasectomies were the new, trendy thing then, so we decided I would have one
on cruise. Apparently a lot of my shipmates had the same idea, because sickbay turned
into a vasectomy assembly line. I got mine without incident and after twelve hours in
a sickbay cot, was told to go to my stateroom (02 level forward under cat 1) and stay in
bed another couple of days. The next day I heard the faint echo of the Air Boss yelling
emergency pull forward on the 5MC [intercom speaker]. I knew the other CAG LSO
was flying, and I was feeling fine, so I jumped out of the rack, pulled on my wash khaki
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trousers and white LSO jersey and proceeded to do the thousand-foot low hurdles
through the knee knockers to the LSO platform. I got there just in time to wave a burning Tomcat aboard (they seemed to catch fire a lot). We took him in the barrier and the
crash crew immediately had the fire out. Great, but when the book writer turned to
look at me for the grade he turned white and said, “Barney! What is going on?” I looked
down at my crotch where he was staring and it was like I had peed my pants with blood.
I had ripped all the stitches out (did not feel a thing—good ole adrenalin). Well, they
could not re-stitch me, so I hobbled around the next couple of weeks with big wads of
gauze stuffed down my pants. Fortunately, I was full systems capable by the time I met
my wife in Rome . . .
Mother Ship
Later that cruise, on a balmy night with scattered showers, Ike was steaming through
the Straits of Sicily making her own wind to recover aircraft. I was backing up and
greatly enjoying the fact that F-14 drivers did not seem to suffer the old F-4 illusion of
being high and fast. The wind started to die off and the Air Boss came up on the 14MC
telling us to be ready for a foul deck. All of a sudden the collision alarm sounded. I
looked around the windshield just in time to see lights come on right in front of our
bow. It turned out to be a mother ship for cigarette runners that had been running dark.
Obviously there had been some back and forth between the bridge and Combat Information Center (CIC) about a non-correlated radar blip that took a finite amount of time.
By the time someone decided that yes, the radar blip was more than a shower, we were
bearing down on the mother ship.
I yelled at my team to grab onto something because I was sure we were going to hit.
Now, for those of you who have been down in the machinery spaces of a Nimitz class,
you know that the power output of the reactors and the engines is, for all intents and
purposes, infinite. The bottleneck that keeps a CVN (Carrier Vessel Nuclear) from having the same thrust to weight ratio as a Hornet is the propeller shaft. Kind of like the
dilithium crystals in the Starship Enterprise. I can hear in my mind the conversation
between Capt. Jim Mauldin, then-CO of Ike, and the chief engineer:
“All back emergency, Scottie!!!”
“She will not take no more, Cap’n!!”
“Dammit, Scottie, I said emergency power!!”

“Scottie” obviously obeyed the Captain and pulled out all the rods. The propeller shafts
must have been starting to look like the rubber band on a model airplane, but the net
effect for us on the platform was that Ike became a 90,000-ton bucking bronco. Forget
the collision, we had to cling to whatever we could grab onto in order to keep from being
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launched off into the water. Amazingly, we stopped short of hitting that mother ship,
which by now had lights on and was stoking its boilers for all they were worth. In that
moment I imagine there was a brotherhood of soiled britches on both bridges.
The MiG Moment
By early 1980 Ike was starting workups for another cruise. In those days we did our initial drills off “Gitmo” (Guantanamo Bay), Cuba, where there was a fleet training team.
Ike had sailed from Norfolk with an empty deck. We were supposed to bring elements
of the wing aboard once we neared the Gitmo OPAREA (operating area). So there we
were, off the southeastern tip of Cuba, at flight quarters, waiting for the wing. My team
and I were out on the platform, stripped to the waist, basking in the sun and watching
the dolphins and flying fish play in our wake. I heard something behind me and turned
to look forward. I saw a little bug-like thing go zorching down the starboard side of the
ship, bow to stern, at around five–500 feet. I thought, gee, that looks like a MiG-21, but
nah, it can’t be. It zoomed up, did a wingover and came back down at us. Sure enough, it
was a Cuban MiG-21. How could this be? Nobody had said anything. Thus the following conversation on the 14MC:
“Air Ops, Paddles.”
“Go, Paddles.”
“Yeah, does anyone know anything about this Cuban MiG-21 that is buzzing the LSO platform?”
“Say again?”
“Yeah, we have got a MiG-21 buzzing the LSO platform and we wanted to know what the deal is.”
“Stand by . . . ”

One can only imagine the ensuing conversation between CIC and the bridge. Good
thing there was no flag aboard. That Cuban MiG driver had a career day. If he took
pictures, he probably got a Hero of the Revolution medal and a promotion.
Why They Do Not Put MB5s on the Flight Deck Anymore
A month or two later we were up in the VACAPES (Virginia Capes Operating Area)
doing refresher carrier qualifications (CQ) just before going on the interminable Indian
Ocean (IO) cruise (Iranian hostage crisis). Plenty of natural wind with choppy water,
overcast skies, and day Case III. An A-6 showed up calling “coupled ball.” Unbeknownst
to us, he was trying to fly it manual throttle. By the middle the indexer light was green,
indicating something was wrong, so we called “uncouple” and “power.” Should have
waved him off at that point but we didn’t. He added power and seemed to be OK over
the ramp, but then did a big right wing dip. The Intruder immediately lost lift by virtue
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of its spoilerons, sank down short of the 1 wire, picked up a right drift, and “kiddiecar’ed” over the wires.
Now, since everyone flies off Nimitz class nowadays (except for Enterprise), you are used
to a 9.3 degree angle and a 765-foot landing area. In 1980 we had not quite wrapped
our minds around that, being used to the more canted and shorter angled decks of the
earlier-class carriers. So we on the platform were not, in that instant, overly concerned
about the bolter, especially since there was nothing on deck—except the MB5, which for
some reason was parked hard up against the crotch, just over the foul line. The MB5 was
essentially the same kind of fire truck you see at shore bases. It turned out that its windshield was at the same height as an A-6 wing. Fortunately, the fire crew saw it coming
and jumped out of the truck, but one sailor got a bad concussion.
We had always heard about the “Grumman Iron Works” and I actually had some time
in the old F-9 Cougar. However, this A-6 added to the legend. The outer six feet of the
Intruder’s starboard wing hit the MB5 at windshield level and peeled the top of the
truck back like a sardine can. It maybe cost the A-6 a knot of airspeed and scratched up
the leading edge flap. It got airborne again and diverted to Oceana. I guess there really
is a moral to this story: do not try to salvage passes and no pass is over for the LSO until
the jet is stopped or safely airborne again.
Prowlers, Toilet Paper, and Miss America
The weeks and months were wearing away slowly in the spring and summer of 1980 as
we rotted away on “Gonzo Station” in the Arabian Sea aboard USS Eisenhower. The
Iranian hostage crisis wore on, and somebody in Washington figured that a visit from
Miss America and her entourage, doing a song and dance USO show for us, was just the
ticket. They were CODed (sent by a Carrier Onboard Delivery flight) aboard, and did
their routine down in the hangar bay. They couldn’t leave until the next day, so were
bunked in some staterooms on the 03 level, under heavy Marine guard. Meanwhile,
flight ops proceeded uninterrupted.
Unbeknownst to me, somebody in the black ops wing of my LSO corps either bribed
or garroted the Marine guards, because in the middle of a night recovery, up pops
Miss America and her court onto the LSO platform. No time to sort it out because
the deck was moving and there was no divert, and I did not feel like creating a
public relations faux pas by kicking them off the platform. So, we just kept landing
aircraft.
Now, any paddles can tell you that the EA-6B Prowler has a weak hook snubber. The
snubber is a little hydraulic cylinder that presses the hook down when you lower it so
that it does not bounce when the aircraft hits the deck, causing it to miss the arresting
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wires. Prowlers were notorious for having “kiddie car bolters” in which the airplane
lands nicely in the wires, but just keeps going due to hook bounce. Well, on this recovery, sure enough, we had a Prowler that just would not snag a wire. We simply could
not just keep refueling him and keep trying. One fix would be simply to barricade
him—catching the whole plane in a big nylon net stretched across the deck. However,
this virtually ensures serious damage to the aircraft. We had a second fix, not covered
at the time in the technical bulletins: stack rolls of toilet paper under the arresting
wires to raise them up more to up the odds the hook will catch one. Toilet paper is
used because it won’t harm the jet engines if it gets sucked into the intake. For this
reason, we had an emergency stash of TP located in a locker under the LSO platform.
I called the play to the Air Boss, who issued a delta and turned on the floodlights. We
grabbed the cases of TP and ran out onto the deck, madly stuffing rolls under the wires.
Sure enough, the Prowler snags a wire on the next pass. Of course the arrestment sends
cascades of TP flowing down the deck and also over the LSO platform. I can just imagine the tales Miss America and her court told their friends back in the States.
Story not complete. The same LSO black ops covert organization that snuck the girls
out onto the platform also rigged up a disco in the aviator’s wardroom. It was after midnight when we finally completed the recovery, so there were a) midrats available and b)
no senior officer presence (unless you considered me, the CAG LSO, a senior officer).
So, the junior officers were dancing and carrying on until, as luck would have it, a
sleepless executive officer of the ship wanders in. We went from disco to tap dancing
in nothing flat.
Moon over the IO
So we find ourselves rotting away in the IO from April to December 1980, with one
four-day port call in Singapore. The first three months were solid Case III due to the
monsoon, with the deck moving a lot. We got real comfortable with MOVLAS (mobile
visual landing aid), and had several of those legendary passes where the pilot did not see
the deck until touchdown. Finally the monsoon blew itself out and the IO turned into
the glassy lake we had heard about. One of the duties of the O-4s aboard Ike was leading
the daily FOD (foreign object damage) walkdowns, and the CAG LSOs were not exempt,
so one fine morning I am out in front of several hundred shipmates moving down the
deck in precise military formation (or so I recall). The Air Boss was always up for dumping on the LSOs, so he kept up a steady stream of cracks and insults on the 5MC as we
made our way aft. When we got to the fantail I decided to fight back. I had everyone line
up facing aft and issued the order “Drop trou!” Everyone obeyed with military precision
and bent over, providing the Boss with a full IO moon. You probably cannot get away
with that today, can you?
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Epilogue
God, I loved waving. The fantail is where the sea and sky meet as the planes come down
the chute to land. It is where the ship and the airplane become one again, and it is the
LSO that makes it happen. In the monsoon, the CO of Ike would have me go out on the
platform at dawn to advise him on whether it was safe (relatively speaking) to fly that
day. He never overrode me. I would stand out there, feeling the ship move, seeing how
she was getting along with the wind and the waves. She was like a living thing, almost.
There I was with her, in a conversation about how she felt about tossing her chicks into
the air. Times like that are rare and precious, and come only to a precious few—the
paddles. I remember appreciating it, even as I stood there—and then all the chaff cuttings that had been dropping through a deck drain in the chaff cutting room, located
just above the air intake vent for the main reactor electrical control panel, shorted out
the main bus and the reactors scrammed, leaving USS Eisenhower adrift in the IO . . .
Happy waving, folks—enjoy it while you can!

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 10 Ch10Platform.indd January 28, 2014 11:09 AM

PART THREE
Joint Operations

meyers$:___WIPfromC032812:_NewportPapers:_NP_41Rubel:_InDesign:0000NP_41Rubel-part3.inddDecember2,201310:15AM

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:0000 NP_41 Rubel-part3.indd December 2, 2013 10:15 AM

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Gettysburg and Midway
Historical Parallels in Operational Command
The purpose of this study is to show the profound effect a commander in chief’s approach to operational command can have on the course of events in war. It does so
by analyzing the performance of two operational-level commanders in chief, General
Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, and Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet, during the
defining campaign of their respective careers. These specific battles are selected to
demonstrate that the requirements of operational-level command transcend time, technology, and environment. Additionally, it is in the study of the losing commanders that
the most compelling lessons can be drawn. The picture that emerges is an endorsement
of Carl von Clausewitz’s notion that there are no hard and fast rules that govern the
conduct of war; it is the presence of the commander that decisively influences the course
1
of events—for better or worse.
This focus on the commander in chief recognizes that the process of command at the
operational level of war is a distinct discipline. An operational commander in chief
must orchestrate the actions of a large and complex organization under the most difficult of circumstances and must creatively out-think his counterpart on the other side.
His span of control is so great that there is no possibility of directly responding to everything that happens. He therefore must impose his will on people with whom he has
little or no direct contact, and he must get them to act as he would wish even though
he cannot know all the situations they will face or even be entirely familiar with their
characters.
The term “operational art” denotes the collection of requirements and skills necessary for effective command at the operational level. The word “art” is used advisedly;
it indicates that operational-level command is a process sensitive to the abilities of the
Naval War College Review, Winter 1995, Vol. 48, No. 1
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practitioner. If it were a science, it would depend on knowledge of certain absolute
truths and their application to situations that arise. A considerable amount of the current literature in the field of military theory concerns itself with principles and concepts,
technology and doctrine—leading one perhaps to suppose that these things exclusively
govern the conduct of war. As usual, von Clausewitz has the best commentary on the
matter: “It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the
realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely
2
useless.” In other words, one can study war by using theory, principles, and doctrine
to disassemble it into understandable chunks, but when the responsibility of command
descends and one has to put it all together, there is nothing but judgment and personal
approach to help one practice the art. How Lee and Yamamoto practiced the art exerted
decisive influence on the campaigns we shall examine.
Historical Parallels and the Study of War
In the world of wargaming, there are two terms commonly used to characterize the
computer models that calculate outcomes. “Deterministic” models are like machinery;
they crank out identical products every time, given identical inputs. “Stochastic” models, on the other hand, use probabilistic calculations and thus may not yield identical
results even if the inputs are the same. War, to invoke von Clausewitz once again, is the
3
playground of chance, and it requires the practitioner to calculate probabilities. Real
war is therefore stochastic. This characteristic has bedeviled theorists who have sought
to identify principles and laws of strategy. Blind application of a particular principle
or doctrine cannot be relied upon in any particular instance to produce victory; the
real world of human interactions is too complex and messy to be encompassed by a few
simple rules.
The complex nature of war should not, however, deter us from trying to understand its
elements and to learn from the failures and successes of those who have conducted it
in the past. In studying the chronicle of warfare, its stochastic nature becomes evident;
concentrating force, for instance, does not always lead to victory any more than dividing
one’s force in the face of a superior enemy invariably invites disaster. Therefore, when
one does find parallel events in the historical record, they should be scrutinized for
evidence that, in certain circumstances, certain approaches to the problem of combat
command are likely to bring about similar results at least more than once. Put another
way, if actual war is likened to a stochastic computer model, whenever similar results are
observed, it is worthwhile to go back and check the inputs.
The battles of Gettysburg and Midway are such parallels, and it turns out that for all
their separation in time and setting, among their similarities are some that seem to
be the product of more than pure chance. This is all the more striking because one is
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an American Civil War land battle, fought with some of the same kinds of equipment
and tactics Napoleon used, and the other a sea battle between aircraft carrier forces;
moreover, the cultural differences between the losing commanders, Robert E. Lee and
Isoroku Yamamoto, appear to be vast. While these are not battles that leap to mind as
subjects for comparison, the “computer” of war does seem to have calculated some surprising parallels between them, due to some interestingly similar inputs.
The Parallels
The battles of Gettysburg and Midway marked turning points in their respective wars.
In both cases the United States secured a tactical victory that gave it the strategic breathing space needed to build, with its massive economic power, an armed force that would
eventually overwhelm its adversary. In both cases, U.S. forces defeated an enemy that
had a reputation for tactical invincibility, thereby greatly promoting the morale of the
American people as well as that of their military commanders and fighting forces. Before these battles, the enemy had enjoyed the initiative and a string of tactical victories
that had kept the U.S. off balance and the issue of the war in doubt. After the battles,
neither the Confederates nor the Japanese were ever again in such a favorable position to
win the war through battlefield victory.
In both battles, the U.S. forces fought on the operational defensive. In neither case did
the battle fit into any overall American strategy except as something required to meet
a threat to a base of operations. However, Major General George Meade’s Army of the
Potomac fought on the tactical defensive, whereas Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Pacific
Fleet forces (under the command of Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond
Spruance) took the tactical offensive. These differences reflect the basic requirements of
each kind of warfare (sea and land) and the nature of the weapons the respective forces
used. However, in both campaigns, owing to the enemy’s failure to provide for adequate
scouting, the U.S. was able to pick the time and place of the battle to its advantage and
thus secure the inherent strengths of defensive warfare.
Both of the battles were lost in part due to the lack of timely and aggressive decision
making by a key subordinate to the commander in chief. In the case of Gettysburg,
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, commanding the Confederate II Corps, failed to
occupy Culp’s Hill when it was his for the taking; at Midway, Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo, commanding the Japanese First Carrier Striking Force, failed to make a timely
decision to attack the American task force when he became aware of its presence. On
both occasions inaction permitted the United States forces to achieve a position of tactical superiority that neither Lee nor Yamamoto could subsequently recoup. In contrast,
outstanding decisions by U.S. subordinates seized the advantage at critical moments.
The decision by Brigadier General John Buford to risk a defense with dismounted
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cavalry against an infantry force of unknown size can be compared to the decision by
Spruance to order an attack on the Japanese carriers even though his aerial strike group
was not completely launched or organized. This position of tactical advantage stole
the initiative from the attacker, who as a result suffered heavy losses to his outstanding
first-line forces. Neither the Confederates nor the Japanese were able to recover fully
from these losses.
The Inputs
The two battles, then, bear a distinct resemblance. Even the circumstances under which
the battles were joined and the performance of subordinate officers were impressively
alike. Accepting that chance can always produce like results from unlike causes, it still
seems worthwhile to search among the threads of similarity in these battles’ “inputs” in
search of useful generalizations about the art of war.
Similar Strategic Dilemmas
Although both the South and the Japanese had, through the use of brilliant tactics
against an ill prepared opponent, seized the operational and even the strategic initiative,
their long-term prospects appeared questionable. For the industry-poor South, gasping
under the squeeze of the North’s economic blockade, a protracted war of attrition was
not feasible. Japan likewise did not possess an industrial base sufficient to engage in
such a war with the United States. Both Lee and Yamamoto saw time running against
their countries. Neither opponent’s initial gambits had brought the United States to the
bargaining table, and for each the question of what to do next was the subject of debate
at the highest levels.
In both cases, the dilemma presented to the national authorities was how to use their
best maneuver forces to secure permanent strategic advantage. The South in early
1863 had to contemplate the threat to its communication with Texas and to the access, through Mexico, to the resources of the outside world that such communication represented. New Orleans had been lost the previous spring, and contact with
the trans-Mississippi theater hinged on maintaining Vicksburg. However, by June
Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant’s troops were threatening Vicksburg, and Union
forces in Tennessee menaced Atlanta and such industrial and resource heartland as the
Confederacy possessed. Its best maneuver force was the Army of Northern Virginia,
under Lee. Should this force, or parts of it, be sent west to secure the Southern position there? Or should it be concentrated in the East to seek decisive battle against the
battered but intact Army of the Potomac, a battle that might lead directly to peace
4
negotiations?
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The situation facing Japanese leadership was similar. To the south lay the resource-rich
East Indies, which represented staying power for the Empire; however, the buildup
of Allied forces in Australia posed a serious threat to Japan’s access there. To the east
lay the undefeated U.S. Pacific Fleet. Should the victorious Combined Fleet be used to
secure Japan’s position in the south, or to defeat the Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle that
5
could lead to a negotiated settlement with the United States?
Strategy has been defined as both an art and a science, but when the bullets fly, strategy
boils down to what people think about war and the influence they each exert in the
decisions made about where, when, why, and how to fight. In the case of the Confederacy and Japan, the resolution of their respective strategic dilemmas was influenced
6
decisively by what Lee and Yamamoto thought about fighting.
The Insistence of an Operational Commander
Both Robert E. Lee and Isoroku Yamamoto were enterprising commanders who believed in the utility of activity. Both men, as junior officers, had served with distinction
in earlier wars. They each had inherited a defensive strategic doctrine as they assumed
their respective commands but soon discarded it as unsuitable to the situations that they
7
faced. Lee realized that digging in and conducting a positional defense of Richmond
would invite eventual pulverization of his army by superior Union forces. He felt he had
to wrest the initiative from Major General Joseph Hooker, then commanding the Army
8
of the Potomac. Yamamoto likewise rejected the defensive doctrine of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, which contemplated ambushing the U.S. fleet as it sailed into the Western Pacific to take back the Philippines. Given the need for naval support for operations
in the south to secure resources, he felt he could not sit and wait for the U.S. Pacific Fleet
9
to arrive at its own convenience; he had to deal with it on his terms.
Both commanders were consummate operational planners and decision makers, adept
at outfoxing and outmaneuvering their enemies. They consequently developed a serene
confidence in the fighting prowess of their forces and in their own command abilities
that made them risk-oriented rather than risk-averse. Two months before Gettysburg,
Lee had divided his smaller force in front of a numerically superior enemy at Chancellorsville in order to maintain the tactical initiative. Yamamoto, in dispatching his fleet
to surprise the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, had hazarded his aircraft carriers in an
attack unsupported by land-based air in the face of significant American land defenses.
Both gambits met with great success and reinforced the commanders’ belief in the util10
ity of operational risk-taking.
As a result of their early successes, both Lee and Yamamoto had achieved considerable prestige and influence in the highest circles of government, not to mention among
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the general public. Each man brought this prestige and influence as a winner on the
11
battlefield decisively to bear in getting his views accepted by national authorities.
Thus in each case, matters of national strategic policy were in effect decided by an
operational-level commander whose outlook was formed by a faith in decisive battle and
a conviction of the necessity to accept risk to precipitate such a battle.
Lack of Strategic Priority
Interestingly enough, the strategic outlooks of both Lee and Yamamoto were heavily
influenced by concern for the security of their countries’ capitals. Lee saw his invasion
of Pennsylvania as a means of drawing the Army of the Potomac away from northern
Virginia and reducing the threat to Richmond without resorting to a static defense of
12
the city. Yamamoto’s fixation on Midway was cemented by the April 1942 Doolittle
13
raid on Tokyo and his desire to prevent a recurrence by eradicating the Pacific Fleet.
While concern for the security of their capitals gave useful leverage in gaining acceptance for their projects, both Lee and Yamamoto clearly thought that the best hope for
a successful end to the war lay in annihilating the enemy in the campaigns upon which
they were about to embark. A sufficiently complete destruction of remaining U.S. forces
would lay open the American homeland to operations that would demoralize the populace and, from the perspective of Lee and Yamamoto, strengthen the hand of those in
14
the United States who might counsel peace.
There were also other reasons for undertaking the Gettysburg and Midway campaigns.
Lee was short of forage for his horses and mules as well as of many other items of supply
that might be gained from the rich countryside of Pennsylvania and points north. He
made enough of this aspect of the proposed operation to convince some that it was the
15
primary reason for embarking on the campaign. Yamamoto too had other uses for a
successful campaign. He felt that Japanese operations in the south against Australia
and New Guinea would otherwise constantly be threatened by the American fleet on
16
his eastern flank. In a real sense, the Midway campaign constituted a monumental
flank-securing operation.
Whatever their reasons for insisting on those particular campaigns, at the most fundamental level neither Lee nor Yamamoto could abide inaction, and both required a
suitable outlet for their martial spirits. The majestic scope of each campaign, the lure of
glory, and the promise of strategic decision pulled them inexorably toward the showdown. But the very multiplicity of prior justifications for the campaigns proved disastrous in the end, because in each case the lack of clear relative priority among the goals
and objectives of the campaign, especially that of waging decisive battle, led to failure to
concentrate forces at the critical place and fatal indecision at the critical moment.
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Failures in Scouting
Much has been made of the ignorance of both Lee and Yamamoto as to the whereabouts
of the U.S. force that opposed them. In Lee’s case, Major General J. E. B. Stuart and his
cavalry failed to maintain contact with either the main Union forces or his own, causing
Lee to march blindly into a collision with the Army of the Potomac on ground unfavor17
able to the Confederates. Likewise, the Japanese Combined Fleet sailed unawares into
an American naval ambush, finding out too late that three Pacific Fleet carriers awaited
18
them at Midway.
The reasons behind each commander’s failure to ensure adequate scouting are open to
speculation. Certainly both Lee and Yamamoto were sufficiently skilled field commanders to understand the necessity for scouting, and both had made provisions for
it. In both cases, however, negligence on the part of a principal subordinate led to a
breakdown. General Stuart failed to keep Lee informed on Federal movements, and Admiral Nagumo sealed his own fate by failing to mount a sufficiently aggressive tactical
19
reconnaissance.
In both battles, however easy it may be to pin the blame on subordinate commanders, the commander in chief retains some responsibility for these failures. In the first
place, neither Lee nor Yamamoto seemed to appreciate fully the importance of detailed
knowledge of enemy movements in a campaign designed to precipitate a battle that they
hoped would decide the war. They both assumed the U.S. force would react predictably
to their own movements, and the lack of information seemed only to confirm their own
20
expectations. Moreover, lack of intelligence did not deter them from pressing on with
their respective plans, even though the level of risk in an already chancy operation had
become thereby even higher.
The reason for this lapse in judgment may be found in the soaring confidence each
commander had in his force. Both the Army of Northern Virginia and the Japanese
Combined Fleet could, with justification, claim to be the finest fighting force of its
kind in the world at the time. Lee and Yamamoto both felt that their commands would
21
inevitably prevail in any situation in which the enemy could be brought to battle.
In this frame of mind, complacency about scouting could easily develop. Both men
expected their movements to stimulate an enemy countermove that would bring about
the expected engagement. The enemy was going to come to them, they would defeat the
enemy when he arrived, and that was that.
The Decisive Place and Time
If there is a principle that is universally accepted by military theorists and writers, it
is that a commander should attempt to concentrate his own forces when and where it
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matters most. Concentration may be absolute (that is, having all one’s force available)
or relative (being superior to the enemy at the point of contact), but either way, successful results in a battle cannot be expected, especially on the tactical offensive, if superior
combat power cannot be brought to bear. At Gettysburg and Midway, neither Lee nor
Yamamoto, two acknowledged masters of the operational art, adhered to this principle.
Both of their forces had sufficient combat power in the aggregate to achieve a battlefield
victory if favorable conditions for engagement could be obtained. Lee’s army, while
numerically inferior to the Army of the Potomac, was a combat-proven force whose effective power had consistently been out of proportion to its numbers. Yamamoto, on the
other hand, had a fleet that was superior to the American task forces both in numbers
and in certain aspects of fighting capability, such as aircraft range, torpedo tactics, and
night gunnery.
Lee’s inability to concentrate was partially a function of his order of march. He sent his
army across the Potomac piecemeal, partly in order to maintain a credible rear guard in
22
case Hooker decided at that moment to advance on Richmond. Lack of parallel avenues
of advance further exacerbated Lee’s maneuver problems, and by the eve of the battle
the Army of Northern Virginia found itself spread out over many miles along the narrow defiles of the Cumberland Valley. The final division of Lieutenant General James
Longstreet’s corps was to be unable to reach the scene of the battle until the evening of
the second day of the battle, too late to have a decisive effect. Yamamoto likewise strung
out his forces. The most egregious dispersal was of his aircraft carriers; he assigned two
of his eight carriers to a deception operation in the Aleutians, kept one more with his
so-called “Main Body,” and placed another with his invasion force. Almost half of his
total carrier strength was thereby prevented from participating in the main engagement.
Each commander failed, in designing his operational campaign, to achieve consistency
between the principal goal of the operation and the force dispositions employed. In
light of the strategic situation in which each commander found himself—a high-stakes
gamble to stave off ultimate strategic defeat—taking unnecessary operational risks by
failing to provide for rapid concentration should the desired major battle present itself
seems almost incomprehensible, especially considering the demonstrated talent of the
two commanders. The answer again seems to revolve around complacency borne of
successive victories. Both men had achieved success by breaking, rather than adhering
to, conventional military wisdom, and each seems to have lost some respect for both his
23
enemy and the dangers of war in general.
Indecision by Key Subordinates
General Ewell’s failure to occupy Culp’s Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg
is commonly cited as one of the major contributing factors in the Confederates’ defeat.
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Worried about a possible Union flanking attack and the fatigue of his men, he chose to
take up temporary defensive positions around Gettysburg rather than press the attack
on into the evening. Had he acted aggressively to take the high ground while it was still
24
weakly held, the ill fated attacks on the following days might have been avoided.
Likewise, Admiral Nagumo’s failure to launch promptly a strike against the U.S.
forces he had just found doomed his four carriers to a bombing attack with their
25
decks crowded with fully fueled and armed aircraft. He opted to recover his fighters
and prepare an escorted attack on Spruance’s force because he had just witnessed the
carnage that had befallen the initial unescorted American raids on his force. The fatal
dive-bombing attack occurred just as he was completing these preparations. Had the
American attack been any less successful than it was, Nagumo might indeed have annihilated the U.S. force.
The intriguing question is why these officers failed to demonstrate initiative when
the need arose. The issue is all the more puzzling given the aggressive nature of their
respective commanders in chief. For Ewell, part of the problem was that he was new to
command. Assuming command of Stonewall Jackson’s corps after that brilliant tactician’s death on the eve of the Gettysburg campaign, Ewell was presented challenges
with which few officers might have been capable of coping. He had little opportunity
to develop confidence in either his own judgment or the capabilities of his lieutenants.
These leadership challenges were exacerbated by Lee’s own style of command. Ewell had
functioned well as a division commander under Jackson; Jackson’s directives had been
very detailed, left little room for interpretation, and had given Ewell small opportunity
to develop the analytical thinking that underpins initiative. Lee’s discretionary orders
proved debilitating for a commander like Ewell, because Lee had not impressed on him
a clear vision of the campaign’s objective or accompanied his orders with a clear state26
ment of intent.
Nagumo, on the other hand, was an experienced carrier task force commander who had
commanded the Pearl Harbor attack and several operations in the South Pacific and the
Indian Ocean. However, he was also a methodical and cautious flag officer, a battleship
specialist who now found himself in command of an aircraft carrier–centered fleet. He
had been criticized for failing to follow up on the initial success at Pearl Harbor; in fact,
Yamamoto had been pressed to relieve him but had refused to do so for fear he would
27
commit suicide.
Each of these officers has had his supporters and detractors among historians and
analysts. Detractors accuse them of indecision, and supporters claim they were exercising justified caution. However that may be, their failure to risk aggressive tactical action
allowed in each case the U.S. force to gain a measure of initiative that ultimately decided
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the battle. In part, responsibility for this failure to exercise initiative must rest with the
commander in chief. Failure to impart a clear vision of the campaign’s purpose and the
place of decisive battle within it made it possible for each of these officers to opt legitimately and rationally for a too-cautious tactical course of action at the critical moment.
Old and New Forms of Warfare
Despite prior battlefield successes that had taken advantage of improved weapons at
their disposal, in the battles of Gettysburg and Midway both commanders reverted to
tactics appropriate to weapons of the previous generation. Lee had enjoyed great success
employing a tactical defensive that was enhanced by the new rifled muskets. Effective
at over twice the range of smooth-bores, these new weapons made traditional infantry
charges excessively costly. Assuming the tactical defense at Fredericksburg, Confederate
forces had mowed down attacking Federals. While Lee’s understanding of the newfound
strength of the defense may not have been complete, the lesson was abundantly clear to
officers such as General Longstreet, who sought to engage the Army of the Potomac us28
ing the strengths of the tactical defensive. Lee must have had some appreciation of this
when he decided to divide his forces at Chancellorsville in the face of a superior enemy.
For his part, Yamamoto was considered the oracle of carrier warfare in the Imperial
Japanese Navy. His design for the Pearl Harbor attack had reflected his understanding of the potential of this new form of naval warfare. The results of Pearl Harbor had
provided ample reinforcement of the doctrine.
Yet embarking on the most portentous operations of their careers, both commanders
reverted to forms of warfare made obsolete by their new weapons and tactics, and which
they themselves had seen fail when used by the enemy. At Gettysburg, Lee ordered
Pickett’s charge across open ground against prepared Federal positions when he must
have understood its hazards. Yamamoto made his battleships the centerpiece of his
tactical plan even though it was by then evident that the aircraft carrier was the ship
29
that counted. It is difficult to account for these lapses, and available evidence for their
rationale is scanty. It is possible that when the strategic stakes became sufficiently high,
the commanders’ confidence in the new forms of fighting was insufficient to bolster
their nerve, causing them to adopt the methods they had seen succeed in their formative
years. As a captain during the war with Mexico, Lee had participated in the storming
of Chapultepec. There, even though he learned about the value of strong fortifica30
tions, he saw the tactical offensive carry the day. Yamamoto had served with Admiral
Heihachiro Togo at the battle of Tsushima and had seen the big guns of the Japanese
31
battleships annihilate the Russian squadron.
In any event, in their greatest trials both commanders changed their modes of operation
and found themselves applying inappropriate tactics. One of the responsibilities of an
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operational commander is to understand the nature of battle and to adapt to new forms
that technology demands. In this fundamental aspect of the operational art, both men
failed.
Command at a Distance
Finally, these two commanders failed one of the most crucial tests of operational
command: the ability to influence the course of events that are outside the immediate
span of personal control. A tactical commander’s job is to extract maximum fighting
performance from his engaged forces. In this role he is in explicit control of the situation
and can react to sudden developments with immediate and specific orders. The operational commander, by contrast, is removed by one order of cause and effect from direct
control of events. He must achieve orchestration of the varied elements of his command
through influence. Not being privy to every local tactical detail, he must rely on the
judgment of his subordinate commanders to accept or avoid risk in consonance with his
overall intent for the operation.
Both Lee and Yamamoto had a fatally flawed command and control arrangement. For
a variety of reasons, neither enjoyed a productive relationship with key subordinates.
They failed to exercise effective influence over the situation because they did not firmly
establish in their subordinates’ minds the importance of a major engagement in the
32
overall scheme of campaign. Additionally, neither commander promptly provided information, guidance, or even moral support once it became evident that the sought-for
33
major battle with U.S. forces was imminent. In striking contrast is Admiral Chester
Nimitz’s council of war with his tactical commanders, Spruance and Fletcher, and his
34
message concerning calculated risk. Nimitz’s influence allowed Spruance, a normally
circumspect and cautious commander, to go against type and to get in the first blow by
ordering his incompletely launched and half-organized strike forces to attack Nagumo.
Lessons
It is clear that similarities in the observed results of the two battles are attended by some
striking similarities in the decisions and command styles of Lee and Yamamoto. Differences in environment and weapons—one battle being a twentieth-century naval engagement involving aircraft and submarines almost exclusively, the other a Napoleonic land
battle of foot soldiers and smooth-bore artillery—seem less relevant than the parallels in
the personalities and approaches of the commanders, at least the losing ones. It is in the
personal approaches to operational command on the part of Lee and Yamamoto that the
most enduring lessons can be found, for in the planning and decision making of these
two commanders some of the similarities in the results of the two great battles can be
understood.
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The first lesson is that strategy should be left to strategists, which validates
Clemenceau’s dictum that war is too important to be left to generals. Lee and
Yamamoto ventured into the realm of strategic decision making with a rather narrow
perspective that was based on their faith in the strategic utility of battlefield victory.
To the misfortune of the Confederacy and Japan, they served no wartime strategists
like Lincoln or Roosevelt, who possessed the perspective and authority to prevent the
displacement of coherent grand strategy by operational-level opportunism.
The second lesson is that the operational commander in chief must build internal consistency into his plans. Each of the campaigns studied here was a risky strategic venture,
normally the recourse of the desperate. Given the high stakes, each commander should
have attempted to minimize the operational risks. Lee would have been well advised to
provide for quicker concentration, or at least to form a contingency plan for managing
an unexpected meeting engagement. Yamamoto should have kept his force concentrated
so that he could have steamrolled the Americans whether they struck by surprise or not.
However, reducing operational-level risks sometimes means accepting greater tactical
ones. Both Ewell and Nagumo could have risked an aggressive attack and thereby saved
the day. They did not because their orders did not impart to them the vision that would
have allowed them responsibly to accept greater risk.
Consistency not only means complementary risk management, it also means knowing what one wants. An organization cannot have more than one top priority, or its
members will find themselves working at cross purposes. At Gettysburg and Midway
the fundamental implied objective in the plans of both commanders was to generate a
decisive battle that would destroy the enemy’s remaining main maneuver forces in the
theater. That was the object of the strategic risk, and it should have ordered all efforts;
but neither commander established that priority, either in the disposition of his forces
or in his guidance to his subordinates. Nor is it even clear that either man had expressly
prioritized the objectives in his own mind. Beforehand, in marshalling their arguments
to gain approval for their respective projects, both Lee and Yamamoto had articulated a
variety of objectives and benefits, and both may have ended up confusing themselves as
to what exactly they were about.
Thirdly, the operational commander must have faith in his methods. Mastery of the art
of war involves understanding the characteristics of the weapons at hand and their influence on both tactical and operational-level plans. Technology is always creating new
and improved weapons, tactics undergo change, and senior commanders are often faced
with having to apply appreciably different methods than those they learned as junior
officers. Lee and Yamamoto appeared to lose their poise as the burden of national salvation descended on their shoulders, and they abandoned their newly acquired warfare
expertise in favor of methods they had seen work years before.

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 11 Ch11Gettysbg.indd December 2, 2013 10:16 AM

writing to think

147

The fourth lesson is that the operational art is a delicate balance of delegation and
influence. The commander simply cannot control everything that is going on in a
battle or campaign; he must allow subordinates room to exercise initiative. However, he
retains absolute responsibility for everything that happens and must take steps to ensure
that all parts of the force work with unity of purpose. He achieves this by establishing
a close and forthright relationship with his key subordinates and imbedding his vision
in their minds before action occurs. Once the operation is underway, he must follow
up his training of subordinates by providing them information, guidance, and moral
support to help ensure they react to the changing fortunes of battle in consonance with
his intent.
Finally, the biggest lesson that can be drawn may be that though forms of war change,
people do not. Theorists search in vain for the perfect strategy or for immutable
principles of war. Clausewitz admonishes us that the human genius for war will always
operate outside the rules. Conversely, as these cases show, even geniuses fall prey to
such human frailties as pride, complacency, and irresolution. While these faults may be
understandable reactions to the pressure cooker of war, when they reside in the operational commander in chief even the finest weapons and the bravest soldiers, sailors, and
airmen cannot save the cause.
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CHAPTER TWELVE

Principles of Jointness
For all the attention that has been given to jointness among the U.S. armed forces since
World War II, nobody yet has developed a comprehensive theory that underpins statute,
policy, or doctrine. This is curious, since the literature on operational-art theory, a
subject that most senior military officers contend is inherently joint, is quite extensive.
Operational art is a clearly identified military discipline and enjoys a general agreement
as to its basics. However, despite claims that modern operational art is joint in nature,
nobody links it to a theory of jointness. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S.
Armed Forces, provides a list of joint principles, but these are mostly exhortatory and
fall short of constituting a theory of jointness.
The reasons for this state of affairs are not hard to fathom. Roger Beaumont, in the preface to his book Joint Military Operations: A Short History, puts his finger on it:
In the course of research and analysis, I also gained a sense of why jointness has rarely been treated
clinically. In peacetime, the bewildering maze of operational detail, legislation, doctrine, technology, personalities, factions and formal organizations has made jointness many things to many
people. Since as a subset of war, jointness in combat lies in the realm of chaos, it is no more tractable
to numerical reductionism, logical formats or formulae than the arts, sculpture, or the weather.
Like schools of thought in art, the intensity of partisanship on issues of jointness has sometimes approached the level of emotion held toward foes in war, for it touches closely on the critical bonding
and cohesion that lie at the heart of military institutions, and their predisposition to see the world
1
in “them-us” terms.

In such a highly charged environment, it is difficult to attain the degree of objectivity
necessary for the development of theory. This does not mean, however, that there is no
literature on the subject. It does mean that even if some brave soul articulates valid principles, the proposals are bound to threaten somebody, and the likelihood of universal
acceptance is virtually nil. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, this article will attempt
a little clinical analysis and set forth some principles of jointness that could underpin
the development of theory on the subject.
A different version of this article appeared in Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 2000/01
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A review of the literature reveals a rather fragmented approach to joint theory. Writers tend to concentrate on either the theater war-fighting aspect of jointness, or on the
Washington, D.C., headquarters scene. This is not surprising, because the environments
are so very different. Moreover, writers usually deal with joint principles in order to
support some other issue that is the real subject of their writing. However, where the literature does attempt to address underlying factors, two basic principles seem to emerge
repeatedly, either explicitly or implicitly:
•

The Complementarity Principle. By combining the various military services into
single organizations (joint force commands) we can compensate for one arm’s weakness through another arm’s strength. In such a manner, each arm complements the
others. For example, the Air Force can provide the Army more air defense than the
Army can provide itself.

•

The Dilemma Principle. In order for an enemy to defend successfully against one
arm, he must become vulnerable to another. If, for example, an enemy wanted to
throw his mobile operational reserve against a U.S. Army thrust at a particular objective, he would have to move that reserve. This would make it vulnerable to attack
2
by the Air Force. The enemy is therefore faced with an unpalatable dilemma.

Together, these two principles define what synergy means in military terms. In other
words, by combining the forces of two or more services, you get more effect than if you
just added up their respective numbers. Joint doctrine appears to be built upon these
principles, as Joint Publications 1 and 3 (Joint Operations) frequently prescribe achieving synergy and presenting the enemy with difficult dilemmas.
That is not the whole story, however. The preceding principles represent the desired
benefits of joint operations; they do not address how jointness is to be achieved or
how much is enough. A number of writers advance, in various ways, what we will call
the Hierarchy Principle, which says that the degree of jointness (which we will loosely
define here as effective cooperation between the various military services) is inversely
3
proportional to the number of command echelons. The clear implication is that flatter
organizations are more apt to exhibit effective internal cooperation. This principle is
firmly embedded in joint doctrine, in the form of the joint task force. JTFs have become
the principal method of U.S. operational command and control in-theater—despite
the risks and costs of their ad hoc nature—precisely because they make the operational
organization flatter.
Another, somewhat related principle that arises in the literature can be termed the
Necessity Principle. It states that greater jointness tends to be exhibited in the face of the
enemy at the lower echelons of command. One writer states that “the supreme lesson
of the Pacific War . . . [is] that true unity of command can be achieved only on the field
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of battle.” 4 The least jointness is exhibited in peacetime at the higher echelons. There
is nothing particularly surprising about this principle, but it does raise an interesting
point that seems to penetrate to the heart of the matter. While creative improvisation and willingness to put mission interests ahead of service political interests when
engaged in battle is laudable, it should not constitute de facto military policy. In other
words, instead of waiting until we are locked in combat, we would prefer to have “proactive jointness,” the ability to achieve effective cooperation prior to entering a fight.
However, proactive jointness is an inherently top-down policy matter in peacetime, and
it is therefore inhibited by the Hierarchy Principle, since all echelons from the Joint Staff
down get involved.
The literature also deals with the question of how much jointness is enough and how
much is too much. There seem to be at least two principles at work here. The first is the
Cohesion Principle. Writers almost universally state that joint arrangements that disrupt
unit cohesion would negate any potential benefits of jointness by reducing morale and
basic military efficiency. The command level at which jointness would disrupt cohesion
is generally thought to be the upper tactical level (division, battle group, wing, Marine
5
expeditionary force). However, the historical record with regard to the Necessity Principle would seem to indicate that lower levels have successfully integrated. The “Cactus
Air Force” in the World War II Solomons campaign successfully integrated squadrons
6
from different services into a cohesive fighting group.
At this point it is probably worthwhile to distinguish between synchronization and integration. There appears to be great advantage in having tactical units self-synchronize
with elements from other services. However, integration, the assignment of elements of
one service’s forces to those of another (attachment, in joint parlance), is fraught with
hazards. First, logistics can become so cumbersome that formation efficiency is reduced,
despite the additive effects of the attached element. Second, depending on when the unit
is attached, training (or the lack thereof) will be similarly inhibiting. Therefore, we must
conclude that the applicability of the Cohesion Principle is situation dependent.
A second limiting factor on jointness is the idea of diversity. Some writers decry the
7
potential for strategic “monism” if the services were truly unified. So, the Diversity
Principle states that competition of ideas leads to a more robust and stable strategy8
development process. This idea seems to have merit on several counts. First, the historical record is full of episodes in which one person or organization dominated national
or theater strategy to the detriment of the parent nation’s interests. The United States
is a pluralistic democracy, and its strategies should be discourse based and represent
the aggregate interests of the relevant stakeholders. This was illustrated when President
Harry Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. Second, if
jointness were incarnated by a general staff, it might acquire a strategic “tilt” that could
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lead to programming decisions that would eventually paint the military into a strategic
corner. Moreover, the unhappy history of the Canadian Armed Forces with true unification is universally cited as an example of too much jointness.
This is not to say that constant internecine service squabbling is to be tolerated. Congress, in passing the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, clearly based its actions on the idea
that competition could be accommodated only within the context of available national
resources and only down to certain levels of command. In the era 1947 to 1986 the
Diversity and Hierarchy Principles combined, without the moderating influence of necessity, to override decisively the Complementarity Principle. Congress finally supplied
the necessity. If we have correctly discerned the existence of the Diversity and Hierarchy
Principles, then logic would tell us that those are wrong who say that the military has so
changed since 1986 that continuing legislative forcing functions is unnecessary.
The Cohesion Principle seems to lose relevance as we go up the chain of command,
whereas the Diversity Principle loses relevance as we descend the hierarchy. In the
middle, where the curves cross, exist the joint commanders in chief (CINCs) and the
JTFs. At these levels a joint-force commander can choose two styles of command with
regard to these two principles. He can elect to be a “coordinator,” who rationalizes the
possibly competing plans of his service component commanders, or an “orchestrator,”
who uses his staff to develop an operational plan and then issues unambiguous orders
to his components. General Norman Schwarzkopf appears to have been a coordinator,
letting his service components develop their plans (within the context of a general strategy) and then taking whatever minimum steps he deemed necessary to deconflict them.
In contrast, General MacArthur was an orchestrator. The Inchon operation was an ex9
ample of a detailed operational strategy imposed on unwilling subordinate commands.
A coordinator will maximize diversity and therefore unit cohesion, while an orchestrator will minimize diversity and might very well take some risks with tactical formation
cohesion in the interests of tight orchestration. Both of these joint command styles have
their place, and neither can be said to be inherently superior to the other. The trick is to
recognize when one is more appropriate.
This leads us to the conclusion that the degree of desired jointness is situation dependent and not an absolute standard. While the principles so far discussed give us some
general parameters concerning jointness, they do not offer any clear guidance on what
kinds of circumstances demand various degrees of jointness. At this point we leave the
realm of available literature and head into intellectual terra incognita. The principles I
will articulate are at best speculative, but they are based as much as possible on observed
facts and trends.
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The Preparation Principle. A corollary to the Necessity Principle, it states that the
greater the expected necessity for speed of command in an operation, the greater the
required degree of proactive jointness. One of the fundamental tenets of “Joint Vision
2020” is that the future operational environment will demand increasing speed of command. This implies that much self-synchronization of lower command echelons will be
required and that therefore the services should invest heavily in C4ISR interoperability
10
down to the unit level.
Networking of combat units will have a profound effect on how the Preparation, Cohesion, and Diversity Principles apply to military operations. Networked units will permit
a swarming style of warfare, in which individual unit commanders will have considerable decision-making discretion within the context of a constantly updated joint commander’s intent. Good joint doctrine will be critical to the success of such operations, so
that aspect of preparation will be central. However, networking will allow both creativity and changes of plans on the fly, so highly structured joint training will be of less use.
Since networked units will be less dependent on fixed formations for mutual support
and more dependent on information sharing, the Cohesion Principle will change
dramatically. There may be little need for formal attachments, and units will naturally
collaborate and cooperate on the basis of the emerging common operational picture.
Finally, network-enabled swarming will demand knowledge of and adherence to a basic
rule set (doctrine) but will permit (and even require) considerable latitude in decision
making for local commanders, so the Diversity Principle will change.
The Orchestration Principle. Joint strategies and concepts of operation that require
tight orchestration should be subject to centralized joint planning and control. There
may be a time and place for diverse inputs on strategy, but once decided, diversity is
an evil. Desert Storm seemed to illustrate this principle. The Marine Corps was
supposed to conduct a fixing attack in the center while the Army VII Corps conducted
a flanking attack that would surround and annihilate the Iraqi Republican Guards.
However, General Schwarzkopf did not closely control the Marines’ rate of advance,
and their rapid attack forced the Iraqis into headlong retreat before the VII Corps could
11
close the trap.
The Triphibious Principle. (This principle is named in honor of Winston Churchill,
who coined the term to articulate the need for officers who understood the combined
action of land, sea, and air forces.) The converse of the Dilemma Principle, it holds that
a joint-force commander should avoid getting into situations in which he has to risk a
disaster in one warfare environment in order to avoid one in another. There are various permutations of this principle, such as “Don’t get yourself into a situation in which
you have to risk a disaster at sea in order to avert one on land, or vice versa.” Land, sea,
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air, space, and special operations, as well as information, are all warfare environments
that are connected by this principle. A prime historical example is Guadalcanal, where
Admiral Ernest J. King sent the Marines ashore before an adequate degree of sea and
air control was attained. The result was that Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was put in
an untenable dilemma and General Alexander Vandegrift and his Marines were put at
extreme risk.
The Parallel Strategies Principle. Military risk is reduced by executing multiple, simultaneous strategies (for instance, an air strategy combined with a ground or maritime
strategy), to the extent that their effects are additive and do not significantly attenuate
the effects or execution of each other. This is a combination of the Complementarity and
Dilemma Principles writ large. Joint doctrine does not take this issue head on but leaves
the door open for it, and it is the source of serious doctrinal friction between the Air
Force and the other services. The Marines, for example, because they are so dependent
on their aviation arm for tactical fires, are loath to chop their air assets to the Joint Force
Air Component Commander (JFACC), because losses in a precursor air campaign may
hamstring subsequent amphibious or ground maneuver operations. Joint-force commanders must have the authority, objectivity, and guts to decide on a principal operational strategy, but also the vision (based on education in strategy and operations) to see
the benefits and hazards of a multipronged strategy.

There are two issues that have not been addressed by any of the principles articulated so
far. The first is micromanagement. There are those who contend that increasing connectivity and flatter organizations will lead to centralized control. There does not appear
to be any principle governing this matter that can be deduced from either the literature
or the historical record. Abraham Lincoln tried to micromanage his armies at various
points with a telegraph and pony express, whereas President George Bush left Schwarzkopf in a guidance vacuum during cease-fire talks in the desert, despite the availability
of satellite phones, faxes, and numerous other means of instant communications. This
seems to be a matter governed by personalities and not at all amenable to simple rules.
The second matter that has not been broached is who should hold joint command. This
issue is currently governed by the quasi-principle that the commander of a joint force
12
should be from the service that supplies the preponderance of forces. There is some
sense to this, but on the other hand, it does not necessarily guarantee the fittest person
gains command. There is the concern that an officer from one service cannot be trusted
to make strategic decisions concerning the core fighting capability of another service’s
main forces. The Navy, for example, refused to assign any fast carriers to General
MacArthur in World War II, assuming that an Army officer would not be able to make
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hard decisions competently about risking these scarce strategic assets. Most recently,
the Army assigned a three-star general to the command of a relatively small helicopter
detachment in Albania in order to ensure the Air Force JFACC would not “misuse” the
helicopters.
The answer to these problems does not appear to lie in principles or rules of thumb. It
does seem to lie, in this writer’s opinion, in the existence of robust joint institutions.
Joint Forces Command, as the joint-force trainer and integrator, and National Defense
University, through its component schools and think tanks, should be centers of excellence that develop joint operational theory and doctrine. This system would refine officer joint education and training to the point that all officers eligible for joint command
would be adequately prepared and the “preponderance of forces” policy would suffice.
Conversely, if joint officer development reached a sufficiently sophisticated level, individual capabilities and personality, not the color of uniform, could be the deciding fac13
tor in picking a joint commander. In such an environment, where higher echelons had
great confidence in local commanders, counterproductive micromanagement would be
less likely.
Having gone through the exercise of distilling prospective joint principles, can we see
any utility in them? Would the existence of an accepted joint theory make a difference
in how the armed forces operate? I think the answer is yes. For one thing, the articulation of theory provides us with a common set of terms through which we can communicate complex ideas. Who would argue the utility of Clausewitz’s “center of gravity”
or “culminating point”? No common set of terms settles all arguments, but at least we
would move closer to knowing what we are really arguing about. Second, theory begets
theory. If we can take the first step toward a clinical examination of jointness, it likely
will stimulate further work. Progressive theoretical work might help prevent reinvention
of the same wheels by successive generations of officers. The rather cyclic nature of attempts at jointness, reflected in part by the Necessity Principle, would be disrupted, and
actual progress would be achieved.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Slicing the Onion Differently
Seapower and the Levels of War
Significantly, this strategy requires new ways of thinking—about both
empowering individual commanders and understanding the net effects of
dispersed operations.
A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST-CENTURY SEAPOWER1

For most of history, generals and admirals have talked about the process of war in terms
of strategy and tactics. However, in its 1982 Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the U.S.
Army inserted an intermediate level between strategy and tactics that it called the “operational level.” Subsequently, military officers and scholars have devoted considerable
effort to defining and developing the different levels of war, especially the operational
level. Although first institutionalized by the Army, the levels of war were eventually
embedded in joint doctrine. However, the notion of an operational level of war and
its attendant set of terms, principles, and concepts has not gained purchase within the
U.S. Navy until recently, despite being taught and touted by its own war college. Even
now, most naval officers, including many admirals, are either unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the idea, despite giving it considerable lip service. Although this could be
dismissed as parochialism, there are deeper and more pragmatic reasons for the Navy’s
institutional discomfort with the operational level of war that will be addressed in this
article. Understanding these reasons will lead to the articulation of a new way to look at
the relationship between levels of war—a different way to slice the onion.
The Problem of Command
Napoleon, it is said, was unbeatable when he could see the whole battlefield and personally direct the action. However, he did not do so well when he had to rely on his
2
subordinate generals to exercise independent command. Either they were incompetent,
or Napoleon lacked understanding of what we now call the operational art. The growth
Joint Force Quarterly, January 2012, all rights reserved
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in size of armies in the 19th century and the industrialization of warfare, including railroads, meant that no general could exercise personal command of a whole army. This
was clearly illustrated in the U.S. Civil War when General Ulysses S. Grant coordinated
the movements of several widely separated armies toward a common goal. By World
War II, millions of men comprised the Red Army that drove back the vaunted German
Wehrmacht in 1944 and 1945. The Soviets, in order to keep coherence across this massive force, developed the notion of operational art, which referred to the principles and
concepts needed to link a set of tactical actions to a goal that was itself part of a larger
scheme. Armed with this doctrine, subordinate commanders and their staffs could plan
and execute even large and progressive operations in a way that was congruent with
overall strategy. The commander in chief did not have to be there in person.
Until World War II, navies did not have the problem of trying to closely coordinate
the actions of widely separated fleets. It was not that there were no scattered fleets; it
was just that the nature of the problem at sea was different than on land. If one navy
concentrated its power into a main fleet, the contending navy had to follow suit or risk
defeat in detail. The mobility of ships made this a central issue. Therefore, large naval
battles, when they occurred, were concentrated in space and time such that the admiral
in charge was there in person. The key command problem was tactical: how to find the
enemy and then how to coordinate the movements of individual ships or squadrons
such that maximum firepower could be brought to bear. The big battles were over in
a few hours, and they generally had significant strategic effects. Thus, naval officers
thought in terms of strategy and tactics.
World War II forced a change in practice, if not in terminology. The adoption of a progressive island-hopping strategy through the Mandated Islands with concurrent support
to General Douglas MacArthur’s converging drive along the north coast of New Guinea
meant that the actions of separate, powerful fleets had to be coordinated. Upon arrival
in Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, elected to command from ashore in Hawaii, allowing subordinate
admirals such as Raymond Spruance and William Halsey to plan and execute the individual operations that constituted the Central Pacific campaign, each of which might
involve multiple tactical engagements or battles. Although not articulated as such, the
Navy had to develop its own version of the Soviet operational art. However, after the
war—and notwithstanding several dramatic operational-level actions in the Korean
War such as the Inchon invasion and the rescue of Army and Marine forces in North
Korea—with no enemy fleet in sight but pressured by the advent of nuclear weapons, the
Navy promptly reverted to the traditional strategy and tactics framework. Individual
battlegroups each centered on an aircraft carrier became the strategic chess pieces that
the fleet commanders moved around.
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The strategy/tactics framework sufficed for the Navy until the 1991 Gulf War. In that
conflict, the Service discovered that the lack of any theory or doctrine connected with
a progressive and sustained air campaign, a form of operational art, put it in a subordinate position to the Air Force, which did have such doctrine. After the war, the Navy
embarked upon an effort to achieve its own operational-level command and control
capability by trying to mirror the Air Force’s Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC) command structure—at sea. This effort ultimately failed in part because the
Navy attempted to shoehorn a highly complex operations center into a space-limited
ship and superimpose it on existing tactical staffs. However, a key reason it did not work
out was that the Navy did not have any existing operational-level theory or doctrine that
would have established the need for such a command element.
The command problem for the Navy in the 1990s became one of protecting its warfighting equities in an increasingly developed joint command environment that was
based substantially on Army structure, process, and doctrine. In the wake of the Soviet
Union’s demise, the Navy again found itself without a seagoing rival. In order to establish its continuing relevance in new terms, it issued a white paper entitled . . . From the
Sea in which it acknowledged the absence of a threat to its command of the seas and
committed itself to supporting joint warfighting in the littorals. Over the next few years,
several successor documents were issued to refine the Navy’s utility argument, but each
3
retained the fundamental argument that its mission was power projection. This argument ended up presenting the Navy with a new command problem in the first decade
of the 21st century. Prior to . . . From the Sea, the world ocean was divided into two
massive areas of responsibility (AORs), U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Atlantic Command. The two “fleet commanders in chief” owned virtually all naval forces, which
moved fluidly (as it were) around the world operating “in support” of the land-oriented
joint commanders (although substantial forces were transferred on a rotating basis to
the Mediterranean under U.S. European Command). After the Navy issued . . . From
the Sea, each successive Unified Command Plan (UCP), the document that spells out
the joint command structure, expanded the AOR boundaries of the land commanders
into the oceans. Now, U.S. Southern Command, a traditionally Army-centric command,
owns the Caribbean and large swaths of the Atlantic and Pacific. U.S. Central Command owns the Indian Ocean north and west of Diego Garcia, and U.S. Africa Command owns the seas around much of Africa.
In the new joint command arrangements, each unified commander has his own naval
component, a numbered fleet that exercises command in the AOR in a way very similar
to the ground and air components. In joint theory, these components represent the
lower echelon of the operational level, with the joint task force commander being in
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the heart of it and the unified combatant commander (COCOM) being at the “theaterstrategic level”—the levels-of-war onion being sliced rather thin by now.
For the world of the 1990s, this set of command arrangements worked adequately
despite being occasionally awkward for mobile naval forces and despite various spats
between the Air Force and Navy over where the maritime commander’s airspace ended
and that of the JFACC began. Naval forces were essentially a “sea base” that contributed
air sorties, gunfire, and other support to forces ashore. Moreover, even in the peacetime
naval diplomacy role, the pattern of naval operations was a function of the COCOM’s
security cooperation plan. The world as seen from the perspective of the UCP is simply
a collection of individual and autonomous AORs.
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the whole architecture of the UCP started to become obsolete, especially for the Navy. The possibility of terrorists smuggling nuclear weapons
or other dangerous things into the homeland by sea posed a new kind of security threat,
one that neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard was prepared to deal with. As the nature
of the problem and its potential solution began to emerge, it started to dawn on admirals
that a new approach to command and control was necessary. Maritime security and its
component function, maritime domain awareness (MDA), require the utmost in fleet
dispersal in order to catalyze a global maritime security partnership. MDA—the collaborative sharing of information about who is doing what on the seas and where—requires
centralized fusion of information to see tips and patterns from terrorist organizations
that are not constrained by American AOR boundaries. The need is for information
to flow freely among naval forces and headquarters around the world, unfettered or
distorted by the existing structure of joint command authorities and UCP dividing
lines. The Navy’s answer to this problem has been the establishment of a network of
interconnected maritime operations centers (MOCs), one in each of the numbered fleet
headquarters. While not exactly violating the existing provisions of U.S. statute or the
UCP, the networking of the MOCs to rapidly share information is the leading edge of an
emerging process of globalizing naval command and control that eventually will yield a
structure that does not conform to the Army-defined levels of war.
The MOCs are one response to the global terrorist problem, but they are not the only
one. As mentioned previously, achieving global maritime security requires the utmost
in dispersion of naval forces. However, the Navy is not structured to do this effectively.
Its fleet of around 280 ships consists primarily of high-end combat units centered on
nuclear aircraft carriers and large amphibious ships. It currently has few ships that are
suitable for constabulary work or supporting engagement with the many small navies of
African, Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian countries. With such limited
assets, the Navy cannot afford to respond fully to the demands levied by each regional
numbered fleet or the COCOMs. The Navy has decided it needs some way of figuring
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out, from a global perspective, where to place its limited resources for the most effect. It
therefore created the Global Engagement Strategy Division within the Navy Headquarters staff in the Pentagon. Having no direct command authority, it is charged nonetheless with advising the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on how to make the case for
depriving some AORs of forces and attention while loading up others—in other words,
devising a strategy for placing the Navy’s limited chips where they count the most from
a global perspective. Here again, there are no violations of existing law or joint regulations, but the CNO is now getting more involved in how Navy forces are distributed.
A third Navy command and control response to the changed strategic environment is
the standup of U.S. Tenth Fleet, the Navy component of U.S. Cyber Command (which
itself is a subunified command of U.S. Strategic Command). U.S. Strategic Command
has global functional responsibilities, so Tenth Fleet is global within the context of the
existing UCP. However, much remains to be worked out as to how Tenth Fleet relates
to the rest of the numbered fleets and their MOCs. Tenth Fleet has recently assumed
authority over the Navy Information Operations Command, allowing it to coordinate
information operations that will be needed to cover the movement of forces during
crisis or war. In an age of satellites, the Internet, cell phones, and significant ocean
instrumentation, naval operational deception will no longer be a local tactical matter. It
will require a globe-girdling effort of exquisite timing and comprehensiveness to allow
ships and fleets to show up somewhere by surprise. This can only be achieved through
a tightly coordinated effort among all the MOCs and the Navy Staff in the Pentagon.
Tenth Fleet’s MOC will be the logical coordination point.
Perspective
The Navy’s responses to the command and control problems it faces point toward a different way of looking at the relationships among forces and commanders. In each case,
the Navy is attempting to match planning and execution authority with the perspective
needed to ensure those plans and orders are coherent at the proper level; and in each
case, the Navy has found that the existing joint command structure is either inappropriate or incomplete. That command structure, and the attendant levels-of-war framework
upon which it is based, is inherently regional and land-oriented. What is missing is an
effective global and maritime perspective.
For the Navy, and perhaps also for the Air Force, a framework that makes more sense
in terms of matching command arrangements with environment and mission can be
described simply as global, regional, and local. Unlike the existing levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic), in this framework the military skill sets of strategy and
tactics—and, yes, the operational art—could inhabit each level of command, depending
on the nature of the specific missions and functions that are needed. By divorcing the
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separate intellectual skill sets of tactics, operational art, and strategy from command
level, we would empower Sailors, to use a trite phrase, to think globally and act locally.
Moreover, if the military skill sets were refined within this framework, there would be
less likelihood of destructive micromanagement from above, of the operational tail wagging the strategic dog, and of “loose cannon” activities at the tactical level.
The proposed framework is anchored at the global level. The Navy has good reasons for
needing a global perspective embedded in its planning and decision-making process,
operational as well as administrative. The first and perhaps most fundamental reason
is that seapower can be neither understood properly nor applied properly except from a
global perspective. Most naval theorists have missed this point. A true maritime strategy is based on the ocean and is oriented on movement. Leveraging the geographic fact
that the seas are all connected, it seeks to gain and maintain the global exterior position in order to provide sanctuary for the Nation’s trading economy, maintain credible
contact with allies and create strategic options, and hem in opponents. The pursuance of
such a strategy might result in regional or local operations (such as invasions) but must
be coordinated from a global perspective. One reason for having a maritime headquarters with a global perspective is that because the global system is so tightly coupled,
perturbations propagate rapidly and globally and can emanate from disruptions that are
of natural or human origin. Planning for and reacting to such disruptions must be
based on a global perspective and can best be coordinated from Washington, where,
not coincidentally, most of the personnel from other executive branch departments,
headquarters of nongovernmental organizations, and embassies of other countries
are located.
In 2003, the Navy and U.S. Joint Forces Command ran a war game entitled Unified
Course 04 in which conflicts erupted in several different regions of the world nearly
simultaneously. Each region’s game cell was led by an admiral. By the end of the game,
a strong consensus emerged that since events in widely separated theaters seemed to be
coupled in various ways, some sort of “global operational art” was needed for a number of reasons, including making sure the logistics of one theater did not disrupt the
logistics in another. Moreover, in the Internet age, ad hoc allies scattered around the
globe can form up and coordinate their efforts if their common foe is the United States.
Without commensurate operational coordination among theaters, the U.S. military
risks being outmaneuvered. In lieu of the Joint Staff acting as a general staff, such a
military skill is orphaned, with no staff having the perspective or incentive to develop it.
In World War II, Admiral Ernest King and his staff, with King functioning as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as well as CNO, provided the Navy with the global operational perspective needed to rationalize Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian
Ocean projects. Currently, the UCP offers no such mechanism. The issue here is that the
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global level is not necessarily strategic; an operational art perspective is needed at times,
mostly for naval, air, cyber, and space operations.
There are clearly times and places where the local perspective is the key to effective
military decision-making. The sea Services have a long tradition of decentralized command and control, and this corporate culture will continue to serve them well. However,
naval weapons, both offensive and defensive, and sensors have attained such range and
capability that in many cases, local perspective is no longer competent to control them.
It has been a long time since a naval officer in tactical command has had targeting
authority over his land attack missiles or aircraft, and as the Standard Missile achieves
over-the-horizon aircraft intercept capability, it is likely that the JFACC will have the
call on some defensive shots. Because our arsenal of missiles is limited, including those
for ballistic missile defense, a headquarters with regional perspective will have to make
decisions on the positioning of forces and establishing doctrine for making actual use
of these weapons. The necessity for regional perspective is a way of establishing who
should have what authorities over what weapons and sensors. Given the culture of
delegation in the Navy, allowing the matter to be defined as centralization versus decentralization will unnecessarily abet conservatism and generate tensions. As the Navy
establishes the MOC as its key regional command center, using the needed geographic
perspective as the litmus test for whether it should have certain command authorities
will help ensure its ultimate success.
New Principles
As with the introduction of the operational level of war in 1982, adoption of this
framework will necessarily be attended by a gestation period in which the war and staff
colleges and perhaps academia in general digest the concept, test it in games, and generate doctrine. However, it seems possible at this point to identify some principles a priori
that fall out logically from the inherent nature of the new framework.
The first principle is the most basic: define the security problem from all perspectives.
Defining the problem is a preliminary step in the military decision-making process
4
that has found currency in the U.S. Army in the past few years. Performed prior to the
mission analysis step, it makes the whole process more intellectual and less mechanical.
In terms of the new framework proposed here, defining a problem separately from the
global, regional, and local perspectives helps to illuminate what measures of coordination will be necessary and where various command authorities ought to reside.
A second principle is that strategy is not a level of war or even a command echelon, but
a thought process that links specific actions, military or otherwise, to political and economic goals. This makes strategy an intellectual skill set that, combined with defined
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command authorities, might be applied at each of the levels of command. For years, the
military literature has been full of assertions that the levels of war have been fusing into
5
each other and of observations about “strategic corporals.” However, the traditional
levels-of-war framework does not accommodate such an evolution comfortably. Establishing a framework based on command perspective, and regarding strategy, operations,
and tactics as skill sets to be applied as needed at each level, would accommodate these
phenomena quite naturally.
Regarding strategy as a skill set versus command echelon or level of war might also
improve the oversight of military operations. Two Army authors argue that the elaboration of the original Soviet concept of operational art into a level of war and echelon
of command has driven a wedge between civilian political authorities and commanders in the field. Politicians, they say, have become detached strategic sponsors rather
6
than effective strategic overseers of operations. If perspective rather than levels of war
became our organizing principle, and there existed a military staff in Washington with
operational authority, the coordination of politics and operations would be much more
effective. Moreover, since strategy would be a skill set that inhabited each level, based
on perspective, the appropriate influence of political and economic guidance from the
7
capital would be clearer, with issues of micromanagement or neglect becoming moot.
The issue of strategy as a skill set leads to a third principle. Command authority should
not be a comprehensive or blanket tool; it is multifaceted and should be delegated in
specific segments to the command with the appropriate perspective for exercising it.
This kind of thing has already happened. Navy battlegroup commanders no longer
have targeting authority over the land attack missiles their ships carry; that resides
with higher authority—commanders with the requisite perspective on the effects those
weapons are to produce or on the coordination of their employment with other means
from other Services. Instead of echeloning command as is currently done, it would be
distributed. Moreover, specific command authorities would not be static; they would
migrate among the command levels as the situation unfolds. Whereas the local commander might initially have the authority to strike certain types of targets, emerging
intelligence may indicate that such authority should be moved to either the regional or
global level, at least for a time. Authorities could as easily migrate downward. For those
used to the rigid command structure that has been in place since Napoleon’s day, this
may seem a recipe for chaos. However, what we have observed at the tactical level in
wars from Vietnam through Afghanistan is that an echeloned command structure is
not capable of rapidly integrating strategy and operations, thus allowing events to spin
out of control. At the end of the “100-hour war” in 1991, the George H. W. Bush administration failed to exert sufficient oversight of General Norman Schwarzkopf (who,
despite having four stars, was a local commander in that fight), and the Iraqis were
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allowed to fly their helicopters, thus keeping Saddam Hussein in power. In 2003, Army
ground commanders removed key command elements from Baghdad at precisely the
moment their presence could have been most helpful in averting an insurgency. While
echeloning of command is necessary for the effective functioning of ground forces at
the corps level and below, the presence of a global/regional/local framework might have
distributed command authorities in these cases such that the strategic errors could have
been avoided.
A fourth principle prescribes that speed of coordination trumps speed of command.
Since Air Force Colonel John Boyd articulated his theory of the “observe-orient-decide8
act loop,” military theorists have almost universally extolled the virtues of what some
call “speed of command,” that is, the ability of a commander and staff to make and implement decisions faster than the enemy. This is clearly a benefit when the issue is solely
kinetic combat, but in an age in which fewer military actions are purely or even mostly
kinetic and the need for interagency and international coordination is also universally
cited, it is more likely that kinetic speed of command will produce harmful strategic
side effects that outweigh the tactical or operational benefits. If coordination is indeed
key, then the faster it can be done, the less it will adversely affect speed of command.
A command framework that has at its core a global operations center that is collocated
with the headquarters of the other government agencies as well as foreign embassies,
and has as its intellectual fabric the integration of strategy, operations, and tactics at
each command level, is far better positioned to achieve speed of coordination.
A final preliminary principle is that the U.S. Government should act in a unified
manner. Given the size of the executive branch and its multiplicity of organizations
that could have both a stake in and influence on any modern military operation, the
government as a whole must be convinced to lend support and to coordinate with the
military. This idea was manifested in a speech by Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he said that no military operation ought to be under9
taken unless and until the whole government is ready. The framework advocated in
this article would make it easier and faster for a proposed operation to be articulated in
a way that would be more intelligible and persuasive to organizations not imbued with
a military culture or educated in military matters. The need for military action must
be sold, but under the current levels-of-war structure, the military is isolated and its
imperatives and reasoning are opaque to other organizations. Defining problems from
the different command perspectives and integrating strategy at each level could greatly
enhance communication and thus aid the vetting process.
There are undoubtedly more principles that can be defined, but these five serve to
provide a better view of what the proposed framework really is and how it would work.
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However, these principles, if pragmatic, are still abstract. If the framework is to be
adopted in practice, a specific new command structure would have to be created.
Fixing the Problem
There are several ways the problem might be solved or ameliorated. The most radical
solution is to do away with the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). Over the
past few years, a number of people, including Admiral Mullen, have expressed concern
1
that American diplomacy has become too militarized. 0 One way of counteracting this
perception, if not fact, is to disestablish the GCC position. Much of the staff structure
would remain in place, but instead of a four-star military officer, the person heading the
staff would be a senior State Department officer. There would be a number of three-star
officers on the staff who would maintain the necessary regional military infrastructure.
The mission of this newly reorganized “regional engagement staff” would focus on
diplomacy. There would not be AOR boundaries in the current sense, but rather perhaps
delineations that correspond to current State Department assignments. There would
also be a standing joint task force headquarters in each region to handle any contingencies that might arise. These joint task force headquarters, as well as the regional Service
component headquarters, would report to a central military coordinating staff in
Washington, thus establishing a joint staff with a global perspective and global authority, located in a place where close coordination with the National Security Council as
well as a host of other agencies is most feasible. If current operational-level doctrine
has produced a disconnect between strategy and operations, then such an arrangement
would facilitate appropriate strategic oversight of military operations.
On the other hand, major surgery on the UCP may be politically infeasible. How could
all of this be squared with the existing joint command and control system? One way
would be to focus on the status of naval forces. Resurrecting the doctrine of operating
“in support” and having the Pacific Fleet and Fleet Forces staffs function as the principal maritime operations centers for each hemisphere would be one way to reestablish fleet mobility in peacetime execution of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower. If a fight did break out in Korea or the Persian Gulf, a joint task force could
be established and, per existing joint doctrine, the local numbered fleet would take over
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander duties for the joint operations area.
Although the Navy, in its attempt to generate a global command perspective, is applying the various band-aid fixes that have been described in this article, a more
comprehensive solution is needed in order to ensure a global command perspective is
available when needed. Assuming that the reestablishment of Admiral Ernest King–like
authorities for the CNO is no more politically feasible than eradicating current AOR
boundaries, a new approach is called for. One possibility is to create a naval deputy to
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the Secretary of Defense who has defined authorities to direct intertheater movements
and certain operations of naval forces. The advantage of such an arrangement is that
this officer would be located in Washington, close to the other cabinet departments and
the Pentagon’s communications capabilities. An alternate solution might be to invest
such authorities in the existing Navy component to U.S. Strategic Command, although
the range of responsibilities and authorities would not be exactly compatible with those
of the unified commander. Moreover, it adds a layer of command between the global
naval commander and the national command authorities. In any case, the emerging
global strategic environment cries out for an updated U.S. military command structure
that can provide a global perspective to local operations and can conceive of and execute
strategic maritime maneuver.
For armies, the three levels of war are not abstract constructions, but a command echeloning framework that emerged quite naturally as a function of the scale of operations
enabled by industrialized warfare. However, this framework does not apply equally
naturally to naval operations. In an era when naval operations were almost entirely
auxiliary to land operations, the inconveniences were tolerable. In an era of global
transnational threats, the Internet, and an emerging global competitor, the inconveniences are turning into operational and strategic vulnerabilities. The world has entered
an era in which the seas are more than just extended communications zones between a
land operation in Eurasia and the continental United States; they have attained strategic
significance in and of themselves. Among other things, they are now a vast strategic
and operational maneuver space, not only for us, but also increasingly for nations and
groups hostile to the United States and to the global system of commerce and security
that perpetuates our economic well-being and political values. If we are to avoid being
outmaneuvered, we must overcome the maritime seams our former strategic success
has created. Slicing the onion differently in terms of maritime command arrangements
will help.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Getting a Grip on Tailored Deterrence
The World of Conflict Management
The end of the Cold War brought about a lengthy hiatus in the national and international dialogue on deterrence. A concept that once seemed pivotal to the very survival of the
human race, deterrence appeared to rest upon the rather narrow foundation of nuclear
weapons, a perception only reinforced by the rapid disappearance of deterrence from
the national agenda after the fall of the Soviet Union. Recently, however, deterrence has
resurfaced as a subject of discussion and concern in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, further
nuclear proliferation and the increasing dependence of the world on computer systems
linked by the Internet.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced a broadened notion of the
concept it labeled tailored deterrence: “The future force will provide a fully balanced,
tailored capability to deter both state and non-state threats—including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic
1
aggression—while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.” The very
broadness of this approach to deterrence has spurred a new round of discussion in
policy and academic circles on the modern nature and limits of deterrence.
Extending the notion of deterrence beyond its more traditional arena of nuclear weapons quickly invokes difficult—if not intractable—issues surrounding who and what
might be the method’s new targets. The 2010 QDR continues its 2006 counterpart’s
discussion of tailored deterrence in this vein: “Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand tailored approaches to deterrence. Such tailoring requires an indepth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision making of potential
2
adversaries, whether they are individuals, networks, or states.” The 2006 Deterrence
Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) adopts the same approach in its central
idea for mechanizing deterrence: Deterrence operations are dependent on the ability
Orbis, Fall 2012. © 2012 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved
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of the joint force to manage perceptions and act directly and discriminately through
3
multiple domains on the decision-making calculus of adversaries.
An interesting recent example of an attempt at very tailored deterrence, albeit directed
at the United States, is China’s development of the DF-21D intermediate range ballistic
missile with an anti-ship homing device installed. China’s specific goal is to dissuade
4
U.S. intervention in a crisis involving Taiwan. The humiliation China felt after the 1996
Taiwan Straits crisis, when the United States dispatched two carrier battle groups to the
area, spawned a general naval buildup. However, realizing that it would be decades, if
ever, before the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could expect to face
down the U.S. Navy, they sought an asymmetric and focused deterrent option. The
DF-21D seems to fit the bill—the presumed effect being to alter the U.S. risk/benefit
analysis to deter intervention entirely, or at least to keep U.S. aircraft carriers far enough
away from a putative Taiwan invasion effort that their tactical aircraft would not be able
to make a difference. While broadly worded, the following quotation from the most
recent Chinese defense white paper clearly conveys their intent: “Following the principle of building a lean and effective force, the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF)
strives to push forward its modernization and improve its capabilities in rapid reaction,
penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while
5
steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations.” Not
surprisingly, the U.S. Navy is hard at work finding ways to neutralize or work around
this threat, which ought to provide insight on the effect of our own attempted efforts to
focus, or tailor, deterrence.
Approaches to Deterrence
There are two potential intellectual approaches to understanding deterrence. The first,
as exemplified by the QDRs and DO JOC, is to focus on the opponent and ask what
levers might exist to influence their actions. This would be especially important for the
examination of tailored deterrence, since it deals with preventing an opponent from
6
taking fairly specific actions. At the heart of this approach is manipulation, and while
history records some successful episodes (an example is the infamous “Mr. X” episode
prior to D Day in World War II, in which a dead body carrying false plans for the invasion washed ashore in Spain and caused Hitler to delay the movement of his reaction
forces toward Normandy until it was too late), it is problematic on several counts. First,
there is the issue of complexity at the strategic level. Understanding the dynamics of
decision making within the inner councils of a government requires “exquisite” intelligence of a form that is rarely available and, in any case, there is still the problem of unpredictability in governments that are less than stolidly doctrinal in their functioning.
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The second difficulty with the focus on opponents is the epistemic one of proving
and predicting a negative. The matter of retrospective proof is important because the
absence of any conclusive evidence from historical cases makes the future-oriented
process of deterrence planning a faith-based proposition. On the other hand, common
sense might convince us that it is easier to keep someone from doing something than
it is getting them to act. However, this is at least partly illusory. While it is likely true
that overall strength and credible intent will serve to raise the risks and deter someone
whose motivation is not especially strong, trying to get specific with deterrence could
easily result in miscalculation. The more specific the intended deterrence, the more it
starts to look like an attempt to catalyze second or third order events; always a risky
undertaking.
There is a second intellectual approach to understanding deterrence, one that, while
neither a panacea nor a key to unlocking the puzzle, at least avoids some of the difficulties associated with the first approach. This second approach focuses on the context
of deterrence, examining the logic of situations and the incentives and opportunities
for action and inaction. Here, the prospects for deterrence depend less on an exquisite
understanding of the other side’s intent (although this is always good to know if one
can obtain such intelligence), than on an understanding of one’s own situation and the
inherent logic of conflict. This article will explore the second approach to understanding deterrence, defining it as a subset of conflict management strategy.
As normally used in the existing international relations literature, “conflict management” denotes a form of bargaining or mediation among nations or other parties to a
dispute, analogous to the use of the term in labor relations and organizational dynamics. In contrast, the term is used in this article to denote the intent of a state or group
and the methods it uses to limit, channel or otherwise control the intensity and nature
of violence associated with a conflict when the prospects for dispute resolution on
favorable terms have disappeared. A conflict management strategy in this context is a
defensive holding action. It will be established that such a strategic defensive holding
action may occur either right after a war, in times of tension or crisis, or even in times of
what might be termed “violent peace” such as exist today.
Defining deterrence as a component of conflict management strategy first requires an
examination of the broader context of conflict, because conflict management strategies are themselves components of an overall approach to dealing with conflict. For the
purpose of this article, conflict means the range of measures a state, alliance, armed
group, etc., takes to resolve a dispute in its favor. Viewed through this lens, conflict
encompasses everything from antagonistic negotiations to nuclear war. At first glance,
this definition may seem to be so broad as to be useless for analytic purposes, but it is its
very holistic nature that produces the necessary insights. Looked at in this way, conflict
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is a single continuum; terrorism is essentially the same thing as nuclear war. Such an
approach is necessary to establish whether a concept like tailored deterrence is viable
and advisable.
If one accepts this “unified field theory” of conflict, then it follows that notions such as
“fourth generation war,” conventional war, insurgency and “hybrid war” deal solely with
means and have no useful meaning with respect to the intent and dynamics of conflict,
the elements relevant to the study of deterrence. These appellations of different modes
of warfare constitute thick intellectual underbrush that must be cleared away in order to
observe the trees of strategy, much less the forest. Moreover, in the literature concerning all these concepts there is frequently embedded the notion that there is a particular
“recipe” for conducting war or conflict in a particular mode. This is an effect of dealing
with means rather than motivation and intent. While the matter of means will enter
into this discussion, it will always be subordinate to the factors of human intent and
motivation.
Disputes
Disputes are the engine of conflict, and before conflict as well as strategies for pursuing it can be adequately characterized, there must be a framework for understanding
disputes. To build such a framework it is first necessary to delineate what kinds of
disputes are relevant to this discussion of deterrence. Simply stated, they are those that
affect the policies and actions of national governments and groups such as al Qaeda,
and more specifically, those policies and actions taken in the national security arena,
broadly defined. These include everything from trade disputes to collisions between the
most fundamental aspirations or identities of peoples. Today’s world is a stewpot of disputes, large and small, some of which simmer quietly and some of which boil over into
violence of varying types and intensities. While any pragmatic discussion of tailored
deterrence would have to pick apart specific disputes, some antecedent considerations
can produce useful insights.
First, because the world is a closed system, disputes will impinge on each other and
amplify, attenuate or alter each other in complex ways. Thus, any discussion of deterrence with respect to a particular dispute or disputant risks the danger of ignoring some
relevant external factor. If this is acknowledged up front, the discussion is at least more
sophisticated. Other useful observations devolve from the first. Disputes tend not to be
static; not only are they affected by the conflict generated by other disputes, they may
change in intensity and nature in response to the dynamics of conflict associated with
the dispute itself. What started out as a simple spat over who may fish where might escalate into a full-blown duel of national pride if one nation takes actions that the other sees
as excessive. Moreover, there is a natural tendency for disputes and conflicts to escalate
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as an inherent function of competitive interaction, a dynamic pointed out by the famous
7
Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz.
A third useful observation is that disputes, especially those that are connected to the
fundamental identity of the disputants, tend to be persistent, if not intractable. Even the
massive application of military force may not settle them, which led Clausewitz to assert
that in war the result is never final. This notion leads, in turn, to a fourth one, based
on this article’s definition of conflict, which is that the span of conflict covers the time
duration from the onset of a dispute to the point at which it is settled. Settlement may
involve a deal (not some sort of armistice or imposed peace) or it may require the extermination of one of the disputants, or at least its government and controlling ideology. It
is critical, though, to distinguish between a cessation of violent conflict associated with
the settlement of a dispute and one that is simply an armistice. The difference between
the two is not always clear. The peace settlement at Versailles in 1919 did not prevent
World War II; the peace accord in Paris in 1973 proved to be a prelude to the North
Vietnamese invasion of the South.
In some cases, wars do produce a definitive settlement of a conflict, such as the Pacific
War of 1941–1945, but in other cases they do not. If they do not, the winning disputant
has a choice to make: do nothing and hope the dispute just goes away or simmers harmlessly, take yet more draconian measures to force a definitive settlement, or adopt some
form of conflict management strategy to limit the nature and amount of future violence
associated with the dispute in hopes that conditions will mature such that a deal will be
possible or that new avenues of forceful dispute resolution will open up.
Disputes are numerous and persistent; they affect each other, and they can evolve in
intensity and nature. They are the source of conflict and conflict does not disappear
until disputes are settled. Each of these characteristics has an impact on the logic of
deterrence.
Conflict
This article has offered a very broad definition of conflict that encompasses, at a minimum, all forms of violence. There are a few more things that need to be said about it in
order to finalize a basis for addressing deterrence. The first is obvious, but needs to be
formally stated: conflict comes in numerous forms, ranging from political maneuvers to
cyber attacks to nuclear war. The key insight emerging from this point is that disputants
have a lot of different tools at their disposal. If one option is removed, they may select
another. If a dispute is not settled by means of war, the losing disputant may resort to
an alternate means of carrying on the struggle. This is today’s asymmetric war. For example, a militarily-defeated Taliban shifted to an insurgency directed from a sanctuary
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within Pakistan. Depending on the disputant, there may be legal, moral, financial or
political strictures that make certain avenues or modes of conflict off limits; however, as
the dispute morphs or is impacted by others, these strictures may disappear.
What does all of this mean for strategy and deterrence? First, strategies may be sorted
into two types: those designed to resolve the dispute on favorable terms and those whose
purpose is to manage the nature of conflict attendant to the dispute. Much of the literature on conflict and war deals solely with the first kind of strategy and indeed makes
the tacit assumption that this is the only kind. The traditional view, focused on means,
is that peace and war are two different phenomena. Clearly, the definition of conflict
that has been established recognizes only the existence or absence of disputes. Thus, it
becomes entirely reasonable to think about strategies that are aimed not at settling a
dispute but rather at managing the conflict related to the dispute until conditions favor
another attempt at settlement. The whole concept of containment pursued during the
Cold War, of which nuclear and conventional deterrence were components, was a massive and extended strategy of conflict management. The current U.S. maritime strategy,
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), is a pure form of conflict
8
management strategy.
The literature of conflict management has tended to divide conflict not only into war
9
and peace, but in a more sophisticated way, into rivalries, disputes and wars. A unified
approach to conflict as a manifestation of disputes produces a different analytic lens
through which to examine conflict management strategy. If all conflict is understood
to emanate from disputes, then the objective of the disputants is to settle the dispute
on terms favorable to themselves. This produces the first family of strategies: those
intended to achieve favorable dispute settlement. If this becomes infeasible, then one or
more of the disputants is likely to adopt a conflict management strategy—which may
be defined as the attempt to control the nature and intensity of conflict until such time
as conditions favor another try at dispute settlement. Starting with this perspective,
conflict management strategy can be dissected in order to help contextualize the role of
deterrence.
Conflict Management Strategy
To begin with, the objectives of a conflict management strategy must be understood. On
the whole, the intent of conflict management is defensive—to keep the military, political
and economic conditions of a dispute from deteriorating until such time as new opportunities for dispute resolution emerge. It should be noted at this point that Clausewitz
regarded defense as the stronger form of warfare, principally because it is the resort of
the weaker side. However, as will be discussed presently, it is often the stronger or even
dominant side that adopts a conflict management strategy. This apparent contradiction
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can be resolved if the widest view of conflict is adopted and it is observed that there are
frequently external factors that impinge on a conflict that block, at least temporarily,
the acceptable avenues of dispute resolution open to the stronger power. A combination
of moral and political inhibitions, for example, not to mention fear of bringing in the
Chinese or Russians, prevented the United States from bombing the Red River dikes
in North Vietnam, which would have been a devastating blow to Hanoi that might
have won the war. Instead, the United States adopted a less harsh but also less effective
conflict management strategy that featured, among other things, local pacification and
supply line interdiction.
The second objective of conflict management strategy is to buy time. The inherent
assumption is that by creating some kind of pause in the intensity of the conflict, the
march of political and economic events will eventually produce conditions more favorable to dispute resolution. Returning to the Vietnam example, the U.S. strategy after
1968 was meant to buy time for the South Vietnamese government and military to
develop such that it could defend itself. This in itself was not a war-winning strategy, but
a holding action that would eventually allow the United States to extract itself from the
10
fight—which it did. To follow Clausewitz’s logic of polarity, if a moderation of conflict
is in one’s own interest, it must not be in the enemy’s interest. Thus, the enemy can be
expected to act in some way to break the strictures of the conflict management strategy.
Of course, any number of real world factors may impinge to moderate the enemy’s desire to do so, including his own internal political dynamics. This is what makes it hard
to assert that particular actions or policies actually had a deterrent effect; the enemy
may have found his own reasons for not acting. However, at the heart of the matter, this
logic governs: if it is in one’s interest to manage conflict, it is in the interest of the enemy
not to allow such conflict management to occur.
The particular combination of factors—a stronger power wanting to moderate conflict
and an opposing weaker power (or group) that does not—leads naturally to what are
termed asymmetric operations. The term denotes the use of means other than conventional military forces, but may also be used to indicate novel employment of conventional forces, such as the aforementioned Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. Fired
from mobile ground launchers, it would be targeted against U.S. aircraft carriers, thus
relieving the Chinese navy of having to face the U.S. Navy in a direct sea battle.
Regardless of the arena of conflict or particular means, the principle is the same: the
weaker power, seeing certain avenues or axes of conflict barred to it by the stronger
power’s conflict management (including deterrent) measures, will look for and pursue
other avenues for gaining advantage in the dispute. A bit like water taking the path of
least resistance, this phenomenon of switching conflict mode or arena due to perceived
obstacles down one avenue or axis of conflict modality is sometimes referred to as “axis
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jumping.” Perhaps this is the most fundamental of asymmetries—one side pursuing
conflict management and the other side pursuing dispute resolution. This is typically
the case in insurgencies, in which the nation conducting counterinsurgency is likely
pursuing conflict management and the insurgents are pursuing dispute resolution. Note
also that differing motivations are structural and not directly dependent on other factors such as political will or the value of the object.
The Chinese DF-21 example also illustrates one of Clausewitz’s basic elements of strategic wisdom: one is faced not with an inert target but with an enemy that reacts. The
1996 dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan precipitated
the asymmetric buildup of Chinese access denial forces. What to the United States
11
was an almost routine exercise in “gunboat diplomacy” (probably termed a “flexible
deterrent option” within U.S. decision making circles) was to the Chinese a national
humiliation that unleashed considerable national energy and catalyzed the current
naval buildup. Measures intended as a deterrent may turn out to be catalytic for several
reasons. First is simple miscalculation. One may simply be wrong about the deterrent
effect of a measure. Second, while the specific instance of deterrence may have been successful, it produced a reaction, such as in the China case, that serves to erode deterrence
in the long run. Finally, and again due to an ostensibly successful instance of specific
and discrete deterrence, the opponent may elect to pursue alternate avenues of conflict.
Thus, one cannot usefully speak of tailored deterrence or flexible deterrent options
without taking these phenomena into account.
Deterrence is a major component of conflict management strategy, but there are others
also. Among the other potential tools are conflict channeling, accommodation and appeasement, dissuasion and preventive war. Deterrence cannot be properly understood
unless its relationship to these other tools is taken into account. While there is not room
here to examine all the relationships among these tools, the main point to be made is
that for deterrence planning to make sense, it must be preceded by the recognition and
admission that a conflict management strategy is being pursued (often a difficult admission) and this being the case, there are, inevitably, more components to it.
Making Strategy
At this point it is useful to pause and reflect on strategy making and execution, as this
plays a key role in how the logic of deterrence plays out. Although the word “strategy”
is general and scalable—it can mean anything from a chess player’s scheme to the
Schlieffen Plan—for the purposes of this discussion it will denote the pattern of policies
and decisions taken over time by a national government or defined group (such as the
Taliban) in conjunction with a dispute or series of concurrent disputes. As such, it normally does not take the form of a well-defined and formally articulated plan to which
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national leadership refers when decisions are called for. Sometimes a nation’s strategy is
only discernable in retrospect, even to its own leadership; muddling through has been
something any number of governments have done. Internal bureaucratic dynamics and
the coming and going of politicians, among many other things, serve to make the process less coherent and straightforward. However, underneath, the DNA of the dispute
remains and works to shape the strategy. This alone ensures that deterrence is not some
formula—not some tool in a mythical strategic toolbox. It is a temporary condition that
someone is trying to create in the context of considerable uncertainty.
However, strategy must be discussed and analyzed if the human mind is to bring coherence to the realm of conflict. A useful way to proceed is to categorize strategy on the basis of intent—dispute resolution or conflict management—for these categorizations can
lead to certain insights about deterrence. To begin with, the word “deterrence,” like the
word “strategy,” is general and can be used to denote the condition of someone refraining from doing something under threat from another in circumstances ranging from
personal disputes to those among nations. While the focus here is on the national level,
it is necessary to point out that it can be applied at each level of war, tactical, operational
and strategic. In fact in On War, Clausewitz has a nice discussion of what today would
12
be termed the operational or campaign level. In his view, a general would calculate
the potential outcome of an envisioned engagement and if it was likely to be adverse, he
would decline the engagement. Thus deterrence naturally inhabits conflict and war at
the operational and tactical levels, regardless of the intent of a strategy. However, armed
with this insight it is possible to say that deterrence is at most a subordinate and auxiliary part of a dispute resolution strategy, whereas it occupies a more prominent place in
conflict management strategies.
Conflict management strategies are frequently not the desired approach to disputes,
since solution on favorable terms is the preferred solution. Conflict management strategies are often strategies of necessity. The conditions under which they are adopted will
be addressed presently, but since they are usually not preferred strategies, their adoption
is likely to be shrouded in cant and propaganda. Governments will cling to the rhetoric
of victory even as they recognize that dispute resolution on favorable terms has slipped
from their grasp. This makes the rare moment of lucidity such as George Kennan’s Long
13
Telegram during the Cold War all the more valuable and revealing. This is not to say
that conflict management strategies always denote some type of antecedent failure—
simply that they imply limits to power and motivation. It is in that context, however,
that deterrence must be examined.
Armed with an understanding of conflict as a broad, inclusive phenomenon that can
change in nature and intensity over the course of a dispute, it is possible to identify situations in which conflict management strategies might be adopted. A simple, schematic
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representation of conflict over time could be drawn. The vertical axis would include
all means from hostile political maneuvering to nuclear war. The graph depicts the
notional life of a dispute in which conflict begins at a low level, perhaps propaganda, but
escalates into economic sanctions. The first spike is a medium intensity war in which
one side “wins” but fails to achieve dispute settlement. As time passes, another, more
violent war breaks out that finally settles the dispute by, perhaps, removing the opposing government.
The first situation that stands out is the area where the curve bottoms out at the end of a
war that fails to settle the underlying dispute. The capture of Baghdad and the disintegration of the Iraqi army is a case in point. At this juncture, unless the winning power
has some plausible avenue for pursuing dispute resolution, it has no choice but to adopt
a conflict management strategy or simply retreat and relinquish the political gains that
victory in war conferred. Clausewitz explicitly recognized this situation with his concept of the culminating point of victory.
Every offense, he said, regardless of how successful it has been, must culminate in a defense. Knowing this, an attacker must first of all ensure he has enough military power to
mount a successful defense at the point of victory. Clausewitz’s example was Napoleon’s
invasion of Russia. Although he captured Moscow, Bonaparte no longer had sufficient
force to impose a peace on Czar Alexander. Assuming that a) having reached his goal,
the attacker no longer wishes to keep on fighting and b) the defender is significantly
beaten down but neither fully defeated nor willing to cede his side of the dispute, then
the victor must establish a strong enough defense to deter further military action on
the part of the defender. In other words, to again leverage Clausewitz’s thought, the
defender calculates the likely outcome of another counterattack, sees that it would be
defeated, and so refrains from doing so—is deterred—at least for some period of time.
If the defender’s army is defeated but the government is still viable, perhaps in hiding if
the capital was overrun, it may carry on the struggle via insurgency. This is especially
feasible if some type of sanctuary exists. Two obvious examples are the Free French
government in World War II and the Taliban of today. The nation attempting to counter
the insurgency or resistance must, almost by definition, pursue a conflict management
strategy, the goal being to suppress the degree of violence as much as possible in order to
“pacify” the occupied territories.
Dispute resolution may consist of trying to win the hearts and minds of the populace,
but history has demonstrated that if the resistance can just keep the pot boiling, the nation attempting to defend its conventional victory will sooner or later resort to a conflict
management strategy as a prelude to leaving. In this context—when there is a political
sanctuary—deterrence of any sort from the perspective of the occupier is not likely to
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be successful, simply due to the circumstances under which the conflict management
strategy was adopted. Moreover, the original military victory is not likely to have deterrent value after the occupier leaves. The North Vietnamese invasion of the South in 1975
is an example of this, because it was U.S. exhaustion that led to its adoption of a conflict
management strategy and subsequent withdrawal—it wasn’t going to come back. No
amount of rhetoric can change the inherent dynamics of the situation.
The other location on our graph of conflict where conflict management strategies may
occur is after the onset of a dispute but prior to the escalation of violence into a war. A
key example is the Cold War. It is thought by many that the existence of large arsenals
of nuclear weapons on both sides, as well as the presence of hundreds of thousands
of troops stationed on both sides of the inter-German border, served to prevent a war
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Of course, limited wars such as Korea and Vietnam broke out, but despite tense crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the naval
standoff in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1973, the U.S. conflict management strategy of
containment held until internal decay brought down the USSR.
The prospects for success of a conflict management strategy in the pre-war phase of a
dispute are dependent on a wide variety of factors, many of which have received competent coverage in the existing literature on deterrence. On the other hand, the perspective that seems to be missing is the essential fact that a conflict management strategy is
being pursued. One is being pursued because a dispute resolution strategy is unavailable due to the strength of the opponent, one’s own weakness, potential intervention
of third parties or other constraints. They all add up to an uncomfortable situation in
which powerlessness must be at least tacitly acknowledged. This is the psychological and
political milieu of those attempting to deter. The attempt to deter others also implies
self-deterrence on one’s own part. If this were not the case, preventive wars would be the
norm. This is obviously an ultra-realist view, and more altruistic motives on the part of
states must be acknowledged, but even here the strictures of law or morality represent a
form of self-deterrence.
Deterrence Challenges
It is the context of being forced to defer dispute resolution and adopt an expedient
conflict management strategy that reveals the difficulties and dangers involved in
attempting to deter, especially if the deterrence aimed for is specific and discrete. The
epistemic difficulties that attend deterrence in general have already been mentioned.
These difficulties are intimidating by themselves, but there are other difficulties that the
epistemic ones exacerbate: those of wishful thinking that lead to miscalculation. The
military concept of the strategic barrier can be used to illustrate the point. Commonly,
strategic barriers consisted of mountain ranges, deserts and seas. These were geographic
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barriers thought to be impassible. If one was available, that line of potential enemy approach would not have to be defended strongly, freeing up forces for other missions.
Of course, history is full of examples where an enterprising commander was able to
surprise and defeat the army relying on the strategic barrier by going over or through it,
against all common sense or expectation—not being deterred by the putative physical difficulties. From Hannibal’s push through the Alps with his elephants to the wide
left hook of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps through the Iraqi desert in the 1991 Gulf
War, the deterrent effect of strategic barriers has been repeatedly belied. If the strategic
barrier is regarded as a specific and discrete, i.e., tailored, deterrence measure, then the
dynamic of concern can be seen.
The army that relied on the barrier estimated that it would be impassible, i.e., that the
enemy would be deterred from attempting to cross it. Sometimes this worked, but in
some cases the enemy was not deterred and crossed the barrier, surprising and defeating
the army that was relying on it. The problem is that adverse necessity—having too few
forces to defend everywhere, or, relevant to this discussion, having the need to pursue
a conflict management strategy—can lead to overestimating the deterrent value of a
strategic barrier or some “tailored deterrence” measure. The first step in developing a
rational approach to strategic barriers or tailored deterrent efforts is to first recognize
the nature of the context that drives the need. Only in this way can one guard oneself
against overestimating the efficacy of the measure.
It is one thing to establish macro efforts to establish strategic deterrence, such as the
nuclear triad. The destructiveness of these weapons essentially overwhelms the dispute,
even such a fundamental dispute as the future of communist ideology. However, when
more discrete and bounded deterrent measures are contemplated, the context of conflict
management now dominates and the dangers of miscalculation multiply. Thus certain
new concepts such as “tailored deterrence” seem fragile at best and delusional at worst.
Equally dangerous is the concept of “flexible deterrent options” (FDOs) that has been
14
incorporated into some U.S. military planning. Beyond the difficulties already mentioned, FDOs are essentially last-ditch efforts to stave off a war. They are pre-scripted
maneuvers that are conducted in times of high tension where the incentives for wishful
thinking are strongest. Being pre-scripted (a necessity so they can be executed reliably
by deployed forces) they exacerbate the epistemic difficulties too. This is not to say that
deterrent measures are not necessary or desirable, but to have any reliability, they must
dominate the conflict management context, not be subordinate to it. This has certain
implications for escalation theory. Following this logic, a nation desiring to prevent
escalation has to threaten much greater escalation early in the interaction.
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There is another class of conflict management strategies, or rather, another strategic
context in which they are employed. When a state has achieved a dominant status,
either globally or regionally, it generally desires that there is as little violence as possible
associated with any of the numerous disputes that affect the relations of other states in
its sphere of influence. It wants, in other words, stability. This is a situation in which
conflict management strategies writ large are adopted. Once again the situation is one in
which the limits of power to resolve disputes must be faced, but here it is the multiplicity
of disputes, not only between the dominant state and others, but also between or among
the other parties, that brings a state up against the limits of its power and influence.
The approach to conflict management must be broad and may involve the actual use
of force as a preventive measure. In this context, deterrence rests principally on overall
strength, but it also depends on how it is attempted in particular situations. Specific
measures may enhance or degrade the overall condition. This is because a broadly-based
conflict management strategy must be founded on much more than just deterrence; it
must contain a substantial amount of positive incentives in order to prevent the formation of countervailing coalitions or the release of hostile nationalism within a potential
competitor. One may argue that this is precisely what happened when the United States
dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan in 1996. While
this move could be chalked up to U.S. hubris or short-sighted decision making, it is
more revealing and useful to understand the decision as an honest effort at deterrence
taken in the absence of any theory of the relationship of discrete deterrent actions to a
strategy of conflict management.
Deterrence is normally conceived of as a form of coercion, and indeed, the notion of
tailored deterrence, first mentioned in the 2006 QDR, denoting specific actions to deter
specific acts, has an overtone of coercion to it. However, in the context of a conflict
management strategy, a wider conception may be called for. Providing governments
with reasons not to act, especially in the context of a broad conflict management
strategy aimed at general stability, may involve positive inducements. These, of course,
would not consist of anything resembling appeasement, but might, for example, include
establishing a policy, backed by appropriate naval force, of freedom of the seas. This,
presumably, would deter predation of various kinds on the seas and, thus, obviate the
need on the part of many nations to build a big navy.
Another aspect of deterrence as an element of a conflict management strategy results
from the inherent nature of strategy itself. Strategy is normally manifested as a series of
moves, i.e., a campaign. In a campaign, events are related to each other in one of three
ways. First, they could have a sequential relationship wherein event A is prerequisite
to event B, B is prerequisite to C and so on. In cumulative campaigns, events A, B, C
and others are related only insofar as each produces some incremental effect, such as
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damage to the enemy that adds up over time. The third relationship may be termed decisive. Gambit A is designed to precipitate a decisive event, such as a battle. If the battle
does occur and is indeed decisive, the campaign is over. If, however, gambit A does not
produce the battle or it is not decisive, then gambit B is tried, and so forth again.
Conflict management strategies generally take the form of cumulative campaigns. Their
object being inherently negative, they most often focus on the avoidance of their own
casualties or damage while either ignoring enemy damage or conversely focusing very
much on some aspect of damage to the enemy as a surrogate for a measure of progress
toward dispute resolution, e.g., enemy body counts in Vietnam and to a lesser extent
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In terms of deterrence, the cumulative logic can be applied
to generate some insights. A British naval officer once said that the Royal Navy’s (RN)
most precious strategic asset was its reputation for reckless persistence. The implication
is that other countries would be deterred from taking on the RN because it was crazy
and would not admit defeat, thus extracting costs from the enemy out of proportion to
the value of the object in question. Presumably, if the RN did not, on a specific occasion,
demonstrate such recklessness, its reputation would be diminished and deterrent value
lost. So in this branch of deterrence logic there can be a campaign of deterrence and its
nature is cumulative.
Scaling up the RN example to the strategic level, one may deduce that if the dominant
power engages in some kind of limited war that turns out to be unsuccessful in one way
or another, its overall deterrent posture is diminished. This may or may not be the case,
but the essential issue is that deterrence is always part of a conflict management strategy
that is dynamic—always in motion. Thus deterrence, even the macro kind, is a changeable condition that must be continually tended. Discrete instances of tailored deterrence
actions, if indeed such things are possible, cannot be properly understood or undertaken without reference to the context of an unfolding and dynamic conflict management
strategy.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to make the case that deterrence is a desired condition—intended to be produced by certain force postures, policies and, in current U.S. doctrine,
by specific actions—which cannot be properly understood nor reliably achieved without
referencing it to an overall strategy of conflict management. In simple words, it is not
a specific and independent thing; it is a component of something larger. However, that
larger thing, conflict management strategy, has not been subject to sufficient examination, at least in the sense it has been presented in this article. Thus deterrence, and
especially the new notion of tailored deterrence, has been subject to an intellectual
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approach that at a minimum requires exquisite understanding of the other side’s decision process—the possibility of which is debatable.
Deterrence, inherently, is about stability—keeping things from happening. Therefore,
its intellectual framework should not be based on the unstable foundation of exquisite
intelligence and razor-edge predictions of specific decisions. Rather, it should rest on the
more stable intellectual foundation of context, situational logic and an understanding
of one’s own motives and incentives. It is hoped that this article will serve to open new
avenues of inquiry concerning deterrence so that novel concepts such as tailored deterrence, coined in important national statements of policy, do not obfuscate defense and
security thinking to the detriment of national interests.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The Forms of Warfare
Integrating Ethos and Warfighting
Wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations
which give rise to them. The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching
act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is
to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking;
neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien
to its nature.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR

Water shapes its course according to the ground over which it flows; the
soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is fighting.
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR

Our direct experience of life is limited to the here and now, and to the immediate and
specific issues that we encounter on a daily basis. However, we understand that there
are larger patterns that arise out of our daily activities. These patterns are produced
by the influence of frequently unseen or unacknowledged forces. Perhaps the first
and most well-known description of such influences was produced by the British
economist Adam Smith. His “invisible hand” of self-interest underlies the effective1
ness of the market in distributing goods and services. Other writers, such as Marshall
2
3
MacLuhan and Jared Diamond, have revealed the hitherto unperceived influences of
media and geography on the patterns of human activity. It is in this same vein that this
paper will attempt to reveal a larger pattern of warfare, the understanding of which
could help governments and militaries improve the judgment that Clausewitz calls
upon them to make.
We frequently talk about not being able to “see the forest for the trees.” What this means
is that we are distracted or blinded by a focus on the specifics or details of an issue
such that we cannot discern the larger patterns—“the forest”—that would reveal the
Unpublished manuscript
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operation of otherwise invisible hands. Thus blinded, we are presumably at the mercy
of these influences and our decision making is thereby defective. This is as true in the
realm of warfare as it is in any other arena of life. In particular, it seems that strategy,
normally considered to be the upper and broadest conceptual level of warfare, is in
reality just another copse of trees. The forest, the larger pattern, is the form of warfare
a nation or group conducts. Strategy occurs within the confines of that forest. If we can
identify and categorize these larger patterns, military services will be able to better understand themselves and the enemy, and thereby, as Sun Tzu says, we will need not fear
the results of a hundred battles.
Forms of Warfare
One of the defining moments of the American Civil War occurred when General
Robert E. Lee ordered Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg. Although ill-fated from the outset,
it was perhaps the apotheosis of what we will call the “heroic” form of warfare. Lee was
the epitome of the “great captain”—the general of genius who, at the head of an army
comprised of highly skilled and motivated troops, used deft maneuver to defeat a more
numerous enemy in battle. The Confederate States of America did not pursue the heroic
form of warfare as an explicit choice; the invisible hand at work was a combination of
history and necessity. All military officers of the day were well steeped in the legend of
Napoleon Bonaparte, the archangel of war whose genius for maneuver had made him
master of Europe. Napoleon applied the heroic form of warfare with considerable success
until his wave broke upon the rocks of the Russian winter. Lee and his counterparts had
imbibed the lessons and ethos of Napoleonic warfare since they were cadets, so adopting
any other form would have seemed almost sacrilegious. However strong the influence of
history, necessity intervened to reinforce Lee’s attachment to the heroic form. The Confederacy was poor in the kinds of resources that constitute the sinews of war. Lacking in
industry and with its finances being constricted by the Union blockade, the South had
to rely on those threads of advantage it seemed to have: excellent generals, especially Lee,
and troops that could outfight their Union counterparts. The South, as had so many other
nations who were weaker than their opponents, embraced the heroic form of warfare.
Lee had flummoxed a series of Union generals over the preceding two years, but his
victorious battles had not produced a strategic decision. Now, in Pennsylvania, he had
the Army of the Potomac in his grasp. A victory at Gettysburg, especially if it allowed
him to threaten Washington, might be the final leverage the Confederacy needed to
force the Lincoln administration to cut a deal. Although the dawning of the third day
of the battle found his army in a tactically disadvantageous position, he was convinced
that the fighting skill and spirit of his troops would carry the day in a battle that would
determine the outcome of the war. This is the essence of the heroic ethos: the faith that
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military genius and virtue will produce decisive results. In the case of Lee at Gettysburg,
we can see the influence that warfare form has on institutional ethos and the consequent effect that ethos has on an individual’s decision making.
By contrast, when Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of all Union
armies, he was in a position to adopt a different form of warfare, which we will call
“systematic.” Grant understood two things that few others did. First, Lee and his army
were the keys to annihilating the rebellion, and second, his army could only be defeated
through attrition and the destruction of its support infrastructure. Grant had the tools
at his disposal to act on these insights: a virtually inexhaustible supply of men and
resources and a government and populace that supported the war effort. Grant thus
embarked on a campaign in Virginia in which he sought to keep constant pressure on
Lee such that the South suffered continual combat losses that it could not make good.
Concurrently, Grant ordered Major General W. T. Sherman and his army to capture
Atlanta and then march through the lower South, destroying the resource base for
Lee’s army. The kind of warfare Grant conducted did not rely on decisive battles or any
tactical genius on his part. Rather, relentlessness, well-planned logistics and competent
management carried the day. A certain degree of ruthlessness also helped. The deliberate, almost mechanistic, approach that the systematic form of warfare employs reflects a
significantly different ethos than the heroic form of fighting.
Perhaps the most indicative articulation of the systematic form of warfare comes from
Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, who wrote several landmark books on logistics in
the wake of World War II: “From the strategic-tactical point of view, exploitation of
momentum is similar to the ‘killer instinct’ in the boxing ring. It means that once a
decisive opening is obtained, every resource is concentrated to obtain overwhelming
victory by the most rapid succession of powerful blows. It aims at the complete destruction of enemy fighting power in the area concerned. The enemy is permitted no respite
4
to regroup his forces and to recover his strength.”
In the spring of 1865, as Lee’s position became increasingly untenable, Grant’s and
Lincoln’s thoughts turned to the end game. In particular, they were worried about the
armies of the Confederacy dissolving into partisan bands and carrying on the struggle
using a different form of warfare. To describe this, commonly termed insurgency or
irregular warfare, we will use a broader term: “disruptive” warfare. This form of warfare
is conducted by a party that is much weaker than its opponent. Termed disruptive
because the stronger opponent’s capabilities to conduct heroic or systematic warfare
are regarded as a system, disruptive warfare seeks to disrupt that system over time until
the opponent is discredited, exhausted and dismayed such that he either withdraws
from the fight or makes terms. The means of disruptive warfare can include terrorism,
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ambushes and other means that allow a much weaker force to impose costs on the stronger opponent and still survive to fight another day.
To illustrate the broader application of the term “disruptive,” we can look at the naval
strategy employed by U.S. Secretary of the Navy William Jones in the War of 1812. The
American navy, with its handful of frigates and sloops, was no match for the dominant
British Royal Navy. What Jones hoped to do was sneak his ships out singly to conduct
commerce raiding against the British. The intent was not to disrupt British commerce;
rather its goal was to force the Royal Navy to spend so much effort trying to chase down
American raiders that Britain would decide the war with the United States was not
5
worth the effort in the context of the larger struggle against Napoleon. One can also
make the case that the German U-boat campaigns in the Atlantic in both world wars
were applications of the disruptive form.
The disruptive form of warfare is the recourse of the much weaker party. Of necessity,
it is drawn-out warfare that is conducted on a shoestring, relatively speaking. The ethos
of disruptive warfare is therefore quite different than those of the other two forms. At
heart, it demands some form of doctrinal or political orthodoxy, because to carry it out
requires small cells or units operating independently. In order to achieve unity of effort,
the leaders of cells must be true believers in the religion, political doctrine, cause or
strategy. Disruptive warfare is inherently cumulative; each raid or ambush incrementally
contributes to the overall effect. In order to persist over time, tactical risk must be minimized. The required mind-set is fundamentally different from that which is willing to
roll the dice on a decisive battle in the heroic form or that which is willing to incur losses
in order to impose unremitting pressure in the systematic form. Moreover, whereas the
heroic form aims for a quick victory and the systematic form demands steady progress
toward victory, in the disruptive form, the path to victory is not predictable in either
duration or character.
In looking at these three forms of warfare we see that the essential elements of each are
6
contained in a “trinity” that is a bit analogous to the one established by Clausewitz. The
form of war is composed of an expected victory dynamic, an institutional ethos and a
set of methods. These three elements are interdependent and when aligned, provide the
power the form has to offer. When they are not aligned, the form is dysfunctional. Most
commonly this occurs when the prospects for victory using a particular form fade, but
the form is retained.
Interaction among the Forms
Lincoln and Grant had good reason to worry about the Confederates resorting to the
disruptive form of warfare. They instinctively understood that trying to apply the
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systematic form of warfare against the disruptive form would be like trying to punch
at smoke. It is precisely the potential effectiveness of the disruptive form versus the
other two forms that brought it into being in the first place. There is perhaps no better
example of the interaction between the systematic and disruptive forms than the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese waged disruptive war against the U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces using a combination of terror tactics against villages and
ambushes against opposing forces. The United States, for its part, entered the war trying
to apply its existing systematic form. While there were tactical successes and failures on
both sides, the net result was frustration and exhaustion for the United States, which
ultimately pulled out of the fight: precisely the result North Vietnam had sought.
In the years between the entry by the United States into and its pullout from Vietnam,
the unsuccessful attempt to apply the systematic form of warfare warped and weakened
the ethos of each of the U.S. armed services. The services had gone into the war with an
adherence to analysis-based management, an approach imposed by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara that was entirely compatible with the ethos of systematic warfare.
In the context of a limited war and against an enemy pursuing the disruptive form of
warfare, frustration led to the adoption of measures of effectiveness that were not useful
indicators of progress, and thus over time produced cynicism within the ranks which
7
eroded the Army’s ethos and its embedded ethics.
After Vietnam, the U.S. Army and its sister services embarked on a program of rehabilitation. As chronicled in the book Prodigal Soldiers, by James Kitfield, senior officers
such as Shy Meyer of the Army and Bill Creech of the Air Force wrought major changes
in their respective services that reset their ethos and ultimately produced the high-tech,
highly professional force that outmaneuvered and dismembered the Iraqi army and
air force in Desert Storm. At the heart of the transformation lay a shift in the form
of warfare the services pursued, from systematic to heroic. After Vietnam, the Army’s
focus shifted to the NATO Central Front. There, facing the massive Red Army and in
the context of massive nuclear stockpiles, the U.S. Army saw itself as the weaker party,
thus making the use of the systematic form infeasible. Although it did not work for the
Confederacy, or for that matter for Germany or Japan in World War II, the heroic form,
in the guise of AirLand Battle, was seen as the antidote against the Soviets. The Soviets, for their part, had to also consider the use of the heroic form. This was due to the
ever-looming shadow of nuclear weapons. With nukes almost anyone could adopt the
systematic form, but their sheer destructiveness would make any victory Pyrrhic at best.
So if the Soviets were forced into a heroic-style war of maneuver in Europe to achieve
their objectives in a hurry before the nukes flew, they would be themselves, by definition, vulnerable to being outmaneuvered.
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Adoption of the heroic form of warfare allowed the Army to shift ethos, not try and
repair one that had been ruptured and discredited in Vietnam. The ethos of heroic
warfare, with its emphasis on warfare virtuosity, was a healing balm for the Army.
Moreover, emerging technology promised to supercharge the ethos. Technology such as
Abrams tanks, F-16 fighters and precision guided munitions required technical virtuosity on the part of soldiers but it also made them more powerful warriors, both individually and as units. Thus the American military that was unleashed in the Iraqi desert in
1991 was heroic in all its dimensions. The systematic army of 1965 most likely could
have defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991 and again in 2003, especially since Iraq had
adopted the heroic form itself as a matter of both Arab tradition and of logistic necessity. Moreover, logically, if one has the capacity to conduct systematic warfare against
an opponent that conducts heroic warfare, one should; otherwise unnecessary risk is
incurred. In 1991, however, the American military was wedded to the heroic form but its
sheer quality overwhelmed an Iraqi military that was a generation behind.
After the 9/11 attacks the American military carried with it into Afghanistan and Iraq
its heroic warfare form and its accompanying ethos. In the early going of both wars the
techno-heroic form made quick work of the organized opposition. In the aftermath of
their initial defeats, both the Taliban and Iraqis reverted to a version of the disruptive
form of warfare—insurgency. However, the interaction between the heroic form and
disruptive form turned out to be a bit different than the interaction between the systematic form and disruptive form in Vietnam. It was true that in confronting the disruptive
form, the heroic form still found itself punching at smoke, but the ethos of the heroic
form turned out to be more resilient under conditions of frustration than did that of
the systematic form. For one thing, the heroic form appears to more easily accommodate tactical adaptation. Army officers such as David Petraeus were able to shift their
approach from killing insurgents to courting key tribes, which, in conjunction with
political errors by Al Qaeda, eventually produced a form of success in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, similar shifts were made, but because the Taliban continued to enjoy
sanctuary in Pakistan, and for other ethnic and tribal reasons within Afghanistan, the
war continues without resolution. There is some evidence that mild forms of the cynicism that infected the armed forces in Vietnam have crept into the American forces de8
ployed in Afghanistan, the misuse of measures of effectiveness and statistics being one.
However, the legacy of the Desert Storm victory in legitimizing and reinforcing the
heroic ethos has made the Army relatively resilient in the face of frustration. Moreover,
that legacy and that ethos have created, along with the galvanizing effects of the 9/11 attacks, a very strong bond between the U.S. armed forces and the American public.
Notwithstanding the resilience of the heroic ethos, the heroic form of warfare is not
working in Afghanistan. The heroic form, which is predicated on maneuver and rapid
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victory, is confronting the disruptive form, which seeks to avoid pitched battles and
whose fundamental dynamic involves prolonging war. In his landmark work On War,
the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz says that defense must be the stronger form
of war because it is the weaker party that adopts it. The same logic seems to apply to the
disruptive form of warfare. In Clausewitz’s formulation the defense can be overcome if
the attacker enjoys a sufficient margin of superiority. However, it is not at all clear that
any margin of superiority would allow either the heroic or systematic forms of warfare
to prevail over the disruptive form, due to the profound asymmetry that exists. This
asymmetry is not necessarily one of means; it is one of form. Being an asymmetry of
warfare form, it is also one of ethos.
The forms of warfare are inherent in the logic of human conflict and have been around
since the Egyptians defeated the Hittites in 1286 BC. A nation or group adopts a form
of warfare for a number of reasons, not the least of which is because it can. There seems
to be a hierarchy among the forms. The systematic form is inherently the weakest form,
because only the very strong, relative to the opponent, can adopt it. However, when it is
adopted, its results are most sure—at least against the heroic form. The heroic form is a
stronger form, and promises quick victory to those who possess the great generals and
excellent technology—assuming that the surrounding set of political conditions permit
a military and political checkmate to occur. The disruptive form is the strongest, which
is why it is the resort of the very weak, relative to the military power of the enemy or in
relation to the political circumstances surrounding the dispute. It should be noted that
in the course of a conflict a nation or group may shift forms in midstream, as circumstances dictate.
Technology and the Forms of Warfare
The literature of war in the last two decades has been full of assertions that the nature
of war is being changed by new technology. While it is clear that new technology has indeed transformed the methods of war over the course of human history, if we accept the
“trinity” of elements that characterize the warfare forms that we have established, we are
led to conclude that technology has done little or nothing to change the inherent nature
of war. Technology has meaning only within the context of one of the forms of war,
regardless of how seemingly decisive it might be. The only exception is nuclear weapons.
Nuclear warfare has not been conducted; one reason may be that it does not fit into the
trinity because there is no available victory dynamic and no available rational ethos for
it. All other technologies are given meaning within the context of a form of warfare.
In the waning days of World War II in Europe, Hitler and the Wehrmacht increasingly relied on a set of “wonder weapons” including the V-2 ballistic missile and the
ME-262 jet fighter to turn the tide of the war. These weapons were supposed to shock
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and dismay the Allies, thereby abetting the efforts of German generals to achieve some
kind of checkmate that would provide Germany with a bit of strategic breathing room,
if not a negotiated settlement. In a sense, these weapons were the technological avatars
of Teutonic knights of an earlier age. Since the Wars of German Unification, Teutonic
armies had been imbued with the ethos of heroic warfare. The goal was always to win
a decisive battle that would produce a checkmate in which the enemy would call for
terms, even though he might still have means for resistance. In the early going of World
War II the Germans used the heroic form with great effect in subduing Poland and
then France. However, there are limits to which the heroic form of warfare can be effective. If the enemy refuses to concede defeat and adopts one of the other two forms of
warfare, the heroic form could fail—as a form—regardless of the quality of the fighting
9
forces involved.
The problem for Hitler in 1944 and 1945 was that the Allies had been able to stay in
the game long enough to adopt the systematic form of warfare. War production in the
United States and Soviet Union reached levels that allowed them to flood the battlefields
with a constant stream of new forces. The systematic form relies on constant pressure
and overwhelming firepower to pulverize enemy forces and force the surrender of the
enemy. This form also relies on competence and determination if not ruthlessness in its
generals and in its soldiers; genius may be an added benefit, but it may also get in the
way. Kitfield reports on how in Vietnam, General DePuy rejected and suppressed innovative tactics by junior officers because they did not conform to the overall doctrine.
Technology flows along the same lines: the American Sherman tank, like its Soviet
cousins, was in many ways inferior to the best German tanks, but the United States
could make lots of Shermans and they were logistically supportable and easy to use. The
Germans had a number of superior tank types, but their industrial strategy of designing and fielding limited numbers of ever better tanks confounded their logistic system,
vitiating whatever benefits the newer tank conferred.
Here one can see the differing roles of technology in the heroic and systematic forms of
warfare. The German Tiger tank was supposed to overcome the Soviet horde with its
pure excellence. However, there were never enough of them to make a difference. Better,
as the Soviets said, is the enemy of good enough. The Soviet T-34s and American Shermans were good enough because they could be built in numbers and be supported with
parts. That is the heart of systematic warfare.
When the Americans rolled into Vietnam they brought with them the systematic form
of warfare they had adopted in World War II and Korea. However, the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong colleagues adopted the third form of warfare—disruptive. In adopting this form, the Vietnamese used such low technology as booby traps,
punji stick–filled pits and a variety of man-toted weapons such as mortars. The use of
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improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq was a way for insurgents to avoid losses
while imposing them on coalition forces. Technology in disruptive warfare must be
focused on empowering persistence while disrupting the enemy. However, disruptive
warfare can also benefit from some of the most advanced forms of technology, including
cell phones, computers and robotics.
Disruptive Warfare
Since the 9/11 attacks the United States has been engaged in two extended wars against
insurgencies—Iraq and Afghanistan. Both wars have sparked a voluminous literature on
counterinsurgency. Within this literature, disagreements have emerged over the relative
efficacy of killing insurgents, denying sanctuary, winning hearts and minds, and nation
building. While the United States succeeded in extracting itself from Iraq with at least
some basis for thinking it had achieved a degree of success, the insurgency in Afghanistan drags on with conflicting assessments over progress there and at best an uncertain
prognosis after American withdrawal occurs. A former Secretary of Defense opined that
wars of this type will characterize the future environment, while scholars and veteran
fighters attempt to concoct a formula for successfully fighting them.
Using the forms of warfare framework will not produce such a formula, but it can illuminate the elements of the conflict and indicate where one might look for solutions,
always keeping in mind Carl von Clausewitz’s caveat that however good theory might
10
be, it can never serve as a formula for a specific situation. In order to find avenues
of possible strategic advantage, the disruptive form of warfare must be dissected into
its component elements. However, even before that is done, the context for disruptive
warfare must be understood, and that context, in a like manner, can be dissected so that
seemingly profound aphorisms like Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of
politics by other means do not constitute the entire description of context.
Context I: Disputes
Politics is about who has the power to do what. In the course of politics, disputes arise
among constituencies, be they political parties, ethnic groups, nations, religious sects
or other groupings. Disputes may be settled peaceably via formal, structured political
processes, or they may be characterized by hostile, violent competition. War occurs in
the context of disputes, but there are other self-help methods used to achieve dispute
resolution besides violence: diplomatic maneuvering, dirty tricks, demonstrations, etc.
All of these methods, including violence up to and including nuclear war, may be seen
as a continuum of actions, with no clear boundary necessarily existing between methods that involve violence and those that do not. This is lesson one about war; its mother
is not politics, it is the dispute. The nature of the dispute, the nature of the parties to that
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dispute and the circumstances attending the dispute will influence the methods used to
resolve it. Some writers have made the clever comment that politics is the continuation
of war by other means, and they are correct. But that only illuminates the point that
there is a continuum of conflict that is spawned by a dispute.
The nature of a dispute has a profound influence on the methods people will use to resolve it in their favor. Sometimes disputes arise over specific issues like fishing rights or
even ownership of a particular piece of territory. Depending on the relative motivations
of the disputants, solutions can be achieved either through diplomatic maneuvering or
even limited military action. Identity disputes are much harder to resolve and may result
in the highest levels of violence. The place of Germany in Europe, for example, involved
multiple wars of the most extreme kind. Another kind of dispute that falls somewhere
between issue and identity disputes is what might be termed security disputes. The tug
of war between the United States, NATO and Russia over countries in Eastern Europe is
an example. While this tug of war is mostly characterized by diplomatic maneuvering
and interference in internal politics, the Russian invasion of Georgia represented a spike
in violence in the conflict over what constitutes satisfactory security buffers for Russia.
Disputes are not static or simple phenomena. What starts as an issue dispute might
easily metastasize into an identity dispute if the actions by one disputant are seen as
either disproportional or existentially threatening by the other. Clausewitz indirectly
addresses this with his concept of culminating point of victory. Any victory, he says,
11
no matter how complete, must be defended in some way. If, therefore, one disputant
does something that so enrages the other that the nature of the dispute changes, then all
previous calculations of strategy are negated, and the conflict becomes something much
more intense. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to take the U.S. Pacific
Fleet off the table and thereby convince the United States that interference in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not feasible. Given the isolationist sentiment in the United States and the sheer distance to East Asia from North
America, such a plan had some logic in the minds of Japanese strategists. However, the
way the attack was conducted—without warning—so violated the American sense of
honor and fairness that it galvanized America and sparked a crusade against fascism
that resulted in the destruction of Imperial Japan as well as Nazi Germany. Morphing of
disputes is scalable; it can happen locally as easily as globally, and this has implications
for the way disruptive warfare is conducted and the way it is countered.
Context II: Conflict
“Conflict” is the term we will use to indicate the hostile intent and methods used
by disputants to achieve resolution on their terms. As mentioned previously, it can
encompass the whole range of noncooperative methods from deceptive diplomacy to
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nuclear war. Despite large differences in the methods arrayed along the spectrum of
conflict, it is useful to think of them as variations of the same thing. Viewed in this way,
we can establish a mental picture of conflict that is almost a graph. If the vertical axis
is defined to be the spectrum of conflict methods according to the degree of violence,
with higher on the axis representing more violence, and the horizontal axis represents
time, then we can draw a curve that depicts the dynamics of a dispute. The curve would
start at the intersection of the two axes, representing the onset of the dispute. This is a
simplification, of course, because many disputes emerge gradually, but such simplification does no harm to our theory. The curve may remain close to the horizontal axis
for a while, indicating latency of the dispute or perhaps the employment of nonviolent
means. An upward surge to the curve indicates the introduction of violent means, and
a near-vertical spike represents the outbreak of war. If one party wins the war but the
dispute remains unsettled, the curve will drop down near the horizontal axis, indicating
the quiescence of the defeated party, or it may level off at some point higher, indicating an insurgency. The curve may spike back up, indicating a subsequent war, or it may
undulate at a lower but persistent level of violence indicating an extended insurgency. If
it descends to intersect the horizontal axis, it means the dispute is settled.
With this graph of conflict in our minds we can make some observations about the
context in which the disruptive form of warfare occurs. First, it can be said that any
disputant has available one of two possible overall strategies: a strategy designed to
obtain favorable dispute resolution, or one that is meant to manage the kind and degree
of violence employed in the conflict. The first kind of strategy is adopted when at least
one of the disputants feels it has sufficient resources, be they material, moral or political, to overcome the opposition of the other and achieve resolution. The second kind
is adopted when the disputant does not feel it has such resources, but does not want to
abandon the dispute. Thus it attempts measures to keep the violence within acceptable
parameters until such time as circumstances may favor a turn to a strategy of the first
kind. Pushing this abstract reasoning a bit further, we might observe that the relative
strength of the disputants is measured with respect to the nature and parameters of
the dispute, not any absolute rating of combat capability, economic strength or political will. It is this principle that allows militarily and economically weaker parties to
sometimes prevail over stronger ones, especially in the context of the adoption of the
disruptive form of warfare.
Depicting conflict via a graph over time leads us also to think about how the events of a
conflict relate to the overall picture. If we accept the idea that even massive wars do not
necessarily settle the underlying dispute that spawned them, we can proceed to establish
a hierarchy of events based roughly on their size and duration. To engage in the use of
descriptive physics metaphors as did Clausewitz, we might define the engagement as

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 15 Ch15FormsWarfare.indd January 29, 2014 9:23 AM

200

the newport papers

the basic subatomic particle of a war. Of course, there are even smaller particles that
involve such things as deception and counterdeception, but we can content ourselves at
this point with the engagement as the basic constituent particle. The battle, then, is the
atom, and the campaign the molecule that gives the war its character. But as the graph
indicates, the war may be itself only a part of a larger substance that we might term a
struggle. One might thus define the struggle of Germany to define its place in Europe as
composed of everything from the Wars of German Unification to the Maastricht Treaty.
On an even grander scale, perhaps the grandest, we have regional or global order. At this
level there are nations and groups that adhere to and support the order, and those that
oppose and seek to undermine it. At this level, the graph is essentially open-ended, and
conflict is seen to be endemic, with disputes of this kind essentially irresolvable.
This “Standard Theory” of conflict now allows us to see the elements of context within
which the disruptive form of war is conducted. Generally, if history is an indicator, parties engaging in the disruptive form of war have an identity dispute with the stronger
party. If the particularity of the weaker, let us say insurgent, party is such that the dispute is confined to the level of struggle, then there are prospects for eventual resolution
of that dispute, even if far off and brutal. The unification of an independent Vietnam
under the communists comes to mind. On the other hand, remembering the tendency
of disputes to morph, it is not that hard to envision the struggles of Al Qaeda, the
Taliban or Arab Spring insurgents growing into an open-ended dispute about the global
order. The implication is that what Western powers do in the individual engagements or
campaigns might change the natures of local disputes. This must be kept in mind as we
proceed to dissect the disruptive form of warfare in order to provide insights into how
strategies for engagements and campaigns might be crafted.
The Elements of Disruptive Warfare
To extend the physics analogy, the Navy teaches the “fire triangle”; in order for a fire
to burn, three things are needed: fuel, oxygen and heat to ignite it. Similarly, disruptive
warfare requires three things for it to be viable. The first is some form of sanctuary. This
may range from the ability of insurgents to hide among the populace to political restrictions in the form of inviolable territory across a border to the opacity of the seas. Being
very weak in relation to the opponent, disruptive forces must be able to avoid contact
except under the right conditions. The second requirement is that there must be some
feasible coercive or catalytic defeat mechanism available. In other words, the cumulative
effect of disruptive operations must produce a sufficient level of dismay in the enemy to
precipitate a withdrawal or a willingness to negotiate under adverse conditions. Thirdly,
there must be a tactical mechanism that imposes cost on the enemy while limiting the
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cost to oneself such that the war is sustainable over the long haul. If any of these requirements are lacking or are removed by the other side, the disruptive form will fail.
There appear to be two basic ways to counter the disruptive form of warfare. The first is
to adopt a form of conflict management strategy and the second is to fight fire with fire
by adopting the disruptive form oneself. In reality, current counterinsurgency doc12
trine is a blend of each, with the disruptive form predominating. However, the proper
mixture of force and persuasion cannot be understood or calculated unless the structure
of the warfare form is known—in the context of the particulars of the current conflict.
Then and only then can one decide whether to pursue dispute resolution (to “win” the
struggle) or adopt a conflict management strategy. Once that decision is made, then one
can proceed to examine opportunities for removing one or more of the elements of the
insurgency “fire triangle.” Success in this endeavor might “win the war” but as with a
fire, if the elements remain in place, the fire will reignite. Thus a follow-on strategy is
needed for keeping the elements of insurgency from coming together again (win the
peace), or, if no feasible course of action along that line is available, one must consider
reverting to a conflict management strategy. At every step of the way, the strategist must
consider whether the actions being taken, regardless of their immediate success, will
cause the dispute to morph, either with regard to its nature in the context of the parties involved, or by having it “jump the fire breaks” and become something larger and
endemic that involves regional or world order.
Conflict Management
If we understand war to be one manifestation of the spectrum of conflict that is generated by a dispute among two or more parties, we are in a better position to see the
meaning of a conflict management strategy. Disputes among nations or groups spawn
conflict, which may range from political maneuvering to all-out war. Wars may or may
not settle the dispute, a fact acknowledged by Clausewitz when he said that in war the
results are never final. Depending on the nature of the dispute and the conditions attending it, each disputant will have differing levels of motivation both going into it and
at various points along the timeline of the dispute. The forms of warfare are applied
within this context. As previously mentioned, disputants may adopt either of two kinds
of strategy—one aimed at resolution of the dispute or one whose purpose is to manage the degree and kind of violence associated with the dispute. Conflict management
strategies are adopted when political or military conditions close out the possibility of
a successful dispute resolution strategy. The objective is to remain viable in the dispute
until some future point at which conditions again favor the adoption of a dispute resolution strategy. Examples of conflict management strategies range from deterrence and
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containment to some forms of counterinsurgency to peacekeeping to just hiding out and
biding one’s time.
If the heroic or systematic form of warfare is frustrated by its encounter with disruptive
warfare, adoption of a conflict management strategy is a common and sometimes viable
response. Adoption of a conflict management strategy is a tacit acknowledgment that
the heroic/systematic form must be at least temporarily abandoned, along with its inherent component of a quick or at least predictable victory schedule. The conflict must
be drawn out for some indefinite period of time. Nations and armies do not willingly
admit this to the public or even to themselves. This disconnect between doctrine, ethos,
and reality produces the cynicism, both individual and corporate, that leads to the
breakdown in discipline, institutional coherence and public support. In theory it would
be better for a service and government to acknowledge the true state of affairs and set
about adjusting expectations and even corporate ethos to gain the institutional resiliency needed for the long haul. When victory becomes a fiction, the results are corrosive.
Conflict management can take the form of security assistance, “Vietnamization” being one instantiation. In other words, the host country’s armed forces are trained and
equipped so that they can carry on the fight. The supporting country does this because
it does not see a strategy that would allow it to defeat the insurgents, so it attempts to
extract itself by creating a viable indigenous army. What that army would be able to
do in the future is unclear, but if it is viable, at least the supporting country has not
“lost.” Other strictures on the use of force might be imposed, such as putting the North
Vietnamese dams off limits to bombing. The whole idea is that there is no apparent path
to “victory” but acknowledging defeat is unacceptable. Thus the disputant attempts to
create stable conditions that prevent defeat until some future opportunity might arise.
However, conflict management does not mean a lack of violence; it simply means that
one acts to constrain the vector and nature of events so as to avert defeat until opportunities for winning arise. Counterinsurgency can easily take this form. What is
important is for the nation or force pursuing this kind of strategy to admit to itself that
conflict management is what it is up to and not confuse itself into thinking it is on the
road to dispute resolution.
Fighting Fire with Fire
The other method for dealing with disruptive warfare is to adopt some form of it oneself. There are indications that the United States is doing so in Afghanistan. In this case
it is manifested in the form of drone strikes on Taliban leadership across the border in
Pakistan. The United States enjoys sanctuary in that it has drones operate from secure
airfields and their operators are in Nevada, it has a plausible defeat mechanism in the
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form of decapitation, and it has a sustainable tactical mechanism in that the drones are
relatively cheap and hard to hit.
However, adoption of the disruptive form demands a shift in ethos. Abandonment of a
quick or predictable win is just the start. Drone strikes are anything but heroic, either
with regard to the technology or its operators. This may allow a form of cynicism to seep
in as the “warriors” are not subject to personal risk and go home for dinner after their
shift. Perhaps more importantly, adopting the disruptive form requires pushing the
boundaries of international law. Al Qaeda and the Taliban clearly violate international
norms in a number of ways, including using Pakistan as refuge. The United States, for
its part, walks a fine line with its drone strikes. Advances in precision targeting may
reduce harm to innocents, but denying sanctuary to disruptive operatives will continue
13
to challenge traditional views of norms.
The battles of the Atlantic in both world wars offer additional perspective on fighting
the disruptive form with the disruptive form. As previously mentioned, disruptive warfare requires a combination of sanctuary, a strategic defeat mechanism and a sustainable
engagement tactic. For the German navy these consisted of, respectively, secure ports
(submarine pens under thick concrete roofs), the “tonnage theory,” which specified that
a sufficient rate of sinkings in excess of allied ship replacement capacity would “bring
England to her knees,” and the stealth of a U-boat torpedo attack. Initial allied “heroic”
efforts to sweep the sea-lanes and bomb submarine pens proved fruitless and the rate of
sinkings in the initial going of World War II approached the catastrophic. In the end,
a form of counterdisruptive warfare—the convoy—was adopted. The convoy disrupted
the third requirement for disruptive warfare, a sustainable tactic. Escorted convoys both
vitiated the damage done by U-boats and also increased the risk and loss to the U-boat
force to the point that the disruptive form was unsustainable at an effective level for
the Germans.
In terms of the broadest field of regard in our model of conflict, the dispute, adoption
of the disruptive form against an opponent doing the same produces some difficult
questions. Especially with respect to its application on land, how does one know one is
winning, or for that matter has won? The inherent opacity of the disruptive form makes
progress assessments problematic. Body counts have proved to be worse than worthless,
and even more focused measures such as the tally of captured and killed leaders may be
deceiving. The number of terrorist attacks or ambushes may be an indicator, but these
could also be deceiving if the enemy is simply regrouping or biding his time. This state
of affairs leads us to an element of disruptive ethos that is almost a fourth strategic requirement: faith in the defeat mechanism, along with massive patience and persistence.
It is certainly possible that for extended periods of time no progress is discernible and
then, abruptly, the opponent collapses. While not a matter of disruptive warfare per se,
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the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred in the context of a disruptive struggle with the
West. This is all to say that the conduct of disruptive warfare is oftentimes a faith-based
exercise, something that would appear to be unprofessional and negligent to one who is
steeped in the ethos of systematic or heroic warfare.
Precipitous collapse of the enemy or not, how does one conclude a disruptive fight?
Clausewitz again offers us some insight with his concept of culminating point of
victory. He says that any offensive, regardless of how successful, must culminate in
14
some form of defense. In the heroic and systematic forms this usually means setting
up physical defenses, establishing a military government of occupation and/or nation
building. In fact, when this process has been flubbed, a disruptive insurgency has
arisen, Iraq being the most notorious recent example. But what happens at the end
game of a disruptive war? Precipitous collapse of the enemy likely results in the same
measures that attend the end of a disruptive or heroic fight. However, if the enemy’s
demise is less clear cut, the putative victor may be forced to adopt some type of
conflict management strategy. This could take the form of long-term occupation
if the idea or doctrine that spawned the insurgency has not been discredited or
eradicated. Open-ended occupations have always eroded the ethos of the occupying
force, just as being a jailer proves hazardous to the moral fiber of guards. Nations
should take this into account when they decide to adopt disruptive warfare to counter
a disruptive foe.
Another moral hazard associated with disruptive warfare is the involvement of innocent
parties. It is certainly true that civilians have been killed in heroic and systematic wars.
In some cases, such as the German pogroms against the Jews and Poles, such killing is
an evil accessory to these forms. Most often, civilian death, injury or displacement is an
inadvertent side effect of heroic warfare. Systematic warfare frequently involves attacks
on civilian infrastructure, but not normally with the express intent of killing civilians,
although civilian casualties associated with World War II strategic bombing were horrific. In disruptive warfare, innocents or at least third parties are frequently inherent
elements. Terror against civilians is an integral element of insurgencies. Innocent third
parties are pawns, as are, to some extent, one’s own forces. One has only to observe
the role of suicide bombers in Middle Eastern insurgencies to understand that the life
of a disruptive operative has a very different value than a heroic or systematic warrior.
Disruptive warfare is fundamentally cumulative and attrition based. A disruptive strategist certainly wants to minimize risk to his forces, but this is for an objective reason.
Minimizing tactical risk is an imperative of a cumulative campaign; it has nothing to
do with the worth of the individual warrior. This is in stark contrast to the heroic form,
in which the individual is valued because he or she is critical to victory. This devaluing
of individuals is an inherent part of the logic of disruptive warfare that can corrode the
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ethos of any organization conducting it. An indicator of this imperative associated with
the disruptive form may be found in the attempt by the Obama administration, ostensibly a liberal values–minded organization, to justify the targeted killing of American
15
citizens that are members of Al Qaeda.
Conclusions
Being able to see a larger forest, the forms of warfare, provides us not only with new and
useful insights on the dynamics of warfare, but also illuminates the intimate connection between strategy and ethos. In a very real sense, every strategic plan and decision
is a moral statement. Our strategy cannot be contemplated in isolation from the moral
agent—the military—that executes it. If this happens, the moral fabric of the military
may deteriorate and with it, its fighting value. To the extent that this happens invisibly,
the greater the overall risk.
In addition to this general conclusion, several others suggest themselves, each flowing
from the concept of warfare form. To begin with, nuclear weapons may have made the
systematic form obsolete. A nation possessing nukes will not likely allow itself to be
overrun or otherwise reduced to impotence without letting them fly. Assuming that
no nation is willing to suffer nuclear attack, the only choice is some kind of checkmate
achieved through heroic warfare or a disruptive campaign to undermine the enemy’s
will. The idea of a heroic checkmate seemed to be at the heart of the 1980s AirLand
Battle doctrine.
The heroic form of warfare has shown it can produce a robust ethos that can withstand
the corrosive effects of a shift to conflict management. However, if the nation elects
to pursue its own form of disruptive warfare, an extension, say, of drone-empowered
decapitation (assassination?) of Taliban and other troublesome nonstate actor leadership, a change of ethos would be required if this mission fell to the military (instead of
the Central Intelligence Agency) and constituted the main thrust of a future extension
of the war on terror. It might be possible that such an effort could be roped off to a particular section of the Air Force or Army, thus limiting the effects of ethos shift, but with
the current joint command and control arrangements established by Goldwater-Nichols,
there is little chance disruptive operations can be carried out without the broad involvement of all the services. The challenge therefore for strategists and military leadership is
to somehow maintain the heroic ethos intact while it adopts a different form of warfare.
This cannot be done if we do not acknowledge the existence of these warfare forms as
the overarching patterns of conflict and their profound influence on the ethos of the
military services.
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a Senior Leader of al Qa’ida or an Associated
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February 2013, available at msnbcmedia.msn
.com/.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

War-Gaming Network-centric Warfare
The familiar techniques of war gaming will be insufficient for scenarios involving
network-centric warfare. NCW, as it is known—with its focus on speed, downstream
effects, and information flow—will require of gamers more than simply additional
computational power or communications bandwidth, although these will certainly be
needed. Gamers will need a new framework in which to apply these tools.
In 1886, Lieutenant William McCarty Little introduced war gaming to the Naval War
College. The concept found immediate acceptance; faculty and students recognized
that the war game was well suited to analyzing the characteristics of naval warfare of
the time. Gaming has since been applied to all manner of warfare, in a variety of ways.
As warfare has become more sophisticated, multidimensional, and joint, the challenges
of gaming it have increased. Even the application of computer technology has not been
effective for all purposes, especially in games that involve large forces. We are now facing, in network-centric warfare, a new form of conflict that will challenge gamers even
more severely. In this article we will attempt to develop a framework to help us identify
techniques necessary for gaming network-centric warfare.
A characteristic of warfare that has made it amenable in the past to simulation through
gaming is its inherently structured nature. Troops operate in formations; so do ships
and aircraft. Groupings of units or formations generally operate according to doctrine,
in some specified relationship to one another. As a result, war-game designers have been
able to govern and model the movements of forces and to project the results of combat
with the enemy by relatively simple rules. A scenario that confines itself solely to surface
ships, ground forces, or aircraft generates possible interactions and outcomes that are
few enough in number for a “playable” game—one with rules sufficiently simple to allow it to be played in a reasonable period of time and at acceptable effort and expense.
However, as the numbers and types of playing “pieces” grow and the flexibility of their
employ ment doctrine increases, the difficulties of gaming by sets of rules swell almost
Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, No. 2
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exponentially. Today, despite the impressive increases in computing power, operationallevel games involving the full range of forces (which includes space assets), even in
traditional hierarchical command arrangements, must generally be controlled and adju2
dicated not by rules or algorithms but by the professional judgment of human umpires.
The current state of affairs in war gaming, then, is not totally satisfactory. Still, it is possible to design and execute games that have a reasonable degree of validity. By validity
we mean a correspondence with reality sufficient to allow useful insights to be drawn
from the game’s results. Validity is achieved through careful design of the scenario and
control techniques, and recruitment of players and umpires with appropriate credentials. Of course, computer models are critical, but they are usually employed “off-line”—
that is, specialized models are used to support the judgment of the human umpires who
ultimately decide the aggregated outcomes of complex and extensive engagements.
A Basic Gaming Framework
War gaming can be classified in many different ways. One common distinction is
between educational (or training) games and research games. In educational games, the
objective is to acquaint players with warfare situations and exercise their decision-making
skills. Designers of educational games may stretch the bounds of probability somewhat in
scenarios, as may control cells in move-outcome assessments, in order to ensure that players are confronted with the decision-making situations desired by the game’s sponsor—
the command or entity (not necessarily the war-gaming center where it is conducted)
that created the game requirement and set its objectives. Research games, in contrast, are
designed to generate insights into military problems; designers and controllers attempt to
inject as much realism as possible, given the inherent limitations of the medium.
Network-centric warfare would be gamed primarily for research purposes; however, of
course, research games frequently have instructional value, and the proposals advanced
here would apply to educational and training games as well.
War games are also classified by the way they deal with time. Some proceed in stages,
known as “moves.” In each of these steps, players (or groups of players) privately assess a
situation as they perceive it—on the basis of “intelligence” provided by the control cell,
and within the scenario framework—and then report to the controllers their intentions (force movements, dispositions, and fighting orders) for the next specified period
of time. The control cell’s umpires, receiving inputs from all player cells, analyze their
interactions to identify likely combat engagements and assess their outcomes. Generally,
moves cover short periods of time for tactical-level games and much longer increments for operational and strategic-level ones. In contrast to such stepwise exercises
are operational games, which involve “moving game clocks” and present players with
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continuously changing situations to which they must respond. The “clocks” in such
games, which are almost always computer based, typically run at four or six times normal speed. Operational games tend to be limited to the tactical level, due to the necessarily limited spans of time they can accommodate.
Network-centric games virtually demand moving game clocks because of the criticality of time dynamics. In other words, one of the primary benefits of NCW is that the
side employing it can generate rates of change that are unmanageable for the other
side’s command and control system. Because of this, a timestep-move convention
would be unsuitable. A moving game clock would be sufficient for tactical-level play.
However, analysts believe that NCW will produce an intermixing, or compression,
3
of the levels of war. If so, it will be necessary to accommodate both short and longterm phenomena in NCW-based war games. One possibility would be composite
operational and move-step games, in which “time” advances at different speeds in
various portions of the game. To meet tactical-level objectives, designers would set
aside periods in which players would operate against a moving game clock, alternating
with move-step phases embracing much longer increments of game time. At the start
of each successive operational-play session, umpires would assess the war’s progress
to that point and produce a new situation for players to confront. There are probably
other ways of dealing with the problem of time in network-centric games, but it is clear
that traditional methods will not suffice.
In order to explore fully the needs of network-centric war gaming, however, we must
go beyond traditional classification methods. The underlying structure of war games
suggests a set of categories that illuminate the way in which NCW relates to traditional
gaming. All war games, whether they involve fighting sail or network-centric fleets,
soldiers, and satellites, share a certain hierarchical organization. We will refer to the
levels of this structure as “dimensions” (figure 1), in order to avoid confusion with the
“levels of war”—tactical, operational, and strategic—which themselves form a different
gaming framework.
FIGURE 1

“Dimensions” of Gaming

DECISION
ANALYSIS
OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT
ORCHESTRATION OF
OWN FORCES
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At the bottom of the pyramid is the most fundamental dimension of gaming. If blocks
representing ships are laid out, perhaps on a chart table or a grid floor, players can
move them around and see directly their relationships to one another at various points.
Similarly, the U.S. Army routinely conducts “rock drills,” in which markers (as simple
as bits of stone) representing platoons or tanks are used to orchestrate maneuvers. Even
complex operations, including their logistical flows, can be simulated in essentially this
way, using either physical markers or computer symbols. Many games need to go no
farther. This first dimension is an extremely important aspect even of more ambitious
games; the analytical or instructional usefulness of outcomes at higher dimensions of
a game depends on how realistically forces are played. If tactics are used that would be
impossible to execute in the real world, assessments of interactions with the enemy will
be invalid.
The next dimension is assessment of outcomes, the determination of what would
have happened in a confrontation of forces. Whether based upon a roll of the dice, the
“crunching” of complex algorithms by a computer, or the judgment of human umpires,
the outcomes form the basis for judgments of how effectively players orchestrated their
forces, and for the input to be provided them for subsequent decisions. Many games stop
at this dimension; such exercises are generally analytical and are meant to draw insights
into the suitability of certain tactics or the efficacy of new equipment. Here again, fidelity to real-world phenomena is necessary in order to prevent distortions at the dimension of player decisions. Skewed assessments can lead to faulty analysis and to decisions
that yield no useful insights.
The topmost dimension is the analysis of player decisions. Frequently the focus of educational gaming, the purpose of such analysis is to help players perceive objectively their
own reactions to warfare situations. It must be emphasized, however, that many analyses
focus on aspects other than player decisions. For instance, a game intended to explore
the logistics of amphibious operations might require players to develop possible courses
of action; the factors affecting these courses of action might well be of more concern in
terms of game objectives than specific plans produced. In order to simulate the “fog of
war,” players in educational games are typically provided not the actual, precise, and
complete outcome assessments—the “ground truth,” about which more below—but only
those elements (or indications of them) that might realistically be observable. Research
games do not often deal with this dimension, because of its indeterminate and unpredictable nature; a notable exception is the Navy’s Global War Game series.
Network-centric Warfare
Having established a baseline understanding of war gaming, we must do the same for
network-centric warfare. Stripped of the jargon and mysticism that has grown up
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around it, NCW can be simply described as the style of warfare that is possible when
individual combat units are robustly connected by information. When this is achieved,
many familiar constraints disappear, and units become able to interact in many more
productive ways than are possible under traditional systems of command and control.
In fact, the potential flexibility is so great that centralized orchestration or management,
however lightly exercised, becomes a limitation. When units know what is going on and
are confident that others do as well—that is, when they have shared awareness—they can
themselves avoid wasting efforts on enemy units that other friendly forces are engaging,
or even shooting at each other. They can also render mutual support without higherechelon coordination, fixed physical relationships to each other, or restrictive doctrine.
The net effect of this new flexibility is a “swarming” warfare style that demands a
fundamentally different approach to command and control than has been practiced up
4
until now.
Current U.S. practice employs layers of staffs to coordinate the efforts of command
echelons below them. Plans and orders originating from a senior commander produce
a series of staffing cycles in which successively junior echelons distill the orders of the
next higher echelons into more focused orders for their own subordinate commanders. This cascade of planning and order writing can produce delay and confusion. In a
network-centric environment, fighting organizations will be much “flatter,” because the
need for intermediary coordinating layers will be obviated. However, the exact nature
of future command and control requirements, should new and radical policies and
techniques be adopted, cannot be determined without resorting to some form of gaming
and simulation.
The principal requirements for achieving network-centric warfare are a network and
shared awareness. By a network we mean linkage of all units and echelons of a force with
all others. But merely wiring together a collection of units does not guarantee that NCW
or its benefits will result; network-centric warfare is a behavioral, tactical, bottom-up
phenomenon. The network cannot be achieved either merely by tuning everyone’s
radios to the same frequency, because voice channels alone cannot deliver the required
diversity and volume of information. Nor is e-mail sufficient. We are talking about
significant bandwidth, enough for simultaneous transmission of voice, video, data, and
any other necessary medium of communication. All this is necessary because shared
awareness is a robust phenomenon—comprehensive, responsive, adaptable, and surviv5
able—or it does not exist at all.
Shared awareness entails more than the possession of large amounts of information; in
fact, flooding the network with information will guarantee that shared awareness does
not occur. Some undertakings require complex graphics and a sophisticated stream of
diverse media; in others, only a few words are necessary. In any case, the delivery of
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information is not enough; it must be absorbed and interpreted by the people within the
units. Shared awareness, it can be seen, is a concept still in need of refinement by the
naval warfare community. For our purposes, it is a condition in which every element
of a force has sufficient grasp of its own situation and that of other friendly forces to
synchronize its actions with them without detailed orders from next-higher echelons,
which themselves would limit their exercise of command and control to the promulgation of broad “commander’s intent.”
So understood, shared awareness via networks powers network-centric warfare. In turn,
the “swarming” style of warfare thus enabled will generate higher operational tempos
than ever before. Because of the psychological effects of shock and paralysis that such
speed promises to inflict, it may become possible to produce higher-order, even strategic, effects very quickly. It is for this reason that many writers have envisioned the weak6
ening of the boundaries between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.
This compression would be furthered by information operations, which would themselves be enhanced by networking. All of this has important implications for gaming.
Putting It All Together
Traditional war gaming employs markers, maps, and rules as substitutes for real warfare. What should gamers use to represent the network-centric environment? It seems
clear that the only way to game network-centric warfare, as is the case for actually
waging network-centric warfare, is to create a network of players with shared awareness. But what kind of network is needed? One of the principal values of gaming is that
it allows its practitioners to simulate warfare “on the cheap”; field exercises using real
troops and ships are prohibitively expensive, especially for educational and research
purposes. How are gamers to replicate a network without generating a real one? The
interrelated issues of shared awareness and robust networking confound our current
attempts to game network-centric warfare. Overlaying specially designed local-area
networks onto traditional command structures does not constitute a satisfactory
simulation of the NCW environment. Until a tactical network of units, each of them
exercising a great degree of autonomy, can be simulated, it will be impossible to game
network-centric warfare adequately.
One promising line of development is agent-based models. These programs, fairly
simple in concept but demanding considerable computer power, consist of a number of
7
individual “agents,” virtual entities whose actions are governed by rule sets. However,
merely dictating rule sets is insufficient for exploring network-centric warfare. Units in
the net must be able to generate information for headquarters, and anomalous behavior
on the part of a few units will be necessary in order to create realism for the players in
the command center.
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Absent a suitable model to simulate a network, an actual one will be required. To
achieve that, distributed gaming will be necessary. The technology that distributes the
gaming might be one that units would use in actual operations. If so, the control cell
would need to generate “synthetic” forces, both “Blue” and “Red” (friendly and opposition), that would create a realistic combat environment in units’ display systems. All of
this implies a much closer relationship between war-gaming centers and operational
units than currently exists.
Still, a network is of no use unless players can effectively use the information it is capable of moving around. It is simply not sufficient to dump information into player cells;
commanders and staffs would be quickly overwhelmed. Therefore, a prerequisite to the
achievement of network-centric gaming is the development of techniques for creating
shared awareness among the players. This may seem a chicken-or-egg dilemma: which
should come first? However, it appears from the Navy’s experience in the latest games
of its Global series that shared-awareness technology can be employed and techniques
“incubated” in the context of traditional command and control structures; thereafter,
they can be applied to the new network paradigm. Then, and only then, can we embark
on the process of effectively gaming network-centric warfare.
A Modified Gaming Framework
With the principles of NCW gaming in mind, we can alter (figure 2) the gaming
structure by adding two new dimensions, producing a framework in which the higher
and more challenging dimensions rely as before upon the execution of the more basic
levels. This reliance has important implications as we proceed with the development of
network-centric warfare gaming.
FIGURE 2

Higher-Level Dimensions

NETWORK
BEHAVIOR
SHARED
INTERESTS
DECISION ANALYSIS

OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT

ORCHESTRATION OF OWN FORCES
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First, as we have seen, gamers cannot ignore familiar skills and functions as they strive
for more exotic applications. Errors or omissions in lower dimensions would call into
question any insights derived or phenomena observed in the higher ones. That is not to
say that absolute fidelity is required in all aspects; the attempt would probably result in
a game that was unplayable or too expensive. However, it does mean that designers must
pay attention to the lower dimensions and find ways to simulate properly, or fix, the
variables that reside there.
The alert reader may object that the two new dimensions do not belong on top of the
pyramid—that they should be considered rather as parts of the lowest dimension. This
objection has considerable validity, on several counts. First, it is clear that the process of
getting shared awareness and networking right is akin to orchestrating the tactical doctrine of forces. Second, one might well argue that it is the analysis of human decisions
that is the most difficult and complex problem in gaming. Notwithstanding, the new
dimensions are here placed atop the pyramid to highlight the extensions of gaming logic
that are needed to game network-centric warfare effectively.
The dimension of player decisions becomes very interesting in network-centric gaming. Since shared awareness is probably sensitive to competence of command, sponsors
will have to be especially careful about whom they invite as players in NCW games.
A reflexive application by a senior player of a traditional, centralized command style
would probably end any hope of generating true shared-awareness behavior in a game.
Moreover, players “taken off the street,” with no training in or understanding of sharedawareness theory, techniques, and requirements will likely distort findings from games
that seek to explore the various phenomena encountered.
If all this is true, several implications emerge. First, it may be necessary to change
command and control doctrine before NCW can be gamed, in order to train the officers who will be the players. In other words, game designers must work closely with
command and control experts to synchronize player capabilities with game demands.
Second, if NCW gaming achieves any degree of validity—that is, correspondence to a
future warfare environment—the education and training needed by commanders for
network-centric warfare are likely to be somewhat different than is necessary today.
Third, development of NCW gaming must proceed step by step up the framework. In
other words, gamers should not begin the process by lashing together a network; they
need first to game shared awareness alone, in the context of current scenarios and
equipment. After collecting insights and perfecting their techniques, they can move
with confidence to true network gaming.
Fourth, the development of network-centric warfare war games will bring a fundamental change to the gaming environment. Traditional games, whether played on map
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boards or computers, are conducted by moving playing pieces around in geographical
arenas; the pieces’ movements and interactions are governed by rules, perhaps quite
complex. In network-centric gaming, while traditional geographic displays will be
used, the most important “map board” will be the human mental picture. This is not to
say that a commander’s situational awareness has not always been critical—it has. But
it will now be especially difficult for players to keep track of what is happening in the
game, because events will orient themselves around the flows of information between
networked players. While game pieces (force symbols) will continue to be necessary, the
arena that counts in the network-centric game will be virtual, and there are as yet no adequate rules for the movement of information in that topography. At a minimum, gamers must recognize the fundamental shift of venue and consider how it affects design,
play, and analysis. For instance, whereas previously gamers would use tactical experts as
umpires and analysts, in NCW gaming they may want to involve psychologists or other
social scientists, as well as perhaps physiologists and physicians.
Gaming Effects
Closely paralleling the development of network-centric warfare is a movement tending to shift thinking about military operations away from input-based measures (such
as sorties flown, ground gained, or targets destroyed) and toward an output-oriented
focus on the ultimate effects of military actions—that which, from the commander’s
perspective, has been caused to happen, or prevented. A classic, if limited, World War II
example of this distinction arises from the cruiser-destroyer engagement near Guadalcanal on 8–9 August 1942: in “input-measure” terms, the result was the disaster (for the
U.S.-Australian force) known as the battle of Savo Island. But because the Japanese commander, Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, focused only on the “input” measure of allied warships sunk, the tactically victorious Japanese cruisers and destroyers departed without
having attacked the vulnerable U.S. invasion shipping, which had been their ultimate
objective.
The desired development of effects-based measures of effectiveness will bring with it a
further fusion of the three traditional levels of war. This is characteristic of the emerging nature of warfare in the information age and has been predicted by many writers. It
is a difficult idea to get hold of, and almost impossible if one remains tied to conventional intellectual frameworks. Once again, in terms of war gaming, simply superimposing
effects-based planning onto the traditional gaming approach will not be sufficient; the
whole approach to planning and assessment has to change.
Presently, the same rule sets that govern the movement and engagements of “pieces”
determine the consequent attrition. The strategic effects of this attrition are then extrapolated—that is, if a certain percentage of an enemy force is destroyed or a particular
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category of targets is hit, certain repercussions upon enemy decision makers are assumed to follow. Detailed exploration of the linkages between battlefield events and political decisions has not been a regular feature of operational-level games. Combat—the
use of force itself—has been the centerpiece, and its political and moral effects usually
presumed. All traditional gaming models and methods are designed according to this
approach.
Some work, however, has been done on effects. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center conducts detailed and sophisticated analyses of how various types of effects can be generated through bombing and other military action. To date, most of its work has focused
on what may be termed “definitive effects,” those whose mechanisms are physical—such
as neutralizing an electrical generation grid or disrupting a rail transportation system.
Such an effect can presumably be more easily predicted than can those that lie in the
realm of belief and reason. The latter, whether catalytic or coercive, involve inducing
enemy commanders or political leaders to make decisions one wants them to make.
The complexities and difficulties of precipitating congenial decisions by hostile parties
are self-evident. However, well-designed games might at least be able to generate useful
insights into the problem.
To that end, a fundamental reorientation of the gaming process is required. Gamers
must center their analyses, rules, and gaming contexts on the minds of the decision
makers whom military actions are designed to influence. Models and methods must be
capable of rationally depicting, assessing, and synthesizing the effects of a wide variety
of events on these decision makers. In this context, the use of force is only one of an
array of factors that must be considered if war games are to reflect in a valid way the
influence of combat outcomes on an enemy’s strategic decisions.
One way to shift gaming to an effects-centered approach is to focus on specific desired
enemy decisions, to have players begin by analyzing the full range of factors, including
(but not only) military ones, that might induce them. Such an approach would tend to
keep players from ascribing a priori utility to various kinds of military actions. A sensitivity analysis might be able to identify certain types of military outcomes that would
be most influential. The game proper would explore the prospects for generating those
8
outcomes.
Gaming Red
In addition to the taxonomy we have already laid out, war games can be classified as
one-sided or two-sided. In one-sided games, the players are all “Blue,” or friendly; game
controllers play “Red” (the enemy). One-sided games are frequently used when the sole
concern is the orchestration dimension. In higher dimensions, one-sided games are
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most often associated with educational games; Red’s actions are chosen to produce the
desired decision-making situations for the players. In two-sided games, by contrast,
there are both Red and Blue players, and the opposition is free to act as it wishes; the
control cell limits itself to assessing outcomes and briefing “intelligence” on them to
both sides.
It might seem that if a network-centric game focused upon effects is preceded, as described above, by an analysis of factors bearing upon enemy decisions, the game itself
could be one-sided, in effect a high-tech orchestration exercise. This is not the case.
Network-centric warfare theory envisions that rapid operations (rapid, that is, in comparison with the enemy’s ability to react) will preclude (“lock out”) certain Red military
options and cause the kind of decision-making paralysis that French commanders
displayed in 1940 in the face of the German blitzkrieg. One-sided gaming could not
determine if Blue network-centric operations induced such effects. Therefore, much
network-centric gaming will have to be two-sided.
In present two-sided games, Red cells typically “play” orders of battle that reflect fairly
accurately those of actual states being simulated. Organizations specializing in acting as the opposition in war games (like the Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment
at the Naval War College) even employ enemy doctrine, insofar as it is understood. In
network-centric gaming, however, the real key will be the accurate simulation of the
enemy’s command and control. Whether one-sided or two-sided, war games in which
Red either is given artificially good situational awareness or is allowed face-to-face communication between all its command echelons will generate distorted outcomes. NCW
game designers must ascribe networked capabilities only to player cells that would actually possess them; the Red side must be designed with realistic command and control
mechanisms. Only then will players and sponsor be able to perceive the effects of rapid,
network-centric operations on enemy decision making.
Ground Truth
Virtually all war games require some mechanism for keeping track of what forces actually exist (friendly, enemy, allied, and neutral), what their condition and capabilities
are, where they are, what they are doing, and what they intend to do. Ground truth is,
in effect, the sum of the scenario and the moves as privately submitted to controllers
and mediated by umpires. Players usually are not allowed perfect knowledge and must
rely on their own interpretations of the “observables” supplied to them; controllers or
umpires, however, need ground truth so that they can accurately adjudicate combat
results. In war games that deal solely with forces and physical geography, maintaining
ground truth is a relatively simple matter; the control cells know both sides’ strategies
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and orders, decide themselves the outcomes of engagements, and maintain a master
map and status board with the true positions, movements, etc., of all forces.
In network-centric gaming, however, the focus shifts from geographic to mental terrain,
and from ground, sea, and air maneuver to communications and psychology. In such
a realm the very concept of ground truth, let alone plotting it, becomes problematic. It
might be possible to play an NCW operational game (against a running clock) without
keeping ground truth, but it would be almost impossible to analyze the play after the
fact. At the very least it will be necessary, therefore, to find ways to capture each side’s
relative awareness and knowledge at key points. Observers might take notes in command centers, or software solutions may be found. In any case, the whole concept of
ground truth will have to be reevaluated.

It is not going to be possible to game network-centric warfare by simply superimposing
information technology onto traditional gaming techniques. Network-centric warfare
represents in war gaming, as it does in warfare itself, a new frontier, one that will require
new theory, new techniques, and new technology. It will also require new kinds of training for players, controllers, and designers.
This is not to say that traditional gaming techniques are made obsolete by the new
warfare paradigm. The basic principles of game design remain largely intact. Games
will still consist of players, pieces, and rules, and they must, as before, be playable at
acceptable outlays of effort, time, and money. Nonetheless, game designers will not be
successful in gaming network-centric warfare without adopting new approaches. It is of
critical importance that they do succeed, because gaming will be vital to the adoption of
this new warfare style among commanders. It will be in war games that they best learn
to wage network-centric warfare and to abandon certain ingrained elements of operational and tactical art, such as fixed formations and cascading staff cycles. War gaming
will be fundamental in so developing future commanders’ confidence that they do not
retain old methods past their usefulness, simply out of lack of trust in the new.

Notes
1. For background on war gaming, see Peter
Perla’s excellent The Art of Wargaming (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
For the purposes of this article, we can define
a war game as a simulation of real warfare
events based on: a scenario, or story, that
provides the context for game moves; a playing board (either physical or electronic) that

provides an environment in which the pieces
can move; playing pieces (again, either physical or electronic) that represent forces; a set
of rules that govern how the pieces move and
interact with each other; a procedure for determining the outcome of battles; and finally
(and most importantly), players.
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2. The operational level is one of three levels
of war commonly acknowledged by military
officers. The lowest level, involving individual
units up to divisions and battle groups, is
tactical; tactics are mostly concerned with the
actions of forces in contact with the enemy.
The highest level is strategy, where the plan of
war is linked to national political objectives.
The operational level exists between the two.
There, theater and joint task force commanders devise campaign and operations plans
that maneuver forces so as to engage under
the most advantageous circumstances, and to
link the effects of their tactical actions to the
attainment of strategic objectives.
3. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and
Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare:
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington, D.C.: C4ISR Cooperative
Research Program, Department of Defense,
1999), p. 69; see the program site on the
World Wide Web: www.dodccrp.org.
4. For more depth on the “swarming” style
of warfare, see John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). This
publication is available on the World Wide
Web: www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311.
5. “Shared battlespace awareness emerges when
all relevant elements of the warfighting ecosystem are provided with access to the COP
[common operational picture].” Alberts,
Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare.
This is the seminal book on the subject.
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6. The phenomenon of compression of the levels of war has been widely discussed in the
literature. For one of the first examinations of
it, see Douglas A. MacGregor, “Future Battle:
The Merging Levels of War,” Parameters,
Winter 1992–93, pp. 33–47.
7. An example of an agent-based model is
SWARM, developed by researchers at the
Santa Fe Institute. Agent-based models have
been found useful in researching complex
phenomena. See the Santa Fe Institute
Website, www.santafe.edu, and the SWARM
Website, www.swarm.org.
8. One computer-based tool that shows promise
in facilitating this type of analysis is the “Influence Net.” It is based on Bayesian inference,
a mathematical technique that calculates the
relative influence of one set of factors upon
another. The model is applied to particular
decisions to be gamed (for instance, an Iraqi
decision on whether or not to use chemical
weapons). Game designers would, with the
help of a virtual web of outside experts, populate the model with the encyclopedic data
necessary for its proper functioning. During
the game, certain cells would play combat
events in a traditional manner; the outcomes
would be supplied to a wider net of players
who are each responding to the others’ inputs.
The output of the model would indicate the
proclivities of the targeted decision maker
at the end of the move. For a basic description of influence nets see www.inet.saic.com/
inet-public/.
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The Epistemology of War Gaming
Anyone who has conducted or has studied actual warfare knows well its massive
1
complexities.
These complexities do not relieve humans from the responsibility for making decisions—difficult decisions—aimed at navigating their organizations successfully through
campaigns, be they in a theater of war or in the halls of the Pentagon. Minds must be
prepared beforehand, both in their general, educated functioning and in the specific,
sophisticated understanding of conflict and the competitive environments they face.
This preparation must be predicated on the internalization of “valid” knowledge about
the conflict environment. There are many ways of gaining such knowledge: the study
of history and theory, practical experience, and exposure to the results of various kinds
of research and analysis. Each of these methods of developing knowledge has its own
particular epistemology—formally, a “theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge,
especially with reference to its limits and validity,” or more practically, rules by which
error is distinguished from truth. War gaming is a distinct and historically significant
tool that warriors have used over the centuries to help them understand war in general and the nature of specific upcoming operations. The importance of war gaming
demands serious examination of the nature of the knowledge it produces.
Before going farther, it is worthwhile to define exactly what we mean by “war game.”
Peter Perla provides as good a definition as any: a war game is “a warfare model or
simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces,
and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by
2
players representing the opposing sides.” War gaming, rightly considered, is inherently
a method of research, regardless of how people apply it. The essence of war gaming is
the examination of conflict in an artificial environment. Through such examination,
gamers gain new knowledge about the phenomena the game represents. The purpose of
a game is immaterial to this central epistemological element. Moreover, the gaining of
Naval War College Review, Spring 2006, Vol. 59, No. 2
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knowledge is inherent and unavoidable, whatever a game’s object. The real question is
whether such knowledge is valid and useful. This question is all the more important because of the growing reliance on gaming techniques in an increasingly complex world.
This article will attempt to initiate a professional dialogue on the underlying logic structure of gaming by examining the epistemological foundations of gaming in general and
ways in which the knowledge gained from specific games can be judged sound.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to conduct such an inquiry is the possibility of
insidious error creeping into war games. War gaming, even after centuries of practice, is
still more a craft than a discipline, and it is quite possible for rank amateurs, dilettantes,
and con artists to produce large, expensive, and apparently successful but worthless or
misleading games for unsuspecting sponsors. There is little incentive to apply incisive
criticism to games in which heavy investments have been made, and persons or organizations inclined to do so are hampered by lack of an established set of epistemological
theory and principle. This does not mean that the majority of games are fatally flawed; it
does mean that there is no accepted set of criteria to determine whether they are or not.
Judgment as to the success and quality of a war game, especially one of high profile and
consequence, is too often the result of organizational politics.
Epistemology
Some elaboration of the meaning of this somewhat esoteric term is essential. To avoid
getting sidetracked by philosophical complexities, we can adopt a convention based on
current thinking. One widely accepted branch of modern epistemological theory holds
that knowledge results from the building of simplified mental models of reality in order
to solve problems. The “validity” of a model (or knowledge) emanates from its utility
3
in problem solving. This approach seems sufficient for our purposes. Knowledge is a
practical human response to the challenges of our environment. Valid knowledge is
that which has sufficient practical correspondence to our environment to be useful for
problem solving.
Readers with knowledge of modeling and simulation will immediately find resonances
in this definition with widely used definitions of computer simulation validity—for
example, “substantiation that a computerized model within its domain of applicability
possesses a satisfactory range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of
4
the model.” Thus we are not so much concerned with the validity of knowledge in an
absolute sense as with the practical utility of knowledge emanating from a game relative to the projected warfare environment in which it will be applied. Most war games
are oriented in some way to the future, either explicitly or inherently; accordingly, the
predictive value of knowledge emanating from a game is critical. At this point many
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veteran gamers will cry foul, as it is widely accepted that war games are not predictive
(although there are some who will disagree). To untangle this knot, let us go back to
our baseline definition of valid knowledge—that which is useful for problem solving.
This presupposes that the environment can to some degree be shaped by decisions. If
it were not, war gaming—in fact, any decision-support tool—would be irrelevant. If
the environment is malleable, however, there are “right” and “wrong” decisions avail5
able to the decision maker. Ignorant decision makers would be at the mercy of chance;
their decisions would be shots in the dark, or worse. An informed decision maker—one
who possesses valid knowledge about the environment and the potential consequences
of alternate choices—could do better than that in a future situation. Valid knowledge
is predictive to that extent. However, since life in general and war in particular are influenced by thousands of little happenstances that are beyond the control of any single
decision maker (a true definition of Clausewitz’s “friction”), “right” decisions do not
guarantee success. If they did, war would be formulaic and gaming unnecessary. For
that reason, although valid knowledge of the environment is inherently predictive—in
that it indicates potentially valid cause-and-effect relationships through which decision
makers can bring about their intent—a war game can never be truly predictive.
Setting aside, for now, arguments about certain war games in history that have seemed
in some way predictive, we are left with the uncomfortable question of what games are
good for if they cannot truly predict. Indeed, why do we game at all?
Why Game?
If we accept the notion that war gaming is inherently a research tool (a definition that
includes the produced effects of education, training, experimentation, and analysis)
and one that generates potentially valid knowledge, we must ask under what conditions,
or for what problems, it can have validity. Can it be used validly in lieu of other tools,
or does it occupy a unique relationship to a class of problems for which it is the only
valid tool?
Perhaps the deepest treatment of this question is that of John Hanley, who relates the
inherent nature and structure of war gaming to the amount and kind of “fuzziness”
(indeterminacy) attending a problem. Indeterminacy comprises those things we do not
know about either the initial conditions of relevant elements of the problem or about the
effects of our potential attempts to solve it. Hanley posits a spectrum of indeterminacy,
as follows:
•

No indeterminacy. The elements of the problem are known and amenable to engineering solutions.
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•

Statistical indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions is a random variable whose
statistics we know, and the effects of our actions upon it can be determined. For
instance, the chances of a submarine being in a particular area of ocean could be
calculated from intelligence, and our search efforts would be shaped thereby.

•

Stochastic indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions may be known, but the process
by which new states of affairs (for instance, battle outcomes) are produced by our actions is subject to statistical variation—the “roll of the dice.”

•

Strategic indeterminacy. The initial set of conditions is known, but there are two or
more competing “players” whose independent choices govern the end state.

•

Structural indeterminacy. Significant elements of the problem are so little known or
understood that we cannot define the problem in terms of the other forms of indeterminacy. Such elements might be “indeterminacy in current conditions, the kinematics of the process, acts of nature, the available response time, and the perceptions,
6
beliefs and values of the decision makers.”

Hanley describes war gaming as a weakly structured tool appropriate to weakly struc7
tured problems. Such problems are those so complex or poorly defined as to require
a tool that can accommodate their considerable imprecision. Warfare in general and
many of the problems subsumed within it are certainly weakly structured—that is,
marked by structural indeterminacy. This adds up to the first part of the answer to our
question: We war-game because we must. There are certain warfare problems that only
gaming will illuminate.
This imprecision, or lack of solid structure, characterizes both the problem and the
tool, and therefore governs the nature of the knowledge produced by a war game. That
knowledge is not in the form of a solution to an engineering problem. It is commonly
said that war games produce insights, not proofs. This conventional wisdom is correct insofar as it goes, but it is not sufficiently developed to stand as an epistemological
principle. Following Hanley’s line of thought, we can say that the knowledge emanating
from a game is also weakly structured, meaning that such knowledge is conditional and
subject to judgment in application. Our confidence in the structural calculations for a
bridge can be very high if we combine accepted engineering formulae, accurate measurements, and building materials of the predicted quality. In contrast, however, our
confidence in answers produced by population sampling cannot be 100 percent; further,
any answers produced by game theory for a particular conflict situation must be understood to be conditional on the scope for free choice enjoyed by the opponent. Answers
produced by war games are yet more conditional, due to the wide scope of significant
variables attendant to warfare, whether or not incorporated into the game. Perhaps the
best way to characterize this conditionality is to say that knowledge produced by war
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games is indicative—that is, at its best it can indicate the possibilities of a projected warfare situation and certain potential cause-and-effect linkages.
Indicativeness is no mean thing when dealing with a very complex or weakly structured
problem. The primary mechanism through which war games produce such knowledge
is visualization. Games allow players and observers to see relationships—geographic,
temporal, functional, political, and other—that would otherwise not be possible to discern. Seeing and understanding these relationships prepare the mind for decisions in a
complex environment. This holds true whether the purpose of the game is education or
research.
While weak problem structure is a compelling reason to war-game, there are other
equally compelling reasons, each of which has epistemological implications. A common
reason for mounting a war game is socialization, either of concepts or people. Many
organizations within the U.S. government sponsor games in order to get a wide and
diverse set of stakeholders to “buy into” a set of concepts or doctrine. Military “Title X”
games (that is, Title Ten, referring to the federal statute that directs the armed services
to raise, maintain, and train forces) frequently have this as at least a tacit purpose.
Knowledge emerging from such games is less conditional than in other settings, at
least with respect to the consensus they are meant to generate. A recent joint war game
revealed that none of the military services had invested sufficiently in the suppression
of enemy air defenses to support an aggressive airborne assault early in a particular
scenario. That revelation was more than just indicative—it was usable intelligence. Such
knowledge could be used to alter budgets or even service roles and missions.
Some games are used to acquaint organizations with each other. This has been an
important aspect of homeland security gaming in the wake of 9/11. For instance, in a
recent homeland security game, a state emergency management agency learned that
it had formally to request federal assistance in a disaster, not just expect it to show up.
That knowledge was not in the least conditional; the game provided to key officers of a
state agency concrete knowledge of federal requirements.
Simulation
War games are inherently simulations of reality. By this we mean that they are simplified representations of a potential future (or perhaps past) warfare situation. Simulation
has epistemological implications all its own. Most fundamentally, simulation is a calculation technique, and as such it is coupled to the phenomena it seeks to represent along
Hanley’s spectrum of indeterminacy. For instance, physicists use simulation techniques
to explore subatomic interactions. They can do this with high confidence because the
problem set they are dealing with contains no more than statistical indeterminacy.
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Naturally, then, simulation of war is less closely coupled to its parent phenomenon
because of the high degree of structural indeterminacy involved. In other words, it is
far less likely that any warfare simulation would be “valid” due to all the imponderables
that are necessarily distilled out.
A war game is an artificial representation—that is, simulation—of war that is used to
learn more about a particular situation. A common misconception is that computer
simulations are war games. Computer programs are not in themselves war games,
although they are frequently referred to as such; war games require human players,
who may employ computer programs to assist them. In a broad sense, simulation is the
attempt to represent reality to the degree necessary to explore the warfare phenomena
in which we are interested. Thus when we talk of simulation in this article, it is in the
general sense of war-game design and not the narrower sense of computer software.
Following Hanley, we can attack the issue of warfare simulation by establishing a vertical spectrum of sorts, based on the degree of fidelity a simulation possesses. At the bottom of the spectrum exist such games as Go and chess. These games are abstractions;
all that is retained of reality is the essence of conflict. That does not mean that valid
knowledge cannot be gained from these games; many wise generals have extolled their
virtues in preparing the mind for actual battle. At the top of the spectrum are detailed
simulations, attempts to capture as much reality as possible. In between exist what we
will call “distillations”—games in which significant simplifications of reality are made
for specific purposes. In a sense, all simulations are distillations, because a perfect
representation of reality would be reality. To put it more practically, exact simulation of
real warfare is not possible. Admiral Arleigh Burke illustrated the matter well when he
said, “Nobody can actually duplicate the strain that a commander is under in making a
decision during combat.”
This distilling process has epistemological implications for simulation. Pursuing farther
the logic we have been following, we could easily conclude that the knowledge produced by highly distilled games is more conditional and less predictive than that from
simulations having greater fidelity. Such reasoning would force us to conduct nothing
but elaborate and expensive games. Fortunately, such an epistemological blind alley can
be avoided by linking purpose to predictiveness. All war games have explicit purposes,
and rarely are these purposes so holistic as to demand unsparing investment in fidelity.
Bringing the purpose of a game into focus leads quite naturally to distillation; many
games are able to set aside significant aspects of reality. To the extent that distillation
promotes clarity, highlighting relationships in the aspect of warfare we are studying,
the epistemological damage of failure to include all possible factors is counterbalanced. Since knowledge gained from a war game is in the eye of the beholder (player or
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analyst), obfuscation caused by excessive comprehensiveness is at least as damaging as
the omission of some significant element.
Epistemologically speaking, we conclude that a war game should be designed with as
much fidelity as possible without including factors that, because they are not clearly
related to its purpose, risk diluting or masking valid knowledge that might legitimately
be gained.
There is another implication of simulation that must be addressed: the common wisdom
holding that war games are not experiments, as they cannot prove anything. This is
clearly true, in terms of John Hanley’s logic, since knowledge emerging from games
is conditional. The proposition is confirmed also by the nature of warfare simulation;
the lack of close coupling with its parent phenomenon due to structural indeterminacy
makes it always incomplete and defective in some, possibly unknown, way.
Nevertheless, there is an aspect of war gaming that can accommodate experimentation.
Some war games focus on command and control. In them, players are organized into
cells, each of which represents a command or perhaps an element of a staff organization. These cells are provided with communications devices (most recently networked
computers) and command and control (C2) doctrine. The war game provides a venue
in which command and control processes can take place. The point here is that within
the context of the game, actual—not simulated—command and control occurs. Thus,
knowledge gained from this activity can be treated like experimental data, subject to
all the epistemological principles and injunctions of the scientific method. One caveat
is that war games are most commonly one-time affairs, so the data cannot be treated
with the same confidence as that gained from experiments run a number of times. On
the other hand, simple and appropriately distilled games have been used as substrates
within multiple-run C2 experiments, the output of which constitutes valid statistical
8
data. However, in games featuring a significant command and control focus, information gained from the underlying simulation must be treated differently than that
derived from the command and control “layer.”
Game Artifacts
Games can easily produce information that is invalid. Commonly, such information
is produced by what are termed “game artifacts,” defects of simulation that corrupt a
game’s cause-and-effect relationships. If, for instance, a Control umpire somehow used
the wrong weapons-effects table to look up the outcome of a tactical engagement, subsequent player decisions based on that assessment would be tainted. Similarly, defects in
display may cause players to be artificially misled as to where units are. Simply ascribing
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such defects to the “fog of war” and allowing them to be folded into the game’s flow is as
much an epistemological mistake as assigning too much significance to game outcomes.
It is entirely reasonable to build the fog of war into a game, which can be done in various ways. These devices, such as revealing to players only that information which their
reconnaissance assets could “see,” normally place bounds on the nature of misinformation that may crop up. Players may, for instance, make unwarranted assumptions about
the location of enemy forces due to a lack of information; they might equally do so in
the real world, and such imperfection of information does no violence to the intellectual validity of cause and effect or critical analysis. However, if a computer-generated
operational picture through some system defect placed a “Red” unit far out of position
and thereby affected “Blue’s” decision making, we cannot explain it away as the result
of a Red computer attack or some sophisticated deception. Nor can it be chalked up
to equipment failure that might happen in real life; unless it is known that the game’s
designers provided for this real-world factor, it cannot be assumed to be a part of the
simulation.
A game artifact that is perhaps easier to understand but more difficult to detect or avert
is invalid decision making by players. It is a fundamental, if tacit, assumption of war
gaming that players will make the best decisions they can. They need not be the right
decisions—after all, somebody has to lose—but they must not be capricious or negligent. Players are expected to try to win, or at least to carry out doctrine in a faithful way.
When they do not, as a result of alienation, inattention, or malice, the game’s results
are contaminated. This can happen all too easily. In some games, Red is constrained by
Control, in order to shape the game in some needed way, from certain otherwise reasonable actions it wants to take; if Red players react with disillusionment or cynicism, they
may “mentally disengage” from the game and make very different decisions than if they
were properly immersed and motivated. Another source of defective decision making is
ignorance or improper training among players. If the goal of the game is to examine the
efficacy of a particular concept or doctrine but the key players do not know or understand the material, the game results cannot be accepted.
Another player artifact, one that is harder to account for, crops up in games as well:
players tend to be more aggressive than they would be in the real world with real lives
at stake. There are several inherent reasons for this. First, it is just a game, and therefore
real lives are not at stake. Second, depending on the extent of the simulation, there are
no tactical commanders screaming bloody murder if the operational-level player puts
them in an unnecessarily dangerous situation. One of the most common misfortunes to
attend Blue players in Cold War games was the loss of amphibious groups because the
Blue players had let them sit in exposed positions. Third, since every game has a defined
end point or specific set of victory conditions, there is no “tomorrow” to be provided for
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by players after the last move. Game designers must therefore understand these tendencies and attempt to structure their games to minimize the likelihood and intensity of
this player artifact.
The War Game as Military History
We have seen that knowledge gained from war games is conditional—that its validity
is ultimately dependent on its effects on decisions made in real-world operations. But
analysts examine games after the fact, and all participants have the opportunity to learn
from their findings. How should this information be handled, sorted, and considered?
How can it be converted into valid knowledge? Because it is not scientific data, it cannot
be statistically reduced or otherwise treated in ways appropriate for “hard” data. Perhaps information produced by war games is best considered artificial military history.
Game data can then be approached with the full array of methods available to the historian. Moreover, the trap of treating mere discussions as games can be avoided. Insiders
have a term for nongames masquerading as games: BOGSAT (“Bunch of Guys Sitting
around a Table”). If the data derived from an event consists solely of what participants
said, it was not truly a war game, and its results should not be accorded the stature that
knowledge gained from a real game should have.
Perhaps the best commentary on converting military history into useful knowledge is to
be found in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz regarded history as a reallife laboratory of war, one that can be mined for information useful for preparing the
minds of future commanders. His approach was what he called Kritik, or critical analysis: researching the facts, tracing effects back to their causes, and evaluating the means
9
employed. This process (which emerges from a close reading of Book Two, chapter 5, of
his classic treatise On War) is as valid today as it was in Clausewitz’s time. These three
steps constitute more than a method; they establish a criterion for the extraction of valid
knowledge from a war game. It is not enough simply to list the facts of what happened
in the game; these are meaningless in themselves, because the game was a simulation.
We must examine why these events occurred—the combinations of player decisions and
umpire determinations that produced them.
Clausewitz himself, however, acknowledges the limits of the method: at some point,
results must be allowed to speak for themselves. The critic, “having analyzed everything
within the range of human calculation and belief, will let the outcome speak for that
10
part whose deep, mysterious operation is never visible.” In other words, war cannot be
completely understood in its full complexity; ultimately criticism must recognize that
there are factors at work whose functioning can be revealed only by the actual victories
or defeats of a commander being studied. This is perfectly reasonable with respect to
real warfare. It might also be true for war games, but its usefulness is limited by the fact
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that they are simulations. For example, a common method of introducing uncertainty
into battle-outcome calculations is rolling dice to represent the probabilistic nature of
certain phenomena, like sonar or radar detection. Beyond this narrow use of stochastic
indeterminacy, game designers frequently aggregate complex interactions of large combat forces with a combination of dice rolls and structured combat-results tables. Here
the die simulates the effects of a wide range of variables that are not explicitly modeled.
It would be easy enough, lacking any other good explanation of the cause-and-effect
relationships between player decisions and outcomes, to sense here the presence of invisible factors. But if such “deep, mysterious” elements exist in war games, they are not
those of which Clausewitz speaks. A roll of the dice is simply that. To say it simulates
unmodeled portions of reality is going too far. The most one can say is that there are
physical forces at play on the die itself that players cannot calculate and therefore cannot
predict. This is different from admitting one does not understand all the complexities of
a real battlefield. Thus, we cannot approach the results of a war game as a military critic
would the outcome of a real battle or campaign. Results of a war game cannot be used to
fill in analytical blanks in the way Clausewitz describes, nor can theory or judgment be
derived from them in the way historians do from real events.
Nevertheless, we can ascribe a certain significance to war-game outcomes. If the game is
run according to a specific set of rules and those rules constitute a valid distilled simulation of reality, outcomes of individual “moves” or entire games can yield useful knowledge. To understand when this can be the case, we need to understand the difference
between rigidly assessed and freely assessed war games. We describe as “rigidly assessed”
those games that proceed strictly according to rules governing movement, detection,
and combat. Such games produce situations governed by player decisions, the rules,
and combat-results tables (manual or computerized). Assuming the absence of artifacts
and within the limitations of dice rolls, we can in such a case ascribe significance to
game, or even move, outcomes. The game goes where the rules take it; if the rules and
the combat-resolution tables are good representations of reality, the outcome constitutes
artificial military history, and one can usefully work backward from outcomes and look
for reasons. This would be so whether the game is played by hand around a board or at
computer workstations. Inputs are generated, and these, by means of a known system,
produce results that cannot be predicted or influenced. The game goes where it goes.
Freely assessed games are somewhat different epistemological animals. In these, the
flow of the game is governed by umpires and game directors. Instead of following game
rules, players make plans and decisions as they would in real life, more or less, and
umpires, collecting the interacting moves of all the players, translate them into force
movements, detections, and combat results. The umpires may be aided by computers.
The key difference is that the game’s progress, including move results, are governed by
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the objectives of the game’s sponsors, the time available, and sometimes the conflicting
interests of stakeholders. Control may determine that a certain set of conditions must
occur at a specific point if the game’s objectives are to be met. This is most commonly
the case in educational games, but it can also occur in research games. In such a case,
Control defines in operational game terms the needed conditions, looks at the situation at the end of the previous move, and then figures out what—within the bounds of
plausibility, given the players’ new moves—must have happened in order to get from that
situation to the desired condition.
That is, the umpires deduce tactical outcomes, the necessary inputs, by work ing
backward from a set of desired results. This fact does not negate the validity or value of
the game, but it does mean that its outcome does not have the same analytical weight
as that of a rigidly assessed game. Freely assessed games can be valuable for discovery
purposes—perceiving relationships or finding defects in plans—but they cannot be used
to see “who would win.” Similarly, they cannot be regarded as artificial military history
to the same extent as rigidly assessed games.
Monte Carlo versus Deterministic Combat Results
A Naval War College elective course on war-gaming theory and practice recently
designed and played an instructional board game. In the course of it, a Blue player
exclaimed in frustration, “This is a dice game, not a capabilities game!” His observation
was trenchant as well as accurate. In the game—which combined various types of dice
and combat-results tables—a small Red force had just hammered a larger Blue fleet after
four or five very lucky die rolls. The rules had attempted to reflect lower Red strength by
awarding hits only on rolls of one or two on a ten-sided die, but five consecutive rolls of
one or two now produced a David-slaying-Goliath result. How does one deal with such
an outcome?
As we have seen, there are several reasons to roll dice—that is, to use Monte Carlo methods to produce uncertainty in outcomes. Perhaps the best reason is to simulate realworld phenomena that are in fact probabilistic. Some good examples are certain types of
radar detections and the reliability of weapons systems. Epistemologically, there are few
reasons to object to such an application of probabilistic simulation.
Another reason to roll the dice is to represent the aggregate performance of complicated
systems that are at least partially dependent on human performance. If, for instance, we
assign an 80 percent probability of a hit by an antiship missile and its purely mechanical
reliability is on the order of 99 percent, the other 19 percent of uncertainty would consist of such things as operator error and, perhaps, brilliant maneuvering by the target
ship. Here, epistemologically speaking, we start to get a bit uneasy, because the moment
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probability enters into the picture, we introduce the possibility of very-low-probability
occurrences, such as the string of lucky rolls by Red just mentioned. Could such a thing
happen? Of course it could—anything is possible—but we must ask ourselves if such
an ascription of exceptional human incompetence or brilliance has any place in the
intellectual architecture of game objectives. On some level, we may accept the validity of
the knowledge produced by such simulation methodology, but the student’s complaint
haunts us: Is it a dice game or a capabilities game? To put it differently, does the introduction of Monte Carlo methodology distort the intellectual structure of the game?
We have previously asserted that it is not valid to substitute dice rolls for unmodeled
aspects of reality. Here we see one reason why—that luck in dice rolling is a special phenomenon in itself. The actual likelihood of unmodeled factors all lining up in a way that
would be represented by rolling five ones or twos in a row is likely to be far smaller than
the roughly three-in-ten-thousand odds of such a string of rolls. It would be different if
we contemplated a hundred or even a thousand iterations of the game; by looking at the
most frequent outcomes, we might then place the “outliers” in their proper perspective.
This is done in campaign analyses via computer simulations; scenarios are iterated very
many times at high speed to produce a population of results that are subject to statistical
reduction. However, most war games are conducted once, and thus the impact of outlying results arising from the peculiarity of Monte Carlo methods must be considered.
What validity should we ascribe to a web of human decisions impacted by quirky dice
rolls? From this point of view, it appears that invalid Monte Carlo methods can produce
game artifacts.
The obvious alternative to Monte Carlo simulation is deterministic calculation, using
algorithms. Playing pieces are assigned numbers to represent their capabilities on offense, defense, and perhaps other aspects of combat power. Combat-result tables based
on some predetermined formula are consulted to determine outcomes. One simply
compares offensive points to defensive points to find a ratio and enters the table with
that ratio to look up the result. Every time that ratio arises, the same result ensues. For
this methodology, game validity is a function of the accuracy with which the embedded
algorithms describe real combat interactions. In a deterministic game, neither human
idiocy nor brilliance exists, below the level of the game player; the impact of player decisions is sharply highlighted. This leads us back to the axiom that games should model
reality with as much fidelity as possible without masking the phenomena we are trying
to elucidate.
Strategy and Effects
Clausewitz extended his Kritik from the tactical and operational levels into the realm
of strategy through the device of concentric analytic rings. He undertook to analyze
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and critique the decision of Napoleon Bonaparte (then a general in the field, under
the French Directory) to make the peace of Campo Formio by examining the wider
strategic context in stages, working from narrower to wider views. In other words, he
examined the context for Napoleon’s northern Italy campaign to ascertain whether the
11
latter’s decision to make peace with the Austrians when and where he did was justified.
Such analysis might be possible in war games, but the analyst must decide whether the
strategic context of the game was established with sufficient detail and realism to stand
as a criterion for judgment. Operational-level war games are frequently accompanied
by unrealistic or truncated strategic contexts, in order to allow the fighting called for
by game objectives to take place. Assessments of operational decision quality or utility
based on such strategic criteria are likely to be invalid.
As an example, the Naval War College’s Global War Game series (played annually from
1979 until 2001) focused on rapid, operational-level decision making, supported in later
years by an advanced, networked collaboration environment and computer-analysis
12
tools. In 2000 the scenario featured a brink-of-war situation in which Blue players had
to generate high “speed of command” in the conflict’s first exchanges in order to avoid
catastrophic casualties. The national-level command apparatus was played by Control,
which assigned the role to a small cell of subject-matter experts. Pressure from the
game’s directorship resulted in quick, streamlined, and aggressive decision making by
this cell (also recall the player aggressiveness artifact mentioned previously), allowing
operational-level players to preempt and gain a smashing victory. The postgame judg13
ment was that network-enabled speed of command was a very good thing. However,
in fact, the strategic-level command apparatus context had been so unrealistic as to
invalidate any such assessment. In any case, games that incorporate detailed play at both
the strategic and operational levels are uncommon, for a number of reasons, including the practical matter that free play at the strategic level tends to constrain or disrupt
operational-level processes.
Strategic games have a long history, and they can produce knowledge as valid as that
from games at the operational and tactical levels. It is possible to explore the strategic conflict environment in order to discern relationships between factors, including
the structure of incentives that influence players. Sometimes these games are used as
background for subsequent operational-level games. If so, consistency must be achieved
between the scenarios, orders of battle, and player assumptions of the various games, or
it will not be possible to relate their outcomes to each other—they will be “apples and
oranges.” Moreover, analysts must rigorously identify artifacts in the first game in order
to prevent them from affecting player decisions or analysis in following games.
There is yet another issue related to strategic context and critical analysis that must be
considered—“effects-based operations,” or EBO. This concept, which is permeating the
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U.S. military lexicon today, has been an aspect of war gaming for the last few years. EBO
focuses on the second- and higher-order effects of military actions, with an eye toward making these actions more effective and avoiding adverse side effects, in terms of
broader purposes. At the tactical and operational levels, the prediction of battle effects is
reasonably straightforward, at least in the physical realm. Consequently, assessing wargame move outcomes when players are using EBO planning methods is fairly straightforward. Even “moral” effects at these levels are possible to assess; for instance, units
that are outflanked tend to lose cohesion, and generals faced with the cutting of main
14
supply routes can be expected to withdraw their forces to avoid encirclement. However,
at the strategic level, the degrees of freedom proliferate, and assessment of possible ef15
fects on populations and on national leaders is highly problematic. If it is difficult in
real war, as has been proven time and again, it is doubly hard in war games, which look
to an uncertain future.
There is an epistemological solution. It lies in understanding that while war games are
not crystal balls, they can highlight the relationships between factors. We could, for example, decide to explore the political terrain of war termination under given mind-sets
or policies of the enemy leadership. Game designers would “script” a set of presumed
conditions faced by enemy leadership—personal proclivities, influence distribution
among top leadership, and the like—establishing a “moral context” for strategic decision
making. Players would role-play and umpires assess strategic effects strictly within this
context. Such a game would have a chance at generating indicative information concerning, say, the relationship between the course of one’s own offensive operations and
the willingness of an enemy leadership to negotiate. Iterative gaming involving dif ferent
internal enemy conditions would at the very least prove educational.
Comparing War Games
A large military organization with a mission of experimentation and concept development once developed a system for synthesizing the data gained from multiple war games
so that it could capitalize upon the considerable investment in gaming by the services.
The key to the system was correlation; the more frequently a particular result emerged,
the more weight was ascribed to it. Epistemologically, there is potential validity to this
approach, but it was implemented in a way that had serious defects. First, the system essentially captured and digested the comments of senior and experienced subject-matter
experts who participated in the games and interpreted their results. However, that in
effect reduced games to BOGSATs; the system processed people’s opinions, not game
results (i.e., plans, decisions, and move assessments). Second, since the same senior
folks tend to be invited to games, one after another, an expert with a particular outlook
or agenda is likely to make very similar comments at each game, thus lending these
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“findings” artificial weight. It is easy enough to pick apart such a correlation system, but
less easy to establish a sound way of comparing results of different war games.
Experienced gamers, for instance, quite naturally on the basis of running many games,
derive rules of thumb and gaming techniques; also, a number of phenomena tend to occur in similar and consistent ways even in games of very different kinds. One example is
the tendency of players to “fight the scenario”—that is, to object to certain aspects of the
game’s story line, structure, or orders of battle and use these objections to hedge against
the possibility of “losing.” Such underlying commonalities with respect to game process
can lead gamers to assume that equivalent commonalities exist in terms of game substance. They believe that they can derive on that basis, in an essentially correlative way,
synthesized lessons from the substantive outputs of multiple games. But such an attempt
is intellectually unsupportable, on several grounds.
First, unless games are specifically designed to be analyzed in conjunction with other
games, there are almost certain to be differences in objectives and design so fundamental as to prevent it. For instance, imagine two games producing results that, taken
together, point to an apparent vulnerability of the littoral combat ship (LCS)—in both
games several of that ship type are sunk. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that whereas
in one game the objective was indeed to examine the utility of the LCS in littoral warfare, with consequent close attention in move assessment to ship defenses, the other was
meant to explore maritime command and control processes, with assessments focusing
on the handling of various kinds of reports and orders by the C2 system. In the latter
game, umpires in fact imposed ship losses specifically in order to generate reports and
command responses. To attach significance to the fact that several LCSs were lost in
both games distorts conclusions, since in the second game at least some of the losses
were “artificial.” This example is a bit contrived, in order to define the issue clearly; in
reality, many games appear to offer numerous opportunities for comparison, because
their methods and outputs appear comparable. Even then, however, there can exist
subtle, disabling differences.
A second reason why correlation of seemingly similar events in different games fails
at the substantive level (even inside the scenario) arises from the very nature of gaming. Games are not reality, and players are likely to do things they simply would not do
in reality. A common manifestation, as previously discussed, is inadvertently leaving
important forces unprotected, to be knocked off by the enemy. Controllers and umpires,
however, rarely identify such instances, making it almost impossible to go back after the
game and determine when this tendency was in play.
What then can be gleaned from comparing multiple games? First, we must remember
what games can reliably produce: knowledge about the nature of a warfare problem,
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such as potential flaws in a plan, the potential importance of geographic features, gaps
in command and control, logistical needs, etc. The familiar metaphor of blind men
feeling around an elephant tells us that multiple games, almost regardless of their
individual methodologies, can contribute incrementally to the understanding of a
particular warfare problem. That problem may be a specific scenario, such as a war
on the Korean Peninsula, or it may be a function, like close air support. If we avoid attaching significance to the number of times something happens, we can derive epistemologically sound knowledge. We can collect anecdotes of various game happenings,
lessons learned, and analyses, to be pieced together into a more complete, qualitative
understanding of the issue in which we are interested. In one game we may learn that
command and control arrangements for close air support are flawed, in another that
certain types of preferred weapons are in short supply. These specific outcomes can be
combined to form a picture of the “elephant.”
Listening to Whispers
Our general thrust to this point has been to identify limitations on what can be said to
have been learned from a war game. Still, there is an epistemological reason to wrest
from a game all the valid knowledge it has to offer. If it is easy to overstate what was
learned from a game, it is also easy to ignore what it did produce—all too easy, if that
information or knowledge is either subtle or somehow threatening. Such information,
being tempting to dismiss, might be called “whispers.”
We have seen that the results of a war game are in the eyes of the beholder (player or
analyst), because of conditionality. That is, game-generated knowledge, being merely
indicative in itself, must be combined with judgment in order to have useful predictive
value. But such application of judgment is rarely easy or straightforward. For example,
in war games at the Naval War College in the 1920s and ’30s, despite the repeated indications of the importance of the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall island groups—then
known as the Mandated Islands—as intermediate logistics bases in any campaign to
relieve the Philippines and defeat Japan, it took many years for the U.S. Navy to aban16
don fully the idea of mounting a direct thrust on the Philippines from Pearl Harbor.
The games, apparently, were telling officers things many did not want to hear. Conditional knowledge can be a slippery thing. Games are complex affairs that almost always
produce more information than their designers intended to generate. Moreover, game
results are often equivocal, open to interpretation.
The subjective nature of game-produced knowledge is nowhere clearer than in games
that generate information that is bureaucratically or politically threatening to players
or sponsors. It is all too easy either to ignore or put a favorable spin on game events or
results that do not fit comfortably into existing doctrines or accepted theories. A notable
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historical example of this phenomenon was a war game conducted by the Japanese
Combined Fleet staff prior to the Midway operation. Historians have made much of the
fact that the umpires resurrected a Japanese carrier that had been sunk by American aircraft operating out of Midway, citing it as evidence of “victory disease.” In fact, however,
the Japanese umpires were perfectly justified—a dice roll had given a highly improbable hit to level-flying bombers (that is, as opposed to dive-bombers), which had proven
generally ineffective in attacking ships. They were properly attempting to prevent a
capabilities game from becoming a dice game. However, at another point during the
game it was asked what would happen if an American carrier task force ambushed Vice
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s carrier force while it was raiding Midway, and that uncomfortable question seems to have been ignored. The existing plan was based on deception
and surprise, tenets and war-fighting values dear to the Imperial Japanese Navy. To acknowledge the existence of an American task force northeast of Midway in a position to
ambush Nagumo’s carriers would have been to discount the possibility of surprise. The
Japanese planners simply did not want to admit that—it would have negated their plans,
and there was no time to start again from scratch. At the very least the game should
have suggested more extensive searches in that sector, but the plan was not modified
17
even to that extent. It was easier to ignore this particular game outcome.
The “whispers” phenomenon has important implications for war-gaming policy. As the
Japanese example shows, players and sponsors are almost never objective about their
games. Games are played in a setting of institutional imperatives, such as budget justification, or the need to affirm a service’s foundational theory and doctrine (“airpower
is decisive,” “the infantryman is the ultimate strategic weapon,” and so on). Moreover,
as in the Japanese case, games may be linked in some way to imminent deadlines. All of
these factors tend to deaden ears to the whispers. But these whispers are frequently the
most important outcomes of war gaming. How can an organization increase its ability
to hear them?
The key is objective, disinterested sponsorship, or at least analysis. A sponsoring
organization (the agency that “gives,” or initiates, the game, as distinct from the facility that stages it) cannot realistically be relied upon, especially if constrained by time,
political imperatives, or the dictates of theory and doctrine, to hear whispers from its
own games. A frequent alternative is the use of civilian contractors; the difficulty is that
contractors, paid for their services and generally hoping for follow-on contracts, have a
built-in incentive, regardless of the talent or intellectual integrity of the individuals and
companies involved, to tell sponsors what they want to hear, or at least not press them to
hear whispers. Another option is academia. The service colleges frequently perform this
role, and each has a war-gaming center. These facilities, however, must have a sufficient
degree of autonomy—specifically, protection from firing of personnel or other sanctions
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for games that produce uncomfortable results. The gaming departments themselves
must incorporate a culture of rigorous intellectual objectivity and commitment to the
discipline of war gaming.
Finally, the results of war games must receive proper handling. Perhaps most importantly, the heads of sponsoring organizations must commit themselves to receiving
game results directly and personally from gaming organizations, and not after filtering
and sanitizing by their own staffs.
A Guild of War Gamers
In professional war gaming the stakes are high. Not only do games cost money and
time, but their results can influence important operational and programmatic decisions. This holds true for the business as well as military worlds. Many organizations
conduct war games, and even more consume their results, but few if any individuals
involved have rigorous understanding of whether the games produce valid knowledge.
As we have seen, it is entirely possible for games to produce valid-looking garbage. It is
not easy to distinguish error from insight; it can be accomplished only if game design,
execution, and analysis are conducted with discipline and rigor, and according to principles like those outlined here. Even then, however, wheat cannot be sifted from chaff
with consistency and confidence unless another step is taken.
War gaming is currently a craft. There are a few highly experienced and skilled game
designers and directors “out there,” and these individuals each operate by rules of
thumb they have learned over the years. Approaches vary. A large war game might
be proclaimed a success by sponsors but at the same time be criticized severely—in
private—by players, observers, and analysts. Who is right? What is missing is a universal set of standards, an accepted body of knowledge, such as established academic
disciplines possess. In the “hard” sciences, even the social sciences, there is less room
for charlatanism and sloppiness. Practitioners there have frameworks for understanding
their disciplines and becoming credentialed in them. War gaming needs the same if it is
to warrant the resources invested in holding games and the confidence routinely vested
in their results. Such a step is all the more important today in light of the changing
nature of warfare and the concomitantly receding utility of traditional force-on-force
gaming techniques. “Fourth-generation warfare” blends politics, mass media, global
information flows, culture, and religion with combat in a highly complex way; games attempting to simulate it can lead to catastrophic intellectual error if not conducted under
the aegis of a sound, overarching framework.
The substrate for founding a gaming discipline exists. The nation’s war and staff colleges all have war-gaming departments whose directors have professional contact with

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_41 Rubel:_InDesign:NP_41 17 Ch17EpistWargaming.indd December 5, 2013 10:20 AM

writing to think

239

each other and with key figures in the wider war-gaming world. Certain academic
institutions, notably the Naval Postgraduate School, teach courses in war gaming. These
organizations could come together in a “guild” of sorts to establish standards and promote the formalization and professionalization of a war-gaming discipline. This professional society, in effect, could draw members from outside the military, such as business
and academia, whose contributions would universalize standards and add vitality. The
society might publish a professional journal, with refereed articles. All this is necessary
if war-game output is to merit a level of epistemological confidence commensurate with
the uses made of it.
Valid knowledge can emerge from war games, but only if due diligence is applied. That
diligence is considerably hampered today because war gaming is a craft or an art, not
a true profession, a discipline. Much more work must be done. Those who believe in
the value of games must now link up and work toward the goal of truly professional
war gaming.
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